Following the war, Israel should reduce US dependency and seek alliances in Asia - opinion

The conclusion of the multi-front war in the Middle East presents significant strategic implications for Israel, which succeeded in recovering from the collapse on October 7, 2023, following Hamas’ surprise attack, by dramatically degrading the capabilities of Iran's proxies in the region, including Iran itself.

Israel demonstrated aerial superiority, which allowed it to act to prevent Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups from rebuilding their power, employing the “mowing the grass” strategy even after a ceasefire is achieved.

While Israel has shifted the balance of power in its favor, the war simultaneously highlighted its complicated relationship with the West, specifically its closest ally, the United States.

These examples are indicative of a more acute, strategic problem for the future of Israel’s strategic relationship with the United States.

While even mainstream Democratic figures, such as former vice president Kamala Harris, who plans to run for president in 2028, implied that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza, prominent MAGA-aligned figures who influence the Republican Party, such as Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens, mixed their criticism of Israel with harsh anti-Jewish rhetoric.

Although antisemitism is not a new phenomenon within parts of the American political establishment, since the formation of the Special Relationship between the US and Israel in the late 1960s, Israel has always attempted to maintain bipartisan support.

As Israel's national security doctrine heavily relies on the support of a great power, especially in conflict, the recent war, as mentioned, clearly demonstrated Israel’s dependency on the United States. This requires a multi-faceted approach.

A necessary starting point is focusing on ways to tackle the antisemitic and anti-Israeli sentiments within both Republican and Democratic circles. Debunking false claims about Israel and the Jewish people, disclosing the origins of information campaigns, and promoting legal action against any means of boycott, and collaborating with the Jewish community are essential steps.

Furthermore, emphasizing Israel’s geopolitical, technological, and intelligence importance and value to the American defense establishment, as well as to society, academia, media, and other elites – particularly against the backdrop of the US-China competition – is another vital measure to securing the continuation of the Special Relationship.

Developing a more sophisticated self-defense capacity to reduce its dependency on the US, amid the near initiation of negotiations over a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), is another necessary measure.

All these means are important, yet they cannot solve the foundational problem.

Thus, diversifying Israel’s alliances and partnership networks, as it does with friendly and strategic Central and Eastern European countries, is another crucial step.

Expanding these ties might enable Israel to hedge itself during future boycotts imposed by its Western allies, who also criticized it during the war and have failed to prevent the toxic spread of antisemitism.

Therefore, part of the solution must focus on Israel’s strategic pivot into Asia, where antisemitism is neither deeply rooted nor widely spread, and the desire for strategic cooperation exists.

It must be stated clearly: There is no replacement for the enduring, still stable, and strategic relationship between the United States and Israel.

No other country in the world could provide its allies with meaningful security guarantees other than the United States.

Recently, Israel made an important move toward pivoting into Asia by encouraging the expansion of the existing strategic partnership with India.

Additionally, commercial and tourist relations are already thriving, both countries are involved in fighting Islamic extremism, and view each other as a reliable partner.

While India relied on Israel's equipment and defense systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), during the May 2025 war with Pakistan (Operation Sindoor), it had also gained experience in addressing Chinese technologies and hardware.

As antisemitism and anti-Israeli sentiment in the West are growing, and as Israel’s dependency on the US during the war reflected a strategic problem for the future, deepening its relations with Asia, as a mean to diversify Israel's alliances, not to replace the Special Relationship, is a strategic imperative.