Over the last month, there have been growing reports of a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Nothing in this story is simplistic. While some media may see a new struggle emerging, in the Middle East it’s always possible that countries disagree on certain issues, but not on others.
The changing position of Saudi Arabia likely developed over time. This matters to Israel, as well as the US role in the region. Riyadh has often been seen as a possible key new addition to the Abraham Accords. What that means is that any rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi can affect policies in Jerusalem and Washington.
The US and Saudi Arabia have been close partners for many decades, and the UAE has also emerged as a key friend of the US.
In 2020, the Abraham Accords paved the way for normalization between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain. At the time, it was assumed that Riyadh had green-lighted this and was going to wait and see how the Accords played out before deciding to normalize.
Today, things have changed.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have diverged in their policies towards Yemen. Saudi Arabia backs the Yemeni government, while the UAE backs a Southern Transitional Council (STC) based in Aden.
When the STC made gains in December, Riyadh became concerned. The BBC reported on December 30 that the “United Arab Emirates has said it will withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen, after Saudi Arabia backed a demand from the Yemeni presidential council for them to leave within 24 hours.”
The report added that “the Emirati announcement followed an air strike by a Saudi-led military coalition on what it said was a weapons shipment for UAE-backed separatist forces in the southern port of Mukalla.”
The BBC characterized the fighting in Yemen as a cause of a rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
'Deep regional power struggle'
The contrasting policies of the two countries are now seen in a lot of Western media as reflecting a shifting dynamic in the region.
CNN characterizes it as a “deep regional power struggle.” France 24 says this “threatens a new Gulf crisis.” It should be recalled some of the milestones along the way to how things got this way.
A decade ago, Saudi Arabia was a leading critic of the Iran deal of the Obama administration. Riyadh and Israel tended to agree on concerns about Iran.
Over time, the UAE also became closely entwined with Saudi Arabia’s new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. The UAE has been leading the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia were close friends with Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood was banned.
At the time, Turkey was closer to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and tended to oppose the government led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo.
In 2017, Saudi Arabia led several countries to break ties with Qatar. This was during the first Trump administration. This was the height of the UAE-Saudi relationship. At the same time, it should be recalled, Iran was on the march and backing the Houthis in Yemen to attack Saudi Arabia.
By the time of the Abraham Accords, the UAE-Saudi alliance appeared to be a main feature of the region, as Turkey and Qatar became very close. Things began to shift, though.
What happened behind the scences?
Riyadh patched things up with Iran in an agreement brokered by Iraq and China. The UAE did some outreach to the Assad regime.
The UAE also backed the eastern Libyan government in the civil conflict there. When civil war broke out in Sudan, the UAE was also accused of backing the RSF in Sudan, while Egypt and Riyadh appeared to back the Sudanese army.
Other trends began to change. Turkey became less critical of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh was able to position itself as a key player in the region, working with India and also having amicable ties with Moscow and Beijing.
Riyadh sensed that its power was growing. This was a shift from the days when it had felt more isolated by anti-Saudi campaigns waged in the media, campaigns likely backed by Doha or Ankara.
It’s not always clear what happened behind the scenes, but Saudi Arabia has shifted its policies slightly. It has become more critical of Israel. It’s possible that the Gaza War changed perceptions in Riyadh.
It’s also possible that anti-Saudi comments by one of the members of the ruling coalition in Jerusalem changed Riyadh’s calculations. Another factor may have been Saudi Arabia’s sense that Israel was growing too strong, in the wake of airstrikes on Doha only months after the Iran-Israel conflict.
Saudi Arabia was a key conduit for introducing Syria’s transitional leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to US President Donald Trump.
When voices in Jerusalem threatened to bomb Damascus, and one Israeli politician even suggested eliminating the Syrian president, Riyadh may have felt that Israel was becoming a source of instability in the region. Riyadh wants stability, not more wars.
These changing attitudes and the rift with Abu Dhabi likely have ramifications. Saudi Arabia is a strong country and a key US ally as well as a major buyer of US defense products.
It feels that it should be respected and that it has a role to play in the region’s stability. If it senses Jerusalem is not taking Saudi Arabia’s counsel seriously, either via intermediaries or possibly directly, then it’s plausible this will shift regional dynamics.
Israeli officials tend to think Saudi Arabia is rapidly becoming a major power in the region. Speeches have indicated this sense of Israel being a regional and global power.
Other statements by Israel’s Prime Minister, about the country being a kind of “super-Sparta,” are certainly being read in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh likely recalls that the UAE was referred to as “little Sparta” years ago as it played a growing role in places like Yemen.
Saudi Arabia possibly feels, like Greek city-states did in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War, that having too powerful Athens or Sparta was a problem. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, for instance, likely strains relations.
As Israel or the UAE are perceived as trying to remake the region and also back various non-state groups, Riyadh appears more and more concerned. Support for Syria and the Yemen government are manifestations of Saudi Arabia’s policy.
Along with Turkey, it’s possible it is also concerned about a new round of fighting with Iran. Saudi Arabia also may feel it has been pushed out of its traditional role in Lebanon. All of this adds up, and it may bring the UAE and Israel closer, but it may cause the Abraham Accords to remain as they are, without expansion.