The negotiations conducted in recent weeks, led by US President Donald Trump between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, and with the involvement of European and NATO countries – including Germany, France, and Britain – have reached a critical point and could lead to the end of the bloody war between Russia and Ukraine.
The core of the conflict does not center solely on the question of the future of the territories occupied by Russia during the war, mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine (including Crimea, annexed in 2014), or on the status of Russian speakers living in Ukraine. The main dispute being discussed between the parties, which led Russia to launch the war, now approaching four years in length, is the issue of NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s potential full membership in the alliance.
From Russia’s perspective, Ukraine’s integration into NATO is a red line, as it would shrink Russia’s security margins and place NATO forces just tens of kilometers from Moscow. Already in 2007, at the annual Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that Russia would not stand idly by if Georgia and Ukraine were added to NATO – a step under consideration at the time.
Unlike previous rounds of NATO expansion in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Russia was forced to accept the accession of Eastern European and Baltic states to NATO, Moscow acted decisively to prevent a similar move. This was evident in its military operation against Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the invasion of Ukraine (2022).
From Ukraine’s point of view, joining NATO was and remains an essential existential step, intended to provide significant security guarantees against Russian aggression and thus deter Moscow from harming its territorial integrity and sovereignty. It should be recalled that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and Ukraine’s declaration of independence, Ukraine gave up its Cold War-era nuclear weapons stockpiles under the Budapest Memorandum, in exchange for Western guarantees that ultimately proved weak and unreliable when put to the test.
Potential agreement to end the war
According to reports, Trump’s close circle, led by the administration’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is working to devise a creative solution in which Ukraine would receive security guarantees “in the style of NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense,” which obligates alliance members to defend another member in the event of aggression.
If accepted by both Russia and Ukraine, such an arrangement would likely resemble the status quo that has prevailed in East Asia between the US, China, and Taiwan for the past 46 years, which has so far prevented large-scale military escalation between the sides.
This arrangement was founded as part of Washington’s official recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1979, at the expense of Taiwan (then the Republic of China), and was anchored in the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress that year. The act stipulated that the US would provide Taiwan with security assurances – primarily through arms sales – to enable it to defend itself, as long as Taiwan refrained from unilateral steps that could destabilize the Taiwan Strait, such as declaring independence.
Similarly, US recognition of China, which views Taiwan as part of its territory, combined with the security guarantees for Taiwan, was intended to make clear to Beijing that it too must refrain from unilateral steps such as forcibly seizing Taiwan.
Through this “policy of ambiguity” – whereby the US does not commit to directly defending Taiwan but provides it with weapons – Washington froze the dispute between China and Taiwan, allowing both sides to coexist. Taiwan maintained its sovereignty in practice while being forced to acknowledge the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese people, under the “One China” principle.
The arrangement in the East is not perfect and has been breached from time to time – for example, during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, when China fired missiles into Taiwanese territory to influence that year’s presidential election. Moreover, China’s growing power and increasing aggressiveness around Taiwan and in East Asia, coupled with its repeated declarations that reunification with Taiwan will be achieved – peacefully or by force – could collapse the arrangement in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the status quo has had many advantages and allowed China, Taiwan, and other Asia-Pacific countries – such as the Philippines and Japan – to maintain relative peace and economic prosperity for nearly half a century.
A similar status quo existed in northern Europe from the end of World War II until the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, when Finland refrained from joining NATO. Despite its clear aspiration to be part of the Western bloc, Finland adopted a wise and balanced approach that reduced the incentive for Russia to invade its territory. This not only preserved Finnish independence and sovereignty but also enabled Finland to become one of the world’s most prosperous and developed democracies.
It therefore seems that the Americans and their European allies are seeking to establish in Ukraine a Finland/Taiwan-style arrangement – one that would allow all sides to achieve only half their desires, but which could end the war and prevent future military conflict.
Under the emerging arrangement, Ukraine would receive real security guarantees – not under NATO’s Article 5 – but sufficient to ensure its sovereignty and independence against potential Russian aggression. In parallel, NATO’s eastward expansion would, for now, be halted – something Russia perceives as a top national security risk.
If such an arrangement is reached and ends the war, Ukraine would be able to rebuild its economy and infrastructure, both of which have been severely damaged during the fighting.
More importantly, despite the heavy cost and territorial losses, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience and military innovation, despite its fundamental inferiority to Russia. It could then seek, like Taiwan, to establish a strategic partnership with the US.
Such a partnership would need to be backed by legislation or an executive order, ensuring a steady supply of US weapons and comprehensive political, military, intelligence, technological, and economic cooperation.
In this way, the US would not be required to directly defend Ukraine or risk American soldiers in a potential nuclear confrontation with Russia, a scenario that would likely satisfy Trump’s electorate and the president himself, who seeks to implement his “America First” policy and win the Nobel Peace Prize.