The concluding resolution of the Emergency Arab-Islamic Summit in Doha on September 15 – convened to respond to the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in the city a week earlier – was strong on solidarity with Qatar, expressions of concern with and condemnations of the Israeli operation and its broader violent policies, and calls for punitive actions.
Still, like so many previous Arab summits, it, too, exhibited no appreciation of what can affect the only audience – other than US President Donald Trump – that can do something about Israel’s current conduct: the Israeli public.
By accentuating the adverse security and other consequences of Israel’s violent trajectory, as well as the advantages of the regionally offered alternative, those gathered in Doha could have energized the Israeli majority opposition to the government’s policy in Gaza, the West Bank, and the region.
Perhaps it is not too late.
One ventures the hope that in close proximity to Arab decision-makers, someone takes the trouble of studying trends in Israeli public attitudes. It would highlight the potential for change encapsulated in the over 70%, who – in poll after poll and in street demonstrations – express opposition to their government’s policies.
That majority can be energized once awareness of the uniqueness of the moment sinks in. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find a precedent when the choice between two available courses of action – the one pursued by the Netanyahu government, the other offered by a potent regional Arab coalition – has been starker.
Arab leaders overlooked public diplomacy
Equally unprecedented is the fact that the decision of which of the two approaches to pursue is Israel’s alone. Nonetheless, for Israelis to be persuaded of the viability and transformative nature of the regional offer, they need to hear it from the Arab leaders who can make it happen.
It is, therefore, quite astonishing that in deliberating responses to Israel’s increasingly aggressive local and regional conduct, those very Arab leaders overlook the most potent instrument in their arsenal: public diplomacy. Not in the form of long statements reminiscent of previous centuries’ diplomacy but the kind that leverages contemporary communication technology.
The moment seems to call for Arab leaders to grant a series of in-depth interviews to Israeli TV channels and saturate social media with Israeli-public-targeted articulations of three themes: the promise of the regional offer, the destructive nature of Israel’s conduct, and what it would take for the regional opportunity to materialize.
The first message can spell out the region’s extended hand to help extricate Israel from the Gaza quagmire, stabilize the West Bank by helping PA reforms, and expand the circle of Arab and non-Arab Muslim states normalizing relations with Israel, all leading to Israel’s integration in a regional coalition that stands up to aggressors and contributes to the well-being of its members.
They should accentuate that which Israelis worry about most: post-war Gaza security.
Here, it is time for them to spell out to Israelis that which has long been discussed behind closed doors. It involves a joint regional-PA interim Gaza governance that is Hamas-free and responsible for all civil matters and security. It includes the deployment of the 5,000-strong Palestinian security force presently trained in Egypt and Jordan, augmented with regional units, all fully coordinated with the IDF and respectful of Israel’s right of self-defense.
Indeed, in various Arab plans – those developed jointly with the Biden administration, the Arab League’s embrace in March of the Egyptian plan for Gaza reconstruction, and the comprehensive Saudi-French one slated to be the centerpiece of a UN September 22 gathering – much of these undertakings is hinted at. If Israelis are to be impacted, it is time to spell them out.
The second message is to present Israelis with regional perspectives of their government making it all impossible.
Israelis should hear from leaders they respect – even are fascinated with – such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, that the strike in Doha was but the most recent attempt to derail Gaza ceasefire negotiations and that it risked the lives of hostages and extended the war. Israelis should realize that for many in the region, the Israel of the past three years is different from all previous ones.
The choice is Israel's alone
They should understand that the region is concerned with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confining regional conduct to a projection of force, signaling that Israel has no patience for diplomacy and threatening to respond to diplomatic measures not to his liking – such as support for the two-state solution – by annexation and depopulation in both the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, rather than witnessing Israeli integration, the region is driven to get its act together without Israel, if not against it.
Finally, those Arab leaders need to acknowledge that the choice between those two courses of action is Israel’s alone. It can continue on this violent trajectory to be stuck and bleeding in Gaza, set the West Bank on fire, and find the region uniting without it standing up to aggression, all while facing growing regional and international isolation.
Alternatively, Israel can choose the path offered by the region’s historic, transformative initiative. For that to happen, the Gaza war must end, Israel’s attitude toward the Palestinian Authority and its West Bank policy must change, and a commitment to an eventual negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be back on the table.
Arab leaders can thus help Israelis realize how fast – and why – the regional landscape transited from expectations of imminent Israeli-Saudi normalization and regional integration to an Arab consensus that views Israel as endangering national security and regional stability. More importantly, they can spell out what needs to be changed for the historic regional offer to be restored and pursued. Thereafter, it will be up to the Israeli majority to effect a change in Jerusalem.
The writer is a former special envoy and policy adviser to the late prime minister Shimon Peres. He is a fellow with the Israel Policy Forum and the Economic Cooperation Foundation and a member of Commanders for Israel’s Security.