Donald Trump reimagines Israel's border with Syria, from buffer zones to bunny slopes

Try this one on for size: turning Mount Hermon – on both sides of the Israeli-Syrian border – into the Aspen of the East, equipped with ski lifts, snowmaking machines, and tens of thousands of winter tourists enjoying Druze hospitality in southern Syria.

With Witkoff and Kushner involved, there is no problem that cannot be solved – at least theoretically – through real estate development.

Intractable issue in Gaza? Turn it into valuable beachfront property.

Got to get the Russians and Ukrainians to agree about Donbas? First, turn it into a joint economic corridor with power plants, industrial parks, and housing reconstruction.

And regarding that little issue between Jerusalem and Damascus – namely, IDF occupation of a large swath of land inside Syria to keep Israel’s border safe, and the Syrians demanding control of that land back – split the difference and turn it into a blossoming economic zone.

All of this reflects an emerging Trump administration pattern on border conflicts: freeze the fighting, take the disputed territory out of active military contention, and use economic incentives to stabilize the situation – with the expectation that this can eventually open the door to a broader peace deal.

While, at first glance, it seems easy to mock the idea of turning southern Syria into a tourist hot spot, on second glance, the logic behind it makes it worth a second look.

Two weeks ago, at a press conference at Mar-a-Lago alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump was asked if the two leaders had reached an understanding regarding Syria. Trump’s response was, well, Trumpian:

“With Syria, you know, the new president – I respect him, he is a very strong guy, that’s what you need in Syria. You can’t put a choirboy – somebody who is a perfect person, everything is nice, no problems in life – you have the opposite there. He is a strong guy, we get along with him great.”

After praising Ahmed al-Sharaa for the cooperation in responding to the December attack that killed two US servicemen in Syria which Washington blamed on ISIS, Trump went on: “I’m sure that Israel and him will get along. I will make it so that they do get along.”

A few days later, after an impasse of some two months in security talks that reportedly had hit a dead end, the two sides met under US supervision in Paris, where the guns-into-skis plan was discussed. Whether or not it all pans out, the fact that the sides were discussing economic and civil issues, not just security arrangements, was in itself a new and refreshing twist.

Israelis have long dreamt about eating hummus in Damascus as part of a comprehensive peace deal with Syria. That kind of peace still looks distant, but an interim agreement that could one day make it possible to sip hot chocolate in a lodge at the base of a bunny hill on the Syrian half of Mount Hermon is something that may be within reach.

The immediate issue is the area the IDF moved into after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in November of 2024. Not only did it take over the demilitarized zone between the two countries, but it also pushed forward eastward beyond that, building several IDF outposts.

Netanyahu made clear, during the press conference with Trump, the rationale for the move. “We want to make sure the border area right next to our border is safe, we don’t have terrorists [there], we don’t have attacks, and we also want to secure our Druze friends.”

What Netanyahu articulated there briefly was essentially an updated Israeli security doctrine. After October 7, it is no longer enough to have a fence or wall along borders. Rather, a buffer zone is preferred on the other side that will be free of terrorists.

This is the doctrine in Gaza, where any eventual arrangement there will include a belt, around a kilometer wide, along the border with Israel that will be a no-man’s-zone. Why? To keep the terrorists from using that area, as they did on October 7, to launch an attack across the border and overwhelm Israeli defenses.

In Lebanon as well, Israel wants a buffer zone along the border, south of the Litani, without Hezbollah presence.

And nowhere is this needed more than on the Golan.

In a post-October 7 reality, and a post-Assad reality, the fear is that jihadists will move into what was once a sacrosanct demilitarized zone – the Assads, with all their faults, kept that area clear, at least until the Iranians moved into Syria en masse during the civil war.

The fear is that with Assad’s fall and Sharaa’s rise to power, Damascus will no longer feel bound by the 1974 disengagement agreement, allowing actors inimical to Israel’s interests – Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad – to move into or near the demilitarized zone, from where they could one day mount October 7-style attacks against Israeli communities on the Golan Heights.

To prevent that, Jerusalem believes a buffer zone is needed. And here is where things get dicey, because while Israel is demanding a buffer zone, the US is saying all that is required is a demilitarized zone. What’s the difference?

Israel wants to keep IDF forces inside the buffer zone and have it serve as a forward defense belt with unilateral freedom of action to hit threats without needing international approval. In practice, this means a miles-deep strip of Syrian territory where Damascus’s sovereignty is heavily curtailed, and Syrian forces are simply not allowed in at all.

The Syrians, obviously, are not crazy about the idea, and their position has fallen on sympathetic ears in Washington, which wants to see Sharaa stabilize the country. Up until now, the US vision has been a more classical demilitarized zone – a sovereign area in Syria where both sides agree to troop and weapons limitations, and there is likely third-party monitoring.

For Washington, the key is a stable, internationally supervised quiet border that helps Sharaa consolidate the state; for Israel, the key is a physical Israeli-controlled cushion so that October 7-style surprises cannot build up right on the fence. The former prioritizes restored Syrian sovereignty plus monitoring; the latter prioritizes Israeli boots on the ground and guns between any hostile actor and the Golan communities.

And it is into this mix that the whole economic plan is inserted. The buffer, which will be demilitarized, will be filled with cooperative economic projects, not necessarily IDF soldiers.

According to various reports on the proposal, it will include, in addition to a ski resort, a wind power plant, a crude oil pipeline, data centers, and pharmaceutical facilities.

Channel 12’s Amit Segal reported that the offer would give Syria roughly $4 billion in GDP growth – a 20% increase over its current output – along with an 800-megawatt boost in power capacity, 15,000 new jobs, and a 40% reduction in pharmaceutical dependency.

Barrack summed up the idea by saying that “under the leadership and inspiration of Trump, prioritizing economic opportunity, prosperity, and open dialogue consistently leads to meaningful and long-term cooperation.”

Following the two-day talks in Paris, the US, Israel, and Syria issued a rare joint communiqué that described “productive discussions” aimed at pursuing “lasting security and stability” arrangements that respect Syria’s sovereignty and unity, Israel’s security, and the prosperity of both countries.

The language was careful and calibrated, balancing repeated references to Syria’s sovereignty with equally explicit nods to Israel’s security and mutual prosperity, while avoiding any mention of borders, withdrawals, or timetables.

The language was also vague, talking about the establishment of a “fusion mechanism” under US supervision to “facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities.”

A “fusion mechanism” is security jargon for an air traffic control-like mechanism for a volatile border – a standing system meant to prevent collisions, manage incidents, and keep misunderstandings from spiraling into escalation. In other words, a deconfliction mechanism.