Israel’s attempt to assassinate the remaining senior Hamas leadership in its political headquarters in Doha, Qatar, could have been a major game-changer in the war.
Israel waited for the right moment to fire ballistic missiles into space over Saudi Arabia, directed at Hamas leaders gathered for a meeting presumably to discuss US President Donald Trump’s latest offer for a comprehensive end to the war.
If successful, it could have potentially forced Hamas into a corner and left the little of what remains of the terrorist organization’s leadership in Gaza to offer greater concessions in a hostage deal.
However, days later, it is becoming increasingly clear that the assassination attempt was unsuccessful, leaving all of the senior Hamas leaders who were targeted still alive. This fact makes all the difference.
Trump, who in the past has communicated that if Israel makes such an audacious move, they will likely only receive his support if successful, immediately distanced himself from the attack.
During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Israel, in a joint statement on Monday to the press, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu further distanced the US from the attack by emphasizing that the decision to attack Hamas’s leadership in Qatar was his alone.
Thus, Israel quickly lost its typically unequivocal support for daring military actions in the region. The botched assassination attempt has also exacerbated the growing regional perception of Israel as a regional Goliath that needs to be restrained, not a strong power with whom to align.
Arab NATO – take two?
Egypt is reported to be promoting the idea of establishing a regional security organization that would function as an “Arab NATO.” This idea is not entirely new and was also proposed by the first Trump administration in 2018.
At the time, the US sought a regional security alliance consisting of Egypt, Jordan, and six Gulf Arab states. The chief motivation behind the initiative was to contain and roll back Iranian influence in the region.
However, there was not enough political will by all of the regional actors for it to be successful as there were divergent perceptions regarding the nature and the immediacy of the Iranian threat. Nevertheless, despite these differences, Iran was perceived as a major regional threat that needed to be contained.
Even if today’s initiative is just as unlikely politically, the conditions under which the idea was raised in 2018 is a mirror image of the reality today. Israel was then a force to be aligned with against the common enemy of Iran. Less than two years later, the Abraham Accords would be signed.
Today, in contrast, Arab and Muslim countries, including those with whom Israel has official diplomatic relations as well as Iran, are organizing collectively to coordinate ways to counter and isolate Israel in the diplomatic sphere.
The irony of Israel’s crushing military defeat of Iran during the 12-day war is that, as a result, it significantly minimized the view of Iran and its axis as a major mutual strategic threat in the region.
In addition, as a result of the trauma of the October 7 attacks, the Israeli approach of restoring deterrence through what is perceived as its readiness to employ an unlimited use of its power has led regional powers to fear that Israel is becoming an expansionist power, an increasing threat to the region, and, therefore, a force that needs to be constrained.
In other words, these two developments taking place simultaneously – Israel’s dramatic weakening of Iran and its axis and Israel’s expansive use of military power to restore deterrence, have ironically left Israel more isolated than in the past.
Not a matter of fate
What further exacerbates Israel’s diplomatic conundrum is the fact that the government still has yet to present a coherent diplomatic strategy or clear vision for a post-war political reality in Gaza.
Pressure is mounting as patience is dissipating for the slow to arrive “complete victory” over Hamas, and as the international community is advancing with unilateral recognitions of Palestinian statehood, such as will take place during the French-Saudi Summit on September 22.
Descending into diplomatic isolation is not a matter of fate but of policy. Other paths can be taken to better manage and ultimately end the war. Israel has the power to formulate policy to translate military gains into diplomatic successes. Restoring deterrence in the region can be balanced while preserving Israel’s strategic partnerships.
Israel is currently being forced into a corner with countries seeking to forcefully impose the end of the war. Most of the world, including the Arab League, supports the war objectives Israel set in place – releasing all of the hostages and Hamas’s disarmament and removal from power. Israel can leverage this fact and push Arab partners to pressure Hamas to disarm and release the hostages.
The Israeli government should at least acknowledge its willingness to consider going down this route, with a credible military threat always on the table.
If the Arab countries are unable to follow through, then Israel can at least show that it is the one that is in favor of long-lasting stability and the end of the war.
The writer is director of research and policy at the Economic Cooperation Foundation and a PhD candidate in international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.