State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman on Wednesday issued a sharp critique of the Transportation Ministry’s preparedness for the aviation crisis that followed the outbreak of war on October 7, calling on Transportation Minister Miri Regev to correct the failures and prepare emergency plans without delay, according to a report published by his office.
In the report, Englman found that at the start of the Israel-Hamas war, neither the Transportation Ministry, the Civil Aviation Authority, nor the National Security Council had a procedure for prioritizing the return of Israelis stranded abroad based on their importance to the economy or national needs.
According to the report, even soldiers and reservists who received emergency call-up orders were forced to search for flights and pay high prices in order to return urgently to Israel.
Englman nevertheless praised the Civil Aviation Authority and Israel’s airlines for continuing to operate during the crisis. He said the authority worked to preserve regular air services that kept Israel connected to the world, and said the Israeli carriers proved they could function under complex wartime conditions.
At the same time, the report points to broad state failures in handling civil aviation during emergencies, despite Ben-Gurion Airport remaining operational for most of the war.
The comptroller said these shortcomings underscored the need for long-term planning, clearer chains of authority, and a broader national aviation policy for both routine periods and wartime.
The comptroller recommended that Israel formulate a comprehensive aviation policy based on a strategic, long-term view for both normal times and emergencies. He said the policy should ensure that Israeli airlines continue to operate during crises in line with the state’s essential national interests, while also regulating ties among the state, civilian aviation, military aviation, and air cargo services.
Englman also directed criticism at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying the Transportation Ministry and the Planning Administration must move quickly to advance a complementary airport to Ben-Gurion, and that the prime minister must ensure a decision is made and implemented promptly.
He added that recent missile fire from Iran and Lebanon during Operation Roaring Lion made it even clearer that state authorities must ensure the aviation system can function properly during emergencies.
The report said the wars and operations of recent years showed that Israel’s civil aviation system was not properly prepared for a prolonged conflict.
It recommended that the Transportation and Finance ministries review the state’s legal and regulatory tools, including the state’s “golden share” in El Al and broader aviation legislation, in order to define operating arrangements, economic support mechanisms, and the role of Israeli carriers in future emergencies.
A second airport as a strategic necessity
The report describes a second airport as a strategic necessity for Israel, both because of growing passenger traffic and the country’s security realities. It notes that nearly 28 years have passed since the government decided to establish an airport to complement Ben-Gurion, yet years of disputes over location and timing have left the project unbuilt.
According to the comptroller, the state’s continued dependence on Ben-Gurion alone during emergencies could harm both civilian and military aviation. He said the Iron Swords war and subsequent military operations highlighted the need for an alternative airport, and found that while Ramon Airport had been prepared to serve as a backup to Ben-Gurion, it was not used that way during the war.
Englman added that Israel’s other airports, including Haifa, Herzliya, and Rosh Pina, are not equipped to absorb the full range of services currently concentrated at Ben-Gurion. He said that if Ben-Gurion were hit directly or if missile fire around it intensified, Israel could effectively find itself without a viable aerial exit route from the country.
The comptroller also criticized the government for failing to use the leverage it had built through past support for Israeli airlines, including during the coronavirus period, to secure emergency powers over their operations in future crises. According to the report, the state had no real ability to intervene in ticket prices or instruct Israeli airlines to add flights during the emergency, despite having a golden share in El Al and authority to define essential national interests by order.
The report further said that the Transportation Ministry, the Consumer Protection Authority, and the Competition Authority failed to act effectively to moderate airfares.
It found that flights were not added to the list of essential goods subject to price controls during emergencies, that competition enforcement was slow, and that the Transportation Ministry had no program to support passengers stranded abroad or those who did not receive refunds for canceled flights.
Most foreign airlines halted service during the war, leaving hundreds of thousands of Israelis abroad struggling to return home while also limiting outbound travel from Israel. As demand surged, Israeli carriers adapted by adding alternative destinations and flight paths, but the imbalance in supply and demand sent ticket prices sharply upward.
The main beneficiaries were Israel’s airlines, especially El Al, which was left in an almost exclusive position after many foreign carriers suspended flights to and from Israel. According to the report, while the total number of passengers in 2024 fell by 34% compared with 2023, El Al carried 6,590,451 passengers in 2024, more than one million above its 2023 figure of 5,539,127, an increase of about 19%, while its operating profit rose to $772.2 million. Israir and Arkia also posted major passenger growth, according to the report.
Officials in the Transportation Ministry dismissed the criticism as outdated, arguing that much time had passed since the 2023-2024 crisis and that reality had changed since the report was drafted. However, it also says publication of several state comptroller reports dealing with October 7-related failures was delayed for about 15 months due to interim legal orders, including one lifted in April 2025 after understandings were reached with the IDF and Shin Bet, while another High Court interim order issued on December 29, 2025, still freezes review of eight subjects.
In response, the Transportation Ministry said the report had been written in March 2025 and did not reflect the lessons already implemented since then. The ministry said that in more recent emergency aviation operations, including Roaring Lion and other wartime efforts, Israel had successfully returned more than 600,000 Israelis from abroad, maintained continuity under missile fire, expanded access through neighboring states and maritime and land routes, and improved coordination mechanisms.
The ministry also said it accepts some of the comptroller’s recommendations and is already working on updated emergency scenarios, including preparation for a prolonged war. At the same time, it rejected claims that the state’s golden share in El Al was a relevant wartime tool in its current form, and said airfare pricing and insurance compensation fall under the responsibility of economic and regulatory bodies rather than the Transportation Ministry. The report ends with a stark warning: without a true backup to Ben-Gurion and a clear emergency aviation doctrine, Israel risks repeating the same failures in a future crisis.