Wars are no longer fought solely on the ground.
They are increasingly fought on social media, on television screens, and in the minds of millions across the world.
In this arena, Israel is falling behind.
Recent events have shown us how quickly a war narrative can shift when one side in a conflict uses social media to tell its story, and how dangerous it can be when the other side struggles to counter those arguments.
The war between Israel and Hamas highlighted the immense power that social media and public diplomacy now hold in modern conflicts. And it was precisely during this war that I realized where Israel was falling short on this front.
Lessons from the IDF spokesperson unit
For two years, I served in the IDF Spokesperson unit’s Public Diplomacy office. I led delegations of diplomats visiting Israel to observe the army’s operations firsthand. I had the chance to brief diplomats, journalists, influencers, and other international figures.
I was 20 years old.
I took the job seriously. Everyone I served with did. But after the October 7 massacre, it became clear that what we were doing, what I was doing, was not enough.
The Spokesperson unit was not designed to fight an information war like the one that followed October 7, 2023. And arguably, it shouldn’t. The role of the Spokesperson unit is to represent the actions of the Israeli army internationally.
It is unrealistic to expect soldiers to combat disinformation efforts that reach millions of people and to conduct interviews with major news outlets that operate around the clock in dozens of languages.
In the early months of the war, Israel briefly got it right. The National Public Diplomacy Directorate was finally established, presenting a clear and coherent message to major international outlets such as the BBC, CNN, and Fox News.
A few months later, the Directorate was closed. Its closure resulted from both structural and political issues. The Directorate struggled with internal government conflicts, lacked a clear authority, and was caught between opposing ministries. Operating independently proved difficult in a highly divided political environment, and without consistent institutional backing, it gradually disappeared.
Its closure was immediately felt.
Israeli public officials would begin appearing independently on media platforms, each expressing their own ideas. At the same time, Israel struggled to defend its legitimacy on social media, as statements about Israel bombing hospitals or starving Palestinian children circulated widely across the internet.
Consider the example of The New York Times publishing on the front page in July 2024 an article about Muhammad Zakariya Ayyoub, a Palestinian child they accused of being starved to death by Israel.
Israel knew this child was suffering from cystic fibrosis and had previously been cured in an Israeli hospital. Nevertheless, it took days for this information to reach the global public, even as more than 10 million people had viewed the article, and the image had already gone viral.
As one might expect, these blood libels were eventually debunked. But by then, the damage to Israel’s credibility had already been done.
For almost two years, there was no central directorate capable of responding to this crisis. Israel entered its most scrutinized war without an established framework to communicate its actions to the public. Once again, the responsibility fell on nineteen-year-old soldiers, who were required to debunk lies and disclose information that it was not their duty to share.
The State of Israel should establish a National Public Diplomacy Authority. A single, professional public diplomacy authority with full-time employees that can respond in real time, coordinate interviews, and manage messaging not only during war but also during peace.
Israel is governed by different political parties that hold vastly different, sometimes contradictory views, and this raises an important question: can a National Public Diplomacy authority present a unified voice when Israeli parties are not?
The answer is no. And that must be acknowledged.
A new Public Diplomacy authority cannot and should not eliminate political disagreement. However, that does not mean that it should be politicized. It does not have to be headed by a political appointee who is replaced with every coalition, even if it is created as a government authority.
Alternatively, its head could be a professionally appointed director-general with a fixed term, shielded from day-to-day political turmoil. Regardless of the political party in power, this structure would enable it to function consistently, professionally, and credibly.
The goal should be to enforce quick responses to misinformation, centralized coordination with international media, and clear red lines about who speaks on behalf of the State in times of crisis.
In this arena, Israel faces an additional disadvantage. Thousands of anti-Israel activists are engaged in social media campaigns against Israel, spreading propaganda and misinformation.
No single authority will ever be able to counter this alone.
This is why it should act as a coordinator and collaborate with NGOs and civil society groups in Israel and around the world to provide others with better knowledge and skills that will help combat this phenomenon.
Sinwar’s goal was for Israel to be isolated on the global stage. Unfortunately, he succeeded, and Israel was unable to effectively counter the campaigns against it. To prevent that from happening again, Israel must make strengthening its credibility and legitimacy in the information warfare arena a national priority.
The writer is studying government, diplomacy, and strategy at Reichman University. She is currently part of Argov, an honors program in Leadership and diplomacy at Reichman University.