When David Zini was appointed head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) last year, I was among those who believed he deserved a chance.

His critics warned that he was unqualified, too ideological, messianic, and lacked the intelligence background needed to lead one of Israel’s most sensitive security agencies.

Others questioned whether he would be able to distinguish between loyalty to the state and loyalty to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who appointed him.

At the time, I was not convinced. The government, and by extension the prime minister, has the authority to appoint the person it believes is best suited to lead the Shin Bet.

Zini had spent decades in the IDF, rising to the rank of major general and holding some of the military’s most demanding positions. To argue that someone with that experience was unqualified seemed unfair.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with Shin Bet Director David Zini, October 23, 2025.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with Shin Bet Director David Zini, October 23, 2025. (credit: HAIM ZACH/GPO)

As for the concern about political loyalty, I believed a veteran career officer would know where his allegiance lay.

Three weeks after the October 27 election, I am no longer so sure.

The revelations surrounding the police investigation into alleged voter fraud in the Arab community, the involvement of people connected to the Prime Minister’s Office, and Zini’s own conduct have raised serious questions about the independence of institutions entrusted with protecting Israel’s democracy.

To understand why, it is worth recalling what happened.

In the early hours of Election Day, before polling stations had even opened, police officers raided the homes of several Arab activists associated with Ra’am in southern Israel.

Among them was Dr. Saef Abu Reash, a physician from Rahat, whose home was searched without a warrant and who was arrested in front of his family.

The video taken by his pregnant wife is disturbing. She repeatedly asks the officers why they are arresting her husband and whether they have a warrant. The officers offer little explanation.

Abu Reash was subsequently held for six days before a court ordered his unconditional release, sharply criticizing the conduct of the investigation.

Thankfully, there are still decent people in this country. This week, former president Reuven Rivlin called Abu Reash and apologized on behalf of himself and other Israelis who were appalled by what had happened.

But the arrests were only the beginning.

As Israelis went to the polls, police announced that they were investigating allegations of vote-buying involving Ra’am activists.

Netanyahu immediately seized on the announcement, releasing videos urging his supporters to vote and warning that an attempt was underway to steal the election.

In the following days, the allegations grew. There were reports of gasoline vouchers supposedly being used to buy votes, followed by suspicions that Qatar had funneled millions of dollars into Israel to influence Arab voter turnout.

That the allegations of local vote-buying and foreign interference had not been substantiated on anything approaching the scale being suggested did not stop Netanyahu and his allies from portraying the election as stolen.

Thankfully, Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg, who chaired the Central Elections Committee, made clear that the allegations, even if they were eventually proven, did not undermine the overall election results. He stood firmly behind their validity.

But what exactly had happened? And why were such explosive allegations being used to cast doubt on a democratic election before there was evidence to support them?

The questions became even more troubling this week.

According to reports confirmed by the Prime Minister’s Office, the original tip that led to the election-day arrests came from Daniel Greenberg, a former PMO employee who had reportedly met Netanyahu less than two weeks before the election.

The information was passed through Netanyahu’s chief of staff, Ido Norden, who connected the source with the office of the police commissioner. The Prime Minister’s Office denies that this process was wrong on its own, but the sequence of events raises obvious questions.

Was there no normal way to report suspected criminal activity to the police? Why did the information pass through the prime minister’s closest associates? And how did it lead to dramatic, warrantless raids just hours before Israelis went to vote?

The police’s conduct, the involvement of people connected to the Prime Minister’s Office, and the subsequent political exploitation of the allegations all demand a thorough and independent investigation.

Shin Bet leader

And then there is Zini.

The Shin Bet chief reportedly called the alleged voter fraud the agency’s “October 7.”

Perhaps he forgot that his agency already had an October 7, in 2023, when it failed, alongside the IDF, to prevent Hamas from carrying out the worst massacre of Jews on a single day since the Holocaust.

The comparison was extraordinary, particularly given how little evidence had emerged to substantiate the claims.

Even more troubling was the meeting Zini held with Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot shortly after the election, during which he told him that there were election fraud allegations concerning Arabs since 2018, that previous Shin Bet directors had been afraid to investigate, and that he had finally decided to “turn over this stone.”

It is difficult to understand the conduct of this former IDF general, especially after the news this week that there was nothing – no evidence, no large-scale fraud, and no foreign interference.

So what was there that pushed Zini to behave the way he did? This is the problem, and the thought that he allowed himself to become entangled in Netanyahu’s political campaign is hard to avoid.

This is not a conclusion that should be reached lightly. There is a difference between legitimate suspicion, poor judgment, and deliberate political interference.

But it is precisely because the Shin Bet is such a powerful organization that even the appearance of political bias is so dangerous.

If foreign interference took place on the scale Zini suggested, then how did his agency allow it to happen? If it did not, why did he amplify allegations that helped undermine confidence in the election?

Either possibility raises serious questions about his judgment.

And the election is not the only area where Zini’s leadership deserves scrutiny.

Look at the West Bank, where violent attacks by Jewish extremists against Palestinians have become an almost daily occurrence.

Where is the Shin Bet’s Jewish Division, the unit specifically charged with preventing Jewish terrorism? Why has it not done more to stop the violence?

The responsibility does not rest with the Shin Bet alone. The police and IDF also bear responsibility.

But the failure to confront this growing threat, alongside the extraordinary energy apparently devoted to investigating allegations of Arab electoral interference, raises further questions about priorities.

The Shin Bet is not an ordinary government agency. Its people operate in the shadows, wield extraordinary surveillance and intelligence capabilities, and exercise powers that most Israelis will never see or fully understand.

Precisely because of those powers, the organization must be led by someone whose independence, judgment, and commitment to the rule of law are beyond doubt.

I wanted to believe that Zini was that person. I believed his military record entitled him to receive the benefit of the doubt. Instead, his conduct these past few weeks has undermined the confidence that is needed in someone who holds such a position.

Replacing the head of the Shin Bet when a government changes is not something Israel should normalize. Our security institutions must remain above politics.

But that principle cuts both ways, and if a new government is formed, one of its first decisions should be to replace Zini.

This is not because he was appointed by Netanyahu, or because of his political or religious beliefs. But rather because he failed at something far more basic: demonstrating the impartial judgment that his position demands.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), a co-founder of the Middle East America Dialogue (MEAD), and the author of four books on Israel’s defense and national security.