The past week has been extraordinary for Israel. The release of hostages from Gaza, the easing of tensions at home, sudden rumors later denied about an Indonesian presidential visit, and a growing involvement of Indonesia in American efforts to advance peace in the Middle East created an almost surreal moment in which diplomacy and emotion briefly intersected.
Even if the reports were premature, they revealed something important: for the first time, normalization with the world’s largest Muslim-majority seems now to come closer to the strategic horizon. Hence, Israel must begin preparing itself for it.
Yet preparation, not haste, is the key word. Israel should not rush to initiate dramatic moves toward Jakarta. Instead, it should quietly build the political, social, and conceptual infrastructure required for when that window genuinely opens. Indonesia represents an extraordinary opportunity for Israel, but careful strategic navigation is needed for success.
A changing Indonesia
Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia has entered a new phase of foreign policy pragmatism and activism.
Jakarta’s recent diplomacy, including its careful stance on Gaza and its calls for humanitarian restraint without inflammatory rhetoric, and the appeasing message it delivered in its speech at the United Nations General Assembly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, illustrates a leadership style that is assertive yet measured.
Prabowo wants Indonesia to be perceived as a responsible, significant power in the Muslim world capable of balancing moral leadership with realpolitik.
This identity shift matters. Indonesia’s global ambitions-joining the G20, expanding its defense industry, deepening its regional activity through ASEAN, and tightening cooperation with Arab Gulf countries, for example- have made it increasingly pragmatic.
In sectors where Israel excels in cybersecurity, disaster response, medical technology, water management, and smart agriculture, there is potential for quiet, mutually beneficial cooperation. Behind the political caution, Jakarta’s strategic community recognizes that Israel’s technological expertise aligns with Indonesia’s modernization goals.
However, such cooperation will never occur through direct political channels—at least not yet. It will need to emerge through indirect frameworks: academic partnerships, humanitarian coordination, and Track-II dialogues that frame engagement as apolitical, people-to-people, and consistent with Indonesia’s moral identity.
The Palestinian constraint
Here lies the paradox. Indonesia’s foreign policy is still deeply shaped by its anti-colonial legacy and Islamic solidarity. Support for Palestinian statehood is not merely a diplomatic position—it is a component of Indonesia’s national narrative and one of its important foreign policy principles. Moreover, the support of the Palestinian cause is viewed by many Muslims in Indonesia through a wider Pan-Islamic perspective. In addition, public opinion strongly associates the Palestinian issue with moral legitimacy that defines the difference between a just and an unjust foreign policy.
This “Palestinian veto” is the single greatest obstacle to normalization. Unlike the Gulf monarchies, Indonesia’s democracy makes such identity-based sentiment politically binding. Any move toward Israel without visible progress on the Palestinian question would risk domestic backlash and undermine Prabowo’s cautious credibility.
For Israel, this constraint must not be viewed as an obstacle to be bypassed, but as a condition to be managed intelligently.
A successful Israeli strategy toward Indonesia requires empathy, not impatience. Symbolic recognition of Palestinian dignity—through humanitarian coordination, joint initiatives on health or renewable energy that include Palestinian participation can reduce the ideological cost of engagement for Jakarta. Normalization, if and when it comes, must be perceived in Indonesia not as abandoning Palestine but as expanding the realm of practical cooperation for peace.
Soft power as a bridge
Indonesia’s greatest diplomatic asset is its soft power. The image of a moderate democracy within Muslim majority country that promotes tolerance and moderation. This makes it an ideal bridge between the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Jakarta has offered humanitarian assistance to Gaza and hosted interfaith dialogues on peacebuilding, projecting a voice of restraint rather than confrontation. For Israel, recognizing and respecting this identity is crucial.
Instead of trying to convert Indonesia into a “new Abraham Accord” partner, Jerusalem should position itself as a constructive interlocutor within Indonesia’s own moral framework: development, technology, and humanitarian resilience. This also means investing in non-governmental and professional linkages. Academic exchanges, health-sector collaboration, and joint participation in disaster-relief training could quietly normalize perceptions long before any diplomatic ceremony.
Israeli and Indonesian professionals already meet in multilateral contexts-whether in regional climate forums or UN disaster-management initiatives. Formalizing such contacts, even indirectly, can build trust and lower the emotional opposition towards Israel within Muslim societies in Southeast Asia.
A lesson from South Asia
The recent India-Pakistan crisis offers a relevant analogy. After the 2025 Pahalgam attack, India responded not with all-out war but with controlled deterrence- a deliberate balance between strength and restraint. It projected resolve while avoiding escalation.
Israel faces a similar test in diplomacy: to project confidence without arrogance, to act strategically without forcing premature breakthroughs. Just as New Delhi has defined new limits for deterrence, Jerusalem must now establish the boundaries of diplomacy, recognizing when silence, patience, and preparation are more effective than overt ambition.
Conclusion: preparing the ground
Israel’s normalization with Indonesia does not seem to be imminent, but it is no longer unthinkable. The coming years will test whether Jerusalem can combine strategic foresight with cultural sensitivity. The opportunity is immense: engagement with the home to the largest Muslim population and the third largest democracy could reshape Israel’s position in the Global South and expand its economic and security partnerships across Asia.
But the risk is equally real: misreading Indonesia’s moral compass or treating normalization as a transactional bargain would backfire dramatically. Preparing for this path will also require regional coordination.
Israel cannot approach Indonesia in isolation. Countries such as Australia and Singapore, which maintain complex yet stable relations with Jakarta, could become valuable intermediaries. Both have credibility in the Indo-Pacific, close defense ties with Israel, and established trust with Indonesia. Quiet trilateral consultations on humanitarian, educational, or climate-related initiatives could serve as a bridge between Jerusalem and Jakarta, ensuring that normalization, when it comes, is grounded in shared regional understanding rather than bilateral surprise.
The correct path lies in quiet readiness, building institutional knowledge, nurturing personal networks, and crafting narratives that acknowledge both the hope of cooperation and the weight of history. When the next diplomatic opening comes, and it will, Israel must be able to meet Indonesia not with surprise or improvisation, but with understanding, respect, and preparedness.