It would be ironic, to say the least, for the UK or the UN to censure Israel for recognizing Somaliland’s independence – and both have done so – considering that Britain, its colonial ruler, itself granted sovereign independence to the State of Somaliland, more than 65 years ago on June 26, 1960.
Immediately congratulatory messages from some 35 countries, including all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, poured into the Somaliland government, in what was then the standard practice for newly decolonized states.
Even though just five days later, on July 1, the new state voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland to form the ill-fated Somali Republic, the fact remains that Britain and the UN had welcomed the sovereign independence of Somaliland.
In short, they acknowledged that the newly independent country fulfilled the four criteria set out in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: that a state in international law should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government exercising effective political authority over the population and territory, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The Montevideo Convention also states that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” In other words, an entity is a state if it meets the Montevideo criteria alone; recognition by others merely acknowledges an existing situation. Therefore, whatever the UK or the UN now say, Somaliland is a sovereign state according to their own reckoning.
On December 26, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would officially recognize Somaliland’s independence. Pledging extensive cooperation on health, technology and economic development, he invited Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, to visit Israel for his first trip abroad as a recognized head of state.
Since the announcement, there have been days of rejoicing in the capital, Hargeisa. Somaliland’s six million people see Israel’s recognition as a long-overdue reward for decades of successful state-building. The nation has enjoyed an extended period of successful elections, with terrorism, militias, and piracy kept well in check.
The state that refused to fail
In adjacent Somalia, meanwhile, large swathes of territory are controlled by al-Shabab, a Taliban-style Islamist group affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the country is struggling with endless feuding among its clan-based elites.
As Netanyahu’s recognition statement hit the headlines, US President Donald Trump happened to be playing golf at his course in West Palm Beach, Florida. Reporters flocked around him asking whether America would follow Israel’s lead. Trump bluntly replied “No,” adding: “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
Somaliland, located on what is known as the Horn of Africa, sits at the base of the Red Sea, directly facing southern Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. It is a classic product of European colonialism. In the 1880s, Britain, by signing protection treaties with northern Somali clans, created the British Somaliland Protectorate. Its primary purpose was to secure imperial sea lanes through that gulf and sea.
At the same time, Italy, France, and Britain divided the wider Somali-inhabited region among themselves. Anglo-Italian boundary agreements fixed a frontier between British and Italian Somaliland.
The 1960s was a period of rapid decolonization by Britain. By mid-decade, the UK’s imperial power had virtually collapsed. In May 1960, the British government stated it would be prepared to grant independence to British Somaliland “with the intention that the territory would unite with the Trust Territory of Somaliland.” So only five days after becoming independent, what had been British Somaliland voluntarily united with the former Italian Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic. The aim was to transcend the colonial borders that had divided the Somalis.
It was an unhappy, ill-fated merger. Somalia’s leader, Siad Barre, turned out to be a ruthless dictator whose regime bore down heavily on the northern Somalis previously administered by the British. Finally, in 1981, the Somali National Movement took up arms against Barre. The ensuing conflict lasted 10 years.
By early 1991, SNM forces had taken full control of north-western Somalia, including the capital Hargeisa, and the war petered out in political negotiation. In May 1991, northern clan leaders and SNM figures formally revoked the 1960 union, and proclaimed the Republic of Somaliland specifically “within the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.” Their declaration was framed not as a secession from Somalia, but rather as a restoration of the pre-union state.
Since then, Somaliland has built separate institutions, held multiple competitive elections and maintained relative internal stability and security. In October 1994, it even introduced its own currency. The new Somaliland shilling replaced the Somali one, which had been the legal currency in the united Somali Republic. At launch, one Somaliland shilling could buy 100 Somali shillings.
Today, Somaliland's economy is small, resilient, and growing moderately, but it remains structurally fragile. The annual inflation rate, at a peak of 9.4% in 2024, fell in 2025 to 8.6%.
Israeli–Somaliland relations before recognition were limited. There had been no formal agreements, but some commentators suggested there had been low-visibility contacts as part of Israel’s Red Sea intelligence and security interests.
Netanyahu’s announcement that Israel and Somaliland had signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations referred explicitly to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords.”
The declaration included mutual recognition, plans to exchange ambassadors and open embassies, and cooperation in security, trade, agriculture, and technology.
Somaliland’s leadership hailed the move as a “historic moment” and a strategic partnership, hoping it would break the long-standing international taboo over recognition and open doors to wider international acceptance and investment.
From Israel’s point of view, recognition entrenches its presence in a key maritime location, complementing its security partnerships with the Abraham Accords states and enabling the monitoring of hostile Houthi activity in the Red Sea and Yemen.
Criticism of Israel’s recognition has partly turned on what is painted as an apparent inconsistency: how can Israel champion statehood, independence, and self-determination for Somaliland while opposing the same for the Palestinians?
Some voices, however, point out the inconsistency of the UK, France, Australia, and other Western nations recognizing the non-existent state of Palestine, while condemning Israel for recognizing what is clearly the functioning state of Somaliland – and what is more, a state that Britain and the UN have previously recognized.
Israel will stick to its guns, and eventually global opinion will fall into line.
The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com