‘The number one problem is that there are people who hate us. And the second thing is that people don’t know what’s happening or are missing the information,” said Lt.-Col. Nadav Shoshani, the IDF’s international spokesperson, who had been Israel’s face to international media for the past year and a half.
He noted that when it comes to the haters, the IDF can’t do much; but when it comes to those who are misinformed, Israel can bring them the correct information. “In Gaza City, I brought senior reporters or people who have millions of followers. I did briefings about why we are doing [what we are doing],” he said.
Israel has faced a complex, multi-front war over the past two years. One of the fronts has been the information war. The IDF has various spokespeople who have handled this front. These include Shoshani and his predecessor, Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, who was the international spokesperson when the conflict began. I sat down with Shoshani to learn about how he handled the war and what lessons have been learned.
“This has been a long and hard war and in many cases, our successes are the cases you don’t hear about,” he said. What he meant is that there were cases in the war where Israel had to respond to accusations, such as when Hamas falsely claimed that Israel struck the Ahli Hospital in Gaza City on October 17, 2023, soon after the Oct. 7 massacre.
There are also cases where Israel was able to be preemptive in the information war. “Every day we wake up, and it’s crisis management mode. You hear sometimes about various crises. Hamas wakes up and thinks how it can cause a crisis.”
Israel is thus often on the back foot in a sense, forced to respond to a plethora of lies regarding its conduct in Gaza. The Jewish state also faces a complex challenge because of how it has to handle public relations in the war. The officer noted that when the IDF conducts an operation, the spokespeople will come in after the battle.
Hamas will send in its information warriors first, in the sense that the terrorist group has a plan to make Israel look bad, and then sees how it can execute that plan. “Hamas wakes up and thinks how it can carry out a PR war against us.”
Israel faces an uphill battle. “Hamas doesn’t play fair. It isn’t held to a standard, but news outlets use the info it provides.” He said, “As the saying goes, ‘A lie makes its way halfway around the world before the truth puts its pants on’ – and our job is to put on our pants faster and be preemptive. We look at it as an operation.”
The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
Israel’s IDF Spokesperson’s Unit is a large operation with many branches and offices. It has public diplomacy soldiers and also a social media and press desk. It worked with thousands of journalists in the war, Shoshani said. The military was deeply involved in the screenings of the footage from the Oct. 7 atrocities. These horrific scenes were initially shown to select groups of people after the attack. Some of the people watched the film virtually, others in person at screenings in Israel and elsewhere.
He said that the IDF has a social media reach of around five billion, and that around 250,000 people came to Israel during the war and received briefings linked to the IDF. The military arranged for people to receive briefings in areas near the Gaza border and also in northern Israel during the conflict with Hezbollah.
The IDF was often involved in visits that took place, for instance when Elon Musk or Steve Witkoff visited the border area near Gaza. The IDF did this in cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and other state agencies. “Every night, I go through texts of those trying to reach [our] people. People reach out via social media or telephones. We also use Telegram and social media. I get calls from all around the world,” Shoshani said.
The new international spokesperson
Shoshani had finished his IDF service in 2022 and was working with former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eizenkot, who was a politician in the Knesset. “On October 3, 2023, I had decided to become an independent consultant. I had wanted to open a business,” he recounted.
But, like many millions of Israelis, his life changed on Oct. 7. As a reservist, he was called up along with hundreds of thousands and became a spokesperson for the Navy. Several months into the war, he received a call from IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari about taking over as international spokesperson. “After thinking about it, I said yes and re-drafted a second time.”
That was the spring of 2024. Shoshani had to guide Israel through the difficult period of 2024 and 2025: much of the war. He said that much has changed in terms of how Israel responds and also how the information war is waged. He compared it to being a goalie in soccer and facing 10 kicks toward the goal in a few minutes. The speed of news has changed. He said the IDF did around 4,500 interviews during the war with spokespeople at the rank of major and above to help counter the misinformation.
“There were a few low points in the war,” he said. One of these centered on the claims of famine and starvation in Gaza. It should be recalled that during the war, Israel often faced the accusation that there was starvation in the Gaza Strip.
In February 2024, images showed hundreds of desperate Gazans trying to get food from humanitarian aid trucks. This caused the Biden administration to send a floating pier to Gaza. The pier didn’t work, but it prodded Israel to open up new ways for aid to reach Gaza from northern Gaza. Later, after March 2025, Israel cut off aid completely to the embattled coastal enclave. Even when the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation began work in May, Israel faced pressure to increase aid.
Shoshani said Israel dealt with the concerns by bringing reporters into IDF-controlled areas of Gaza to show them how aid was piling up. The IDF’s COGAT unit (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) was dealing with making sure that aid was entering Gaza. “We had a mechanism of bringing reporters to debunk the lies. We also brought in influencers. We brought [people] in every week to show the food stocking up inside Gaza.”
The info battle for Rafah
Another issue Israel faced in 2024 was the looming battle of Rafah. It should be recalled that the IDF initially fought in northern Gaza from October to December of that year before entering central Gaza between December 2024 and April 2025.
Many Gazans had been asked to flee south toward Rafah, leaving a huge number of people in the southern Gaza city near the Egyptian border. When the IDF signaled it wanted to go into Rafah, there was pushback from the international community. The argument was that the million or more people there had nowhere to go. However, the reality was that the IDF had left areas in northern Gaza and Khan Yunis, and the people could begin to go back to central Gaza.
“Rafah was one of the biggest international stories for months,” Shoshani said. “The decision was made to go into Rafah. People thought it would be a huge mess in public opinion. When needed, we were ready to handle the crisis. I think all in all, the operation went smoothly in the public opinion way. We prepared for information on Hamas in Rafah. When we found any piece of proof [of terrorism], such as the rocket launchers in the Philadelphi Corridor,” we shared it.
The IDF held briefings, and Shoshani sought to be “transparent, accurate, open, and active.” This focus on transparency and truth was something he sought to stick to throughout the war.
From coordinating field access for reporters to countering disinformation, Shoshani described a campaign that unfolded across multiple fronts – military, diplomatic, and digital – with a goal of showing the world what Israel was doing and why.
“People were worried about how it would be perceived,” he recalled. “There was one incident where we carried out a strike against Hamas members in a tent. They were hiding with munitions, and people were killed in nearby tents.
We did everything to bring all the visuals.” That effort required close cooperation between senior commanders and communication units. “We held a press conference in English with [IDF spokesperson] Hagari showing what happened and why it happened,” Shoshani said. “We did a Zoom with public diplomacy people who wanted to speak on our behalf but needed the information.”
For Shoshani, Rafah became an example of how operational success and effective communication could align. “We were able to operate successfully in Rafah, and eventually [Oct. 7 mastermind Yahya] Sinwar was eliminated,” he said. “We also showed in real time the things we found – rocket launchers, for example.”
Aftermath of tragedy
The IDF’s efforts to bring transparency extended to the aftermath of tragedy. “We had six hostages murdered in Rafah, and we brought in 20 international reporters to show Hamas having a tunnel under a children’s bedroom,” Shoshani explained. “That was impactful. We brought reporters, did social media – it works systematically. Success is when we can do something operationally and without Hamas succeeding. Rafah is a great success.”
He said Gaza City had similar potential. “We were able to begin operating there, and people understood,” he said. “I feel very at peace at night about being a spokesperson for this military. There are things that are not perfect. This is an army that has a purpose and works according to procedures and values and [fights] a just war in a just way.”
Shoshani noted that those who take the time to engage directly tend to come away with a different perspective. “Every time someone took a close look, they understood,” he said. “I have yet to meet someone who came, saw our story with their own eyes, and came away thinking it was unjust. I’ve had difficult conversations, and people understand what we are doing and why.”
According to the current spokesperson, explaining the IDF’s actions in Gaza City required both clarity and consistency. “We explained why we have to operate in Gaza City. We explained what we are doing,” he said. “We gave civilians a warning and the elements of surprise to give civilians a way to leave out of harm’s way.”
The humanitarian dimension was also part of the message. “We had a program alongside COGAT of tents and humanitarian aid going in – the same as we did in Rafah,” Shoshani said. “I believe we are fighting a just war in a just way. The struggle is to reach as many people as possible.”
Fighting misinformation
Shoshani described two main challenges in shaping international perception: hostility and misinformation. “The number one problem is that there are people who hate us,” he reiterated. “And the second thing is that people don’t know what’s happening or are missing the information. People who hate us, I can’t do much about, but a lot of people are misinformed.”
In response, he worked to bring credible voices to the field. “In Gaza City, I brought senior reporters or people who have millions of followers,” he said. “I did briefings about why we are doing it. It’s not pleasant to warn people and have them move, but we did everything we could to get civilians out of harm’s way. We did everything to prevent death to civilians. Serious journalists understood that.”
Shoshani also addressed questions about how the IDF handles casualty numbers and data coming from the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. “People ask what’s true,” he said. “When Hamas makes up something, I can say it’s not true. I have to only say an alternative number if I have it; we have a process of identifying the terrorists who were killed or civilians who were killed. For us, the solution is to have a process.”
He noted that IDF teams examined the Gaza Health Ministry’s published spreadsheets. “They put out Excel sheets with names, and we found problems with them,” he said. “Some people wrote pieces about it. We did do the work. We would put out an alternative number if we had it, but not just because they said it.”
The spokesperson rejected accusations that Israel’s campaign amounted to genocide. “That is nonsense,” he said. “A lot of people die in war. But all the experts and generals, when they come and look at our actions – when they see us taking every feasible step to prevent harm to uninvolved civilians – they understand.”
He recounted one visit that left an impression. “I had an encounter with a senior editor, and I took him to see the people who are in charge of warning the population – the people who operate drones to see if a clothesline has new laundry on it,” he said. “We are a desert country and we are transferring water. I’ve seen operations halted because it is too dangerous for civilians.”
Counting the costs
When asked about the estimated number of terrorists killed in Gaza, Shoshani said there were established methods. “There are ways to count casualties. One is via ground troops [providing information about casualties], and another is by intelligence,” he said. “We have estimates; the last was more than 20,000 combatants.”
This illustrates the complexity of Gaza. Intelligence can only provide so much information. It can try to rely on what Hamas might be saying internally or come up with estimates. Ground troops doing body counts isn’t a perfect method either, a lesson learned in Vietnam when US commanders were asked to send back body counts, a tactic that didn’t lead to winning the war.
In Gaza, a complex urban environment where the IDF is fighting an enemy that often swaps uniforms for civilian clothes, there are many challenges. Shoshani acknowledged the difficulties. “There is the issue of cross-referencing with intelligence,” he said. “A lot of it is difficult. Hamas is very unique as a terrorist group. Hezbollah would put out data. It’s difficult. Hamas is trying to prevent us from knowing.”
The IDF put out detailed figures on enemy losses in the first year of war, but then these quarterly estimates appeared to end. Interest in military briefings had naturally fluctuated, he said. “After Oct. 7, there was a huge presence in Israel and a huge interest,” Shoshani said. “There was a lot of interest in the first half year of war. There was a process, and it has been consistent. We are always trying to do the maximum. There is less interest as time goes on. I used to give briefings almost every day in Rafah and also in Gaza City.”
Another controversy has been the inability of foreign journalists to access all of Gaza. The IDF has provided some embeds, but in many cases journalists have had difficulty covering the war. The question of journalist access to Gaza, Shoshani said, remained complex. “There are journalists in Gaza – they may be connected to Hamas or not like Israel. I’d rather have international reporters,” he explained. “There is a lot to benefit. I do embeds as much as I can. One [issue] is operational reasons and a government decision.”
He mentioned that access around the so-called Yellow Line continues under similar constraints. “We do embeds, and I have one tomorrow,” he said. “Beyond that, it’s about government and operational issues — not up to us.” Since Shoshani spoke to the Magazine, there have been numerous journalists from major media who have visited parts of the IDF positions near the Yellow Line.
The social media front
Shoshani acknowledged that modern warfare requires mastering new forms of communication. “Social media is the best way to speak to people – not through mediators,” he said. “We have invested a lot in social media. In our unit, it’s not this or that, it’s both. I have a social media team and hasbara [public diplomacy]. They work with people who are not listed as journalists. It’s important.”
He said that today, many people consume information from independent creators rather than traditional media. “People consume information from people who are not journalists or who are independent journalists,” he said. “In the war with Iran, I remember that within an hour I did a live show on TikTok, also with CNN, and an interview with Mario Nawfal – and people told me they had watched Nawfal. I want to play on all the fields; I want to speak to anyone who wants to hear me.”
At the same time, he said there are limits. “It is my job to be aware of it,” he noted. “I wouldn’t go to someone who is a Holocaust denier or who curses.” Shoshani described the information struggle as ongoing and intense. “I don’t lose sleep over whether the war is just,” he said. “I lose sleep over our future because we are in an uphill battle. There are forces and money against us – fake news, for instance. Our job is to stay relevant in 2025. If I used the same tools, then I wouldn’t be doing my job.”
He acknowledged the trade-offs of engaging beyond traditional journalism. “There are pros and cons to working with people who are not old-school journalists,” he said. “We have to play the game to put our message out.”
The Iran war and strategic communication
Reflecting on Israel’s confrontation with Iran, Shoshani said it was a test of both operational and communication preparedness. “In the planning of the strike, I was fortunate to be in the know about it,” he said. “We understood that it was going to be a complex war. We saw the necessity and understood we would operate against it. We didn’t go into the war because we thought it would be easy but because it was necessary.”
He said Israeli officials anticipated the global reaction. “We were thinking about scenarios of a heavy toll on civilians in Israel or pilots downed,” he explained. “Also, we discussed the issue of the world being against us. We prepared for that by explaining the intentions of Iran. We had intelligence declassified and other statements.”
Shoshani said hundreds of interviews and social media appearances helped make Israel’s case. “We were successful in telling our story. The world didn’t know how big a threat Iran was. It could have become a situation where they didn’t believe us or were against us operating there. We were able to communicate that by working with other organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the public diplomacy apparatus. We got the world’s support. The US joined in, and the world understood it was a just and necessary war.”
He said the best successes often went unnoticed at home. “The good situations are the ones where the Israeli public doesn’t know that they could have been a controversy,” he added.
Information flotillas
Asked about recent flotillas headed toward Gaza, Shoshani described how the IDF treated them as information operations. There were several flotillas during the war, one of them involving dozens of sailboats that arrived around the time of Yom Kippur 2025. Others involved a smaller number of vessels.
Several celebrities joined the pro-Gaza or anti-Israel excursions. “We understood that their number one purpose was to get attention and get us bad PR,” he said. “They wanted soldiers to be aggressive. They admitted that their goal wasn’t to bring aid in but to get attention.”
The spokesperson said the Israeli Navy trained troops carefully. Shoshani worked closely with the Navy prior to coming to his current position, so he knows its professionalism well. “Our Navy prepared the troops in the best way possible – how to be polite and speak in English. We involved as many women as possible,” he said. “Everything was filmed because we understood that they would lie. We put cameras in every place. For instance, in the first flotilla, we had given Greta [Thunberg] a sandwich.”
That approach reversed the traditional order of operations and media management. “We approached this as a media operation and then called in the operations people – instead of having the operation and then having PR,” he explained. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all organizations in Israel were part of it. They did it in a ‘boring’ way, without violence. We had every second [recorded] on camera.”
The takeaway, he said, was clear. Israel has learned the lessons from the raid on the Mavi Marmara in 2010, in which 10 Turkish activists were killed when IDF soldiers fast-roped from helicopters onto the deck of a large ship the activists were sailing to Gaza. “The main conclusion from the Marmara is that we have the means to put out what happened [quickly] and not a day later,” Shoshani said. “There were many flotillas [during the Gaza war]. Some people didn’t even hear about them – that is success.”
Technology and accuracy
Shoshani also addressed criticism about the IDF’s use of visual material. “We use a mix of real [visuals] and illustrations,” he said. “We do our best to make it presentable. Illustrations are illustrations – that happens.”
He cited one example. “There is a video of Hezbollah with a huge missile in a house, and there is an illustration based on intel, and we write on it that it is illustrative,” he said. “It is combined with real images and videos and based on intel.”
When Israeli forces later entered Lebanon, the findings validated their claims. “A week or two after the ground operation, we found things that were much bigger and much worse,” he said. “Hagari found fridges and motorcycles in tunnels.” The findings were actually larger than the infographics.
The war in Gaza and on other fronts has been extremely complex. Israel’s IDF Spokesperson’s Unit has faced an unprecedented challenge over a long period of time. Unlike previous, shorter wars, this was a marathon in the information war. There were learning curves. There were also clear choices made to try to tap into the new media and the way in which some independent commentators or influencers are able to speak directly to audiences.
Whether this was a success may rest in the eye of the beholder.
Considering the challenge and the uphill struggle Israel always faces, there is no doubt that the IDF was able to preempt many crises. On the other hand, many people will still feel that the Jewish state could have done a better job getting information into the hands of the public.
There will also be questions about how the IDF dealt with media during the war: from how it gave press conferences to how it decided whom to invite on embeds to Gaza. All of this will be debated as time goes on and the war fades from a current conflict into a ceasefire.