Purges, investigations in China’s PLA: Is Xi preparing for war or weakening the army? - opinion

Since the beginning of his term in 2012, Xi has been raising the banner of the war on corruption and leading a broad and ongoing campaign to purge the ranks of the party and the military of corrupt people, from petty “flies” to senior “tigers,” with about 200,000 officials ousted since.

The party views corruption as a serious threat to good governance, its control of the country, its reputation, and its legitimacy in the public. Corruption in the Chinese military has been a long-standing phenomenon, during which many cases have been publicized involving bribery in exchange for promotion in rank and position, or in the framework of contracts and deals in force buildup.

Zhang, who previously served as head of the Armaments Department, which is responsible for force buildup in the military, is suspected of appointing in exchange for bribes Defense Minister Li Shangfu, also a member of the commission who was purged.

The obvious risks of corruption are damage to the quality of the military through unprofessional appointments, as well as its readiness, such as in the missile units, where due to corruption water instead of fuel was discovered.

According to reports, Zhang is suspected of “building cliques and networks” of influence, undermining the authority of its chairman, his leadership over the army, and the party’s unity. Seventy-five-year-old Zhang is a veteran officer and senior party member; a member of the political bureau, the second-most important forum in the party’s leadership; and one of the party’s “princes,” who are the sons of its founding senior officials.

Zhang’s father, also a general, fought in the civil war that ended in 1949, alongside his friend, Xi Jinping’s father. Zhang himself fought in Vietnam since 1979, in China’s last war to date.

If during the Cultural Revolution the “Reds” – loyal to Mao Zedong – were preferred over professionals, it seems that Xi also attaches the utmost importance to personal loyalty to him, even at the expense of military experience, even with old friends like Zhang, one of Xi’s closest confidants until his ouster.

The current commission initially consisted of seven members, including a chairman, two deputies, and four members. After the dismissals, only two remain – Chairman Xi and his new vice chairman, Zhang Shengmin, a political officer and disciplinary supervisor who helps him purge the ranks of the military of corruption.

Some see this as a “stable-cleaning” after Xi concluded that the current generation of officers, all of whom were appointed during his rule, is the root of the problem. Others see this as preparation for the appointment of a new generation of senior commanders, loyal to the leader and lacking deep-rooted status and networking. Therefore, it is likely these younger officers will find it difficult to stand up to Xi when making decisions, or to update him with bad news and grim information.

This process could affect Taiwan, whose reunification with China is a core goal of Xi’s party. On the one hand, a weakened or young commission would make it easier for Xi to make decisions without resistance. On the other hand, he will have to overcome the obvious doubts – will the extensive purges in the military not leave a significant vacuum, like the purges in Joseph Stalin’s Red Army in the years before Nazi Germany’s invasion?

Finally, there are those who see the recent dismissals in the context of Xi’s future in the leadership of the party, whose 21st congress next year will determine his future: whether for a fourth term or for other options, such as appointing a successor, which is currently unapparent.