Israel needs to draw more limited red lines on Turkish activities in Syria instead of the more aggressive approach it has taken since the old Syrian Assad regime fell in December 2024, the Institute for National Security Studies think tank argued.
On August 17, Israel struck an emerging Turkish position at the Abu al-Duhur base in Syria, leading to a high-profile diplomatic conflict with Israel on one side and the US, Turkey, and Syria on the other.
Last Friday, the IDF targeted a vehicle near the Lebanese-Syrian border carrying Yusuf Ali al-Hassoun, who may be associated with Iran’s terrorist handlers.
Since early 2025, INSS has repeatedly warned that an indefinite stay in Syria was not the answer. It stressed that Israel needs to engage in dialogue with Syria about long-term security arrangements, or it stands to lose many of its gains since the fall of Assad.
The IDF destroyed most of the former regime’s high-profile sea, land, and air military threats. In a similar vein, the military set up a buffer zone in southern Syria to make it harder for potential terrorists or jihadists to initiate an invasion.
INSS’s most recent report was authored by researcher Amal Hayek and former IDF intelligence adviser Carmit Valensi. It recommended that Israel take a more nuanced approach in Syria, and it split the “restoration of Syrian infrastructure and the establishment of a Turkish presence” into multiple components.
“A distinction should be made between technical assistance, training, and the rehabilitation of facilities for the Syrian state on the one hand – and the establishment of independent Turkish command-and-control infrastructure, on the other,” the think tank noted.
Valensi confirmed that the findings of the report still held following recent events in Syria. “From an operational standpoint, there is little practical difference between the deployment of Turkish radar, electronic warfare, or air defense systems in northern Syria and their deployment in southern Turkey or northern Cyprus,” he said.
“Their coverage ranges are similar, and the presence of such systems in northern Syria, therefore, does not in itself constitute a redline warranting the use of Israeli force,” the report noted.
'Turkish navy has inherent advantage in eastern Mediterranean,' INSS argues
According to INSS, these same principles of nuance apply to the maritime domain. “The Turkish navy enjoys an inherent advantage in the eastern Mediterranean, and a limited presence along the Syrian coast would not fundamentally alter the balance of power,” the report read.
INSS’s position clashes with the navy’s. The navy wants to be more aggressive in confronting Turkish naval expansion in the Mediterranean, and it seeks to expand Israel’s submarine fleet from six (with the recently incorporated INS Drakon) to eight.
INSS’s recommendations are partly due to its assessment that, even if Turkey assisted Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, “the relationship between Ankara and Damascus is more complex than is sometimes perceived in Israel and is not free of tension.”
INSS wrote that “evidence of this can be found in a series of structural changes recently implemented by Damascus in the ranks of the Syrian army, indicating an intention to reduce the autonomy of these forces and the extent of Turkish influence over them.”
For example, “as of August 2026, the Turkish military presence in Syria is undergoing a process of reorganization. Ankara is gradually downsizing some of the smaller outposts and facilities it established during the years of war – particularly in areas where the security situation has changed – and transferring authority and responsibility to Syrian state institutions.”
Israeli security officials have said that these are cosmetic changes designed to fool the West. However, some Mossad officials have expressed willingness to test whether Syria’s new regime may choose stability over conflict with Israel.
Notably, INSS warned that Israel’s national security could be harmed if the state is seen as reluctant to give Syria a chance. With that said, INSS still believes that Israel must draw red lines when necessary.
INSS wrote that central and southern Syria are critical areas and that “while Turkey justifies its presence in northern Syria as necessary to prevent threats to its territory, the establishment of Turkish bases farther inside the country – in central Syria, and even more so in the south – is not dictated by such security needs.”
Furthermore, the INSS report said that such a Turkish presence “would also bring potential friction closer to the Israeli front and constitute a problematic shift in the regional balance.”
Israel should focus on thwarting terror elements in Syria, INSS says
In addition, the report said that Israel must avoid the “entrenchment of terror proxies in southern Syria. Israel should focus on thwarting terrorist elements – particularly Hamas – and preventing them from enjoying freedom of action or safe haven under Turkish or Syrian auspices in the southern region adjacent to Israel’s border.”
In other words, INSS is less tolerant of jihadist elements – particularly Hamas – getting anywhere close to Israel’s border in southern Syria than it is of Turkey increasing its presence in northern Syria.
It added, “Turkey’s presence and influence in Syria are an established reality that is unlikely to disappear through the use of military force alone.” In that sense, “Israel’s challenge is not to eliminate Turkish involvement altogether but rather to contain and balance it.”
Moreover, “relying exclusively on military force and striking targets of marginal operational value, without a parallel diplomatic track with Damascus, jeopardizes Israel’s security interests and could drag the parties into a direct confrontation that neither side desires.”
Therefore, “Israeli decision-makers must combine focused military deterrence with direct and indirect dialogue, utilize deconfliction mechanisms, and clearly define the areas in which Israel is prepared to allow Syria to rebuild its capabilities – before the situation deteriorates into dangerous regional escalation.”
INSS said that “blanket Israeli opposition to any process of Syrian military rehabilitation could prove counterproductive, pushing Damascus toward greater dependence on Ankara.”
Moreover, “the broader regional and diplomatic context should be taken into account. Damascus is currently drawing closer to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and gaining growing legitimacy from the United States and European countries.”
In early 2025, Valensi and other security officials suggested that Israel formulate a list of conditions (such as demilitarized zones in Syria) that could lead to it withdrawing from some or all of the buffer zone.
When the IDF first took over the buffer zone in Syria, IDF officials told The Jerusalem Post that the military’s presence was temporary and would end once it was clear that Syria’s new leadership had no intention of invading Israel.
Despite Sharaa’s background as a jihadist, he has given no hint of action against Israel for nearly two years.
INSS reported, “Israel’s actions are increasingly perceived as seeking to destabilize Syria, and in this context, Israel is, at times, even compared to Iran. In this framework, greater attention may be directed toward the issue of the Golan Heights, as recently raised by [US Special Envoy for Syria Tom] Barrack, while regional – and particularly international – pressure could intensify for Israel to withdraw to the lines established under the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement, possibly even without significant political concessions in return.”
INSS’s conclusion should raise some alarm bells. Israel maintains its buffer zone in Syria for its own safety and, if needed, to gain security concessions from Damascus.
However, Israel has made no concession offers to Syria for two years now. This could lead the Trump administration, which supports Sharaa, to force a withdrawal, resulting in few gains for Israel.