State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman on Tuesday issued a report blaming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to decide on an official national security strategy leading into the October 7 disaster.
Englman gave credit to Netanyahu for trying in 2009 and 2017-2018 to make the national security decision-making process more professional, including by empowering a larger National Security Council, but then said the prime minister fell short.
After multiple runs at crafting a national security strategy, the comptroller said Netanyahu ultimately failed to follow through and have the government or the Knesset adopt such a strategy, which would be clear and binding for the whole political and defense apparatus.
According to Englman, the absence of such a strategy was a serious contributor to being blindsided by Hamas’s invasion on October 7.
The report said it “raises a multi-year failure during which the political echelon did not exercise its responsibility to ensure that the State of Israel was ready for the changing security challenges based on a concrete, updated, and formally approved national security concept.
State Comptroller blames Netanyahu's security strategy for Oct. 7 blindside
“In this situation, the ability of the political echelon to direct the IDF and the other defense agencies based on a long-term strategic vision, to challenge them and to conduct proper oversight and criticism of them was seriously defective, and in some cases, was nonexistent,” warned the comptroller.
Next, the report stated that Netanyahu, “who initiated the drafting of a national security concept for the State of Israel during the years 2017-2018 and acted to try to inculcate it [within the state’s agencies] did not finish what he started and did not bring the national security concept for the State of Israel [forward] for an official approval and did not reach any binding decisions to a lay a foundation for implementing the concept.”
Likewise, the prime minister did not carry out any “changes to the country’s priorities, nor were any noticeable new budgets added for security needs in place of other needs, this despite the importance and necessity he himself recognized” of doing so.
As such, Englman stated that Netanyahu, “did not exercise his responsibility on the issue [of national security] and the concept was left with no ability to actualize it and no binding authority.”
Although Englman has already published 15 reports relating to October 7, this is his first report going to the most sensitive core issues of the responsibility for either the prime minister, the IDF, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), or the police for failing to prevent Hamas’s disastrous invasion of Israel’s South.
Englman announced he would probe on October 7 as early as January 2024 when it was clear to him that no state commission of inquiry was in the works (Netanyahu had and continues to oppose such a commission).
He has or is reviewing 60 different issues, covering over 200 agencies, but some of his reports, especially regarding the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the prime minister, were delayed by fights with top officials.
Former IDF chief Herzi Halevi and much of the Israeli opposition still regard Englman as an arm of Netanyahu’s defense apparatus, expecting that his overall findings will artificially place more of the blame on the defense establishment for October 7.
In that sense, Englman’s report on Tuesday appeared to be somewhat of a declaration of independence from Netanyahu and a readiness to criticize the prime minister.
On the other hand, the criticism will not be seen by Netanyahu’s harshest critics as sufficient, as it is still phrased in terms of failing his responsibility to oversee or second-guess the broader failure by the IDF, Shin Bet, and police to do their jobs.
There was no criticism in the report of the idea that Netanyahu – with or without a formal binding national security strategy – was a primary architect of the de facto strategy of seeking to contain and deter Hamas in Gaza, as opposed to other strategies.
Other strategies suggested over the years ranged from re-conquering Gaza, to carrying out a much bigger operation in 2014 or 2021 to topple Hamas and hand control of Gaza over to third parties to pushing forward harder with peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to better isolate Hamas and reduce its support among all Palestinians.
The comptroller generally responds to such criticism, citing his limited mandate to evaluate official documents and policies, as opposed to a wider mandate that a state inquiry might have.
Englman still said he supports a state inquiry, but that at least his report is highlighting failures that are within his mandate and that can now be addressed and corrected.
His future reports are expected to excoriate Halevi, former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, and other defense officials, likely in harsher language than his current report on Netanyahu.
Even this report did not limit criticism to Netanyahu, with Englman also taking aim at Naftali Bennett, who was prime minister from June 2021 to June 2022, and at the various National Security Council chiefs from 2008-2023.
According to the comptroller, Bennett made the same mistake as Netanyahu in failing to define a set national security strategy and make it binding.
Further, the report said that Bennett, like Netanyahu, did not want to face accountability for defining in a more concrete way which aspects of Israel’s national security were higher or lower priority – part of the required process for setting a binding strategy.
Top officials interviewed by the comptroller for the report said that making such decisions was politically risky for officials like Netanyahu or Bennett.
In addition, the report slammed essentially all of the National Security Council chiefs for not pressing mostly Netanyahu, but also for one year Bennett, hard enough to make these politically risky, but security-wise critical, decisions.
Englman said that concerns about political consequences could not be used to avoid decisions that are needed to avoid the next October 7 disaster.
At press time, multiple spokespeople for Netanyahu had not yet responded.
The Jerusalem Post contacted some former national security council chiefs who did not want to respond.
Englman’s report comes a day after former IDF major-general Sami Turgeman issued his report criticizing 20% of the military-focused probes of October 7 performed under former IDF chief Halevi as deficient.