The war that began on October 7, 2023, may be officially over. But the conflicts that underlie it have not been addressed. That is why Hamas still controls more than two million Palestinians in Gaza. That is why Hamas remains armed. That is why Hezbollah has not been dismantled. That is why Iran remains the principal adversary of both Israel and the United States.
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be defeated militarily, nor will they surrender. There is no purely military solution to these conflicts, and there never has been.
There are, however, viable political-diplomatic solutions – especially when backed by credible military power and the willingness to use it. Until now, those solutions have not been seriously pursued. The wars may end; the conflicts remain.
Before examining each arena separately, we must recognize a fundamental truth: The roots of all three conflicts lie in the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Religion plays a role, but these are primarily political and territorial struggles. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the core – and it can, and must, be resolved.
The Abraham Accords – with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco – were an important strategic achievement. But they also fostered the illusion that Israel could normalize relations with the Arab world without addressing the Palestinian issue. That illusion has now been exposed. These agreements are valuable, but they fall far short of genuine peace.
Consider the reality: More than one million Israelis have visited the UAE since 2020, while only a few thousand Emiratis have visited Israel. Most Israeli tourists have little to no meaningful interaction with local citizens.
The same is true of our “peace” with Egypt and Jordan. There is minimal tourism, limited trade, and almost no people-to-people engagement. Even Israelis vacationing in Sinai rarely interact with Egyptians.
These are not relationships of peace between peoples. They are strategic arrangements between governments – important, but insufficient.
This reality could change dramatically if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved through a two-state framework: two states for two peoples, between the river and the sea.
I understood this in March 1988, when I co-founded a joint Israeli-Palestinian public policy think and do-tank during the First Intifada. We did not begin by asking whether a solution was possible. We began by agreeing on the end goal: two states based on the June 4, 1967, lines. From there, we worked on how to make it real.
That framework enabled thousands of Israelis and Palestinians to work together for decades through IPCRI – Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information. This opened doors across the Arab world, where I was received not as an adversary but as a partner. It is also why I have built trust with tens of thousands of Palestinians across the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. A clear, consistent commitment to a just two-state solution creates legitimacy – and access.
Today’s negotiations between Hamas and international mediators reflect the same unresolved tension. The US- and Israel-backed framework demands full Hamas disarmament as a precondition for political progress.
Hamas, for its part, signals willingness to enter a phased process – transferring some weapons and allowing the technocratic Palestinian government to take responsibility – but refuses total disarmament without a credible path to ending the occupation and achieving statehood.
We can debate Hamas’s intentions. But we should also listen carefully. Increasingly, voices within Gaza – including elements of Hamas leadership – signal readiness to accept a two-state framework if it is real, time-bound, and irreversible.
The critical point
This is the critical point: Diplomacy must not repeat the mistakes of Oslo – an open-ended process of negotiations without a defined endgame. The sequence must be reversed. First, there must be a clear, internationally backed commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, based on the 1967 lines with agreed modifications. Only then can the necessary steps – security arrangements, disarmament, reconstruction, normalization – fall into place.
The same logic applies to Hezbollah. While there are additional factors, such as the 13 disputed border points between Israel and Lebanon, the conflict is deeply tied to the Palestinian issue. Hezbollah’s justification for maintaining arms is rooted in that linkage. Remove it, and the foundation of its legitimacy weakens significantly.
The Lebanese state, and a large portion of its population, seeks freedom from Hezbollah’s dominance. A credible Israeli-Palestinian peace process would enable Lebanon to move in that direction.
We are now at a rare moment of opportunity. The United States, under the current administration, is actively engaged across multiple fronts: Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel. With the support of moderate Arab states, it is possible to re-center the entire regional agenda on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This will require political courage from Israel, from Palestinian leadership, and from Washington. It will require confronting entrenched opposition on all sides. But the alternative is clear: continued cycles of war without resolution. There are still nearly three years left in the current US presidential term of Donald Trump. That is enough time to lay the foundations and structure for a genuine political endgame.
If we are serious about ending the wars, we must finally begin by ending the conflict that fuels them all.