The Qatar assassination strike, intended as a bold move to reshape negotiations with Hamas, has backfired, turning what was supposed to be a “victory picture” into a “picture of failure.”
The operation forced Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to post a puzzling tweet in English Saturday night, in which he essentially admitted to the strike’s failure, while trying to convince - even himself - that the operation was the right move. Unfortunately, it was not. As they say in football, the scoreboard doesn’t lie: Netanyahu’s gamble was a fiasco.
Even without the “refusal of an order” story, there is still no small drama here. Israel carried out a historic, unprecedented strike on the territory of a country not defined as an enemy state, in the middle of negotiations that this country is conducting also on Israel’s behalf, without Mossad’s special operations division being involved.
Let’s start with the (relatively) good news: contrary to reports, Mossad chief David Barnea did not “refuse an order” regarding the failed operation. If Barnea had received instructions from the political leadership to carry out a specific operation and decided not to execute it, he would have had to put the keys on the table and resign. He can argue, he can express his opinion, but he cannot refuse.
According to The Washington Post, Barnea’s refusal to carry out the assassination on the ground using Mossad agents supposedly forced Israel to strike via the Air Force. This is incorrect.
Yes, there are always several options for execution. Israel’s security system is very diverse, and its capabilities are extensive, but in the case of Qatar, the decision on which option to pursue was made in earlier discussions. When a decision is made to act immediately, as happened in this case, there is no time for the ground option. An assassination carried out by agents requires lengthy preparation. Aircraft, on the other hand, can take off immediately.
Shin Bet carries out Qatar operation, not Mossad
The fact that Mossad did not participate in the operation, and that the “targeting” of the individuals was carried out by the Shin Bet - which usually handles targets within Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza - is almost unprecedented. Barnea did indeed strongly oppose carrying out the operation at the current timing.
Mossad assessed that an operation in Qatar could sabotage the potential for a deal. Senior Hamas figures had arrived in Doha from Turkey and joined other senior Hamas leaders abroad. Qatari mediators were also supposed to participate in the discussion, and according to assessments, Hamas’s response was expected to be a “yes, but.”
Barnea believed that from a “yes, but” response, a deal could be reached. Hamas leaders can be killed at any given moment - they are not ticking bombs right now. On the contrary, what is ticking are the lives of the hostages. In the Mossad chief’s view, an attack in Qatar would cause much more harm than benefit and would sabotage any chance of returning the hostages, in full or in part.
So why did the Shin Bet push for and support the failed strike? The answer is complex. The Shin Bet does not see Qatar as a fair mediator and preferred Egypt from the start. Only history will judge this debate. There is no argument that Qatar is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas), and Egypt is not.
There is no argument that Qatar funded Hamas and hosted its leaders, while Egypt did not. The debate is over which of these two countries is more effective when it comes to mediation and applying pressure on Hamas. Barnea is convinced it is Qatar. The Shin Bet prefers Egypt.
The Shin Bet believed that an assassination in Qatar, at the current timing, would remove opponents of a deal from the picture, leave Hamas operatives in Gaza under heavy pressure, and create a “billiard effect”: one ball hitting the group of balls and scattering them anew across the table.
According to the Shin Bet’s view, the assassination was supposed to reshuffle the cards, shake the entire system, and perhaps give Hamas the push needed to agree to a comprehensive deal on terms acceptable to Israel.
Within the system, some believe that the fact that the Shin Bet currently has a deputy director, rather than a full chief, is a structural problem that also carries the danger of “folding” under the prime minister’s wishes. The deputy director, even subconsciously, seeks a permanent appointment and wants to remain in the prime minister’s favor, and therefore is more likely to “go along” with the Prime Minister’s ideas.
It must be emphasized: the Shin Bet executes the political leadership’s orders, but the head of the Shin Bet’s position, his opinion, and the information he presents to the Prime Minister played a central role in the case of the Qatar strike.
In the case of the current deputy head, there is no reason to doubt his motives. He is a worthy, professional, and honest individual. The issue lies in what happens subconsciously. When you are acting in a temporary role and want to secure a permanent appointment, it affects you even if you’re unaware of it.
If you understand that the Prime Minister very much wants the assassination in Qatar, it can influence you more than on normal days, when “commander’s intent” is also subject to professional critique.
In Netanyahu’s case, the analysis is more complex. He faces a built-in conflict of interest due to his complete dependence on extremist elements in his government, who threaten to dismantle it if it ends the war.
Netanyahu, largely thanks to Ron Dermer, has managed to reach an unprecedented position of control with former President Trump, who, until now, provided him with an open and unlimited line of credit regarding the war in Gaza.
Netanyahu and Dermer succeeded in convincing Trump that a quick and total victory over Hamas in Gaza was possible. The only problem is that this does not withstand the test of reality.
In this situation, it is entirely possible that Netanyahu planned to eliminate in one blow all that remained of Hamas’s leadership and use it to declare victory and end the war. Netanyahu also knows he cannot continue fighting in Gaza indefinitely.
Even Trump’s patience would eventually run out. Israel’s position in the US has sunk in recent weeks to the lowest depths of all time. This represents a significant loss of Israel's most strategic asset. Netanyahu is responsible for this loss. Since he is not foolish, he may have understood that he needed to aim for a “victory picture” and built the Qatar strike as that image.