Withdrawal of US forces from the region is off the table
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, July 25
Amid the turbulent transformations sweeping across the region, debate has once again ignited over the viability of maintaining US military forces in the Middle East, an estimated 40,000 troops stationed across air and naval bases stretching from Syria to the Gulf. This debate has resurfaced in the wake of recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and growing concerns that Tehran’s potential retaliation could place American personnel in harm’s way.
Yet, influential voices within the military and intelligence communities in Washington continue to argue that a precipitous withdrawal would jeopardize vital US interests and create dangerous vacuums ripe for exploitation by hostile powers or terrorist groups. The recent departure of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson from the region – while the USS Nimitz remains – suggests not a full-scale pullout but a calculated repositioning.
Adm. Brad Cooper, who recently assumed command of US Central Command (CENTCOM), has stated unequivocally that no plans are in place for a sweeping withdrawal. Instead, the force posture remains subject to ongoing review based on field conditions.
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Cooper confirmed that “the approach today is a conditions-based assessment,” emphasizing his commitment to reassessing force levels and their geographic distribution in real time. His remarks emphasize the military’s view that its land, air, and naval assets in the region remain central to America’s ability to respond swiftly to emerging threats.
Recent history reinforces the notion that Middle East crises erupt with such regularity that ignoring them is not a viable option – from the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran to Houthi threats in the Red Sea, from ongoing instability in Iraq and Syria to persistent threats in the Strait of Hormuz.
Gen. Frank McKenzie, who led US forces in the region from 2019 to 2022, has argued that “maintaining a measured military presence serves US interests and provides countries in the region with an additional element of stability in the face of threats.” His assessment, rooted in years of firsthand experience, warns that any abrupt departure would erode Washington’s deterrence credibility and strain vital security partnerships. But this is not merely a defensive posture.
US forces in the region are tasked with safeguarding maritime navigation through strategic chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of global energy supplies. They also play a pivotal role in counterterrorism efforts, particularly as reports surface of Islamic State cells reconstituting in vulnerable areas.
As McKenzie put it, “The war against ISIS is not over,” stressing that while US troops are not directly leading combat operations, they provide indispensable support to local partners on the ground. In this context, America’s military footprint functions as both a deterrent and an anchor of regional stability.
Sen. Angus King of Maine, who recently visited Iraq, offered further firsthand insights reflecting how local allies value the American presence. He relayed that Iraqi officials view US troops as a necessary counterbalance to the aggression of Iranian-backed militias, especially amid the political volatility surrounding upcoming elections.
“American forces are viewed as a stabilizing force at this critical time,” King noted. While critics highlight the high costs of maintaining the military presence, some estimates put it above $20 billion annually, many defense analysts argue that the price tag pales in comparison to the cost of a security vacuum that could invite the influence of adversarial states or extremist actors.
Sources within the Pentagon confirm that regional allies, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, remain committed to their defense arrangements with Washington and view American forces as a reliable bulwark against sudden crises.
Although the notion of replacing fixed bases with agile naval and air units has theoretical appeal, it runs up against the operational reality that rapid deployment and effective joint missions require established logistical hubs. Some defense planners are open to reevaluating the distribution of bases and reallocating forces, but few believe the region has become any less reliant on a US military presence.
The broader geopolitical calculus cannot be ignored either: US security officials acknowledge that while shifting strategic focus toward Asia is imperative, it does not warrant abandoning the Middle East, which has long been a theater of global power rivalry. A withdrawal without a robust, well-structured alternative risks ceding influence to Russia, China, or Iran.
As long as the region remains plagued by recurring and unpredictable crises, maintaining a flexible, responsive US military posture appears far more pragmatic than idealistic calls for a full retreat. Ultimately, the dominant view among senior American military and national security leaders is that “security cannot be achieved in a vacuum,” and that a deliberate, sustainable presence is a far safer bet than the costly mistake of retreat, only to return later under far worse conditions. – Huda al-Husseini
Does Israel want peace?
An-Nahar, Lebanon, July 25
There has been growing talk of a “New Middle East” emerging from the upheavals and shifting dynamics that have shaped the region over the past two years, amid speculation that more Arab countries will join the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel.
These agreements are expected to yield political and economic dividends for the entire region and the United States, while also bolstering the West’s strategic position against China and Russia.
But a fundamental question remains: does Israel truly want to end the state of war and demilitarize its society? Israel’s conduct across multiple fronts casts doubt on its commitment to peace. The devastation in Gaza, along with widespread displacement and destruction in the West Bank, suggests a systematic attempt to bury the two-state solution.
Meanwhile, on its northern front, Israel wages ongoing military operations in Lebanon under the banner of disarming Hezbollah, while escalating its strikes in Syria under shifting justifications – whether it’s combating terrorism, establishing a buffer zone, or defending minorities.
The confrontation with Iran, for its part, was paused not by mutual agreement or surrender, but by a directive from President Donald Trump. Yet the risk of escalation remains, particularly as Israel continues to warn of renewed conflict if Tehran advances its nuclear enrichment and missile programs.
The Iranian regime, far from defeated, remains active in rebuilding its regional network of proxy forces, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. As such, Israel’s multiple wars have yet to produce a resolution on any of the seven fronts it claims to be engaged in.
So, does Israel genuinely seek peace with its Arab neighbors? Should such agreements materialize, it would imply Israeli acceptance of a framework that endorses the two-state solution, recognizes peace and stability along its borders, and opens the door to joint investment and trade initiatives through normalization.
In such a scenario, the existential fear that has long defined Israeli society would be defused, potentially shifting public preference toward economic growth and development over military spending. The influence of Israel’s right wing, which thrives on fear and the perception of external threat, would likely diminish. Even more transformative, the country’s political power structure, which military figures have historically dominated since the state’s founding, could shift toward greater civilian and business leadership.
Yet Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right religious coalition appear determined to prolong the conflict, as several Israeli and Western reports, including a recent New York Times investigation, have indicated. Their political strategy hinges on reinforcing existential anxiety, particularly in the wake of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks, to galvanize support ahead of legislative elections.
But can leaders whose political survival depends on perpetuating fear and conflict truly pursue peace? Within Israel, opposition figures have voiced support for a two-state solution and for seizing the opportunity to make peace with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Syria – moves that could usher in a new era of regional stability. Yet these voices remain sidelined, lacking the political power to shift policy. As a result, Israel’s right-wing leadership will continue to seek out or sustain an adversary to justify high defense budgets and preserve the military’s central role in the national economy.
With current military campaigns still unresolved, it remains unclear who Israel will identify as its next enemy. There is a possibility that it will choose not to end any of its ongoing conflicts definitively, preferring instead to keep a target – whether Iran, with its expanding missile arsenal; Hezbollah, still entrenched in Lebanon; or perhaps a new adversary in Syria – at arm’s reach, to strike periodically and sustain the narrative that underpins its national security doctrine. – Riad Kahwaji
Gaza is a ticking time bomb
Al-Ittihad, UAE, July 26
Hamas is now confronting the most perilous phase of its existence in the Gaza Strip, having shifted from a dominant force to a beleaguered entity hemmed in by internal tribal dynamics and sustained military pressure. Its support from Iran appears increasingly uncertain, as its operational capabilities deteriorate and its leadership hierarchy fragments, despite the efforts of the current leader, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, to reorganize the movement.
Meanwhile, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) is moving to replicate the Rafah-based model of Yasser Abu Shabab’s militia by recruiting similar groups in northern Gaza and in key border zones. This is part of a broader strategy to dismantle Hamas’s governance infrastructure – its administrative, service, and security functions – and to prepare the ground for a potential phased Israeli withdrawal.
The Israeli military is actively studying the expansion of this model to additional areas of the Strip before reconfiguring existing security arrangements. The Israeli government has publicly announced its plan to arm various militias within Gaza in a bid to sow chaos and confront Hamas, a move that signals its intent to press forward regardless of criticism surrounding the Abu Shabab model’s shortcomings.
Despite mounting concerns about the plan’s effectiveness, it continues to receive the backing of Israel’s security agencies, particularly the Shin Bet, and remains under the patronage of Prime Minister Netanyahu. At its core, the Israeli approach reflects a belief that removing Hamas requires the emergence of a viable alternative authority.
The political leadership has rejected top-down solutions, whether from the Palestinian Authority or a proposed multinational force, and is instead pursuing a bottom-up solution rooted in on-the-ground realities. Netanyahu’s stance underscores a clear objective: to exclude both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority from any future governance arrangement in Gaza. Under the proposed plan, the Israeli military would occupy and “cleanse” strategic areas in Gaza before transferring authority to Bedouin militias supplied with arms, personnel, and decision-making power.
This process is being implemented in stages, beginning in zones that have already been cleared and are under complete Israeli control. Should it succeed, the model would be extended to other regions. In Shejaia and Khan Yunis, Israel has begun arming factions led by Yasser Hnaidek and Rami Helles, both members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), who are now active with direct Israeli military support.
These figures receive salaries from the Palestinian Authority, as well as weapons and humanitarian assistance from Israel. One faction operates in Gaza City’s Shejaia neighborhood, while the other is active in Khan Yunis in the south, both areas currently under heavy Israeli military presence as part of the ongoing operation.
Notably, Helles hails from a family that has long been antagonistic toward Hamas, dating back to 2007. The developments in Gaza echo previous Israeli efforts to cultivate internal collaborators, reminiscent of the Palestinian Village Leagues in the West Bank or the South Lebanon Army during the occupation of southern Lebanon.
However, despite robust Israeli backing, this strategy is encountering growing public resistance, raising the prospect of failure much like earlier attempts. On the ground, Hamas no longer exercises centralized control in Gaza. It now issues only general directives to its remaining fighters to endure for as long as possible, while contending with an internal tribal revolt and overt Israeli support for rival tribal leaders and militias. These tribes, for their part, claim they are safeguarding humanitarian aid convoys and attempting to establish a new administrative framework to replace Hamas’s crumbling rule.
In this evolving power struggle, local armed actors have become pivotal players, and Israel appears to be collaborating with them to erode Hamas’ grip. The formation of these security factions, regardless of their political affiliation, has disrupted Hamas’ military wing, particularly amid worsening internal communication between the organization’s military hierarchy and its central leadership in Gaza.
As the situation becomes increasingly complex, several scenarios for Gaza’s future are being proposed. One involves an international force overseeing the territory, though this idea appears flawed due to its lack of administrative viability for Palestinians. Another proposal envisions a joint international-Arab administration, comprising Arab and Palestinian representatives, which could pave the way for the Palestinian Authority’s return to governance. A third suggestion calls for an independent civil administration to manage Gaza’s affairs.
Yet all of these proposals remain speculative and unresolved, with the eventual outcome likely to be determined by shifts in the balance of power on the ground, a picture that is still taking shape. – Tarek Fahmy
The Arab world’s “Day After” plan
Al-Ahram, Egypt, July 24
At the outset of the fifth Gaza War, a pressing question emerged: What is Israel’s plan for the day after it achieves its declared objectives of recovering hostages, decimating Gaza, and eliminating Hamas? Will it reoccupy the territory? Will it act out of territorial ambition, seeking to displace Palestinians in favor of expanding settlements?
While some answers have surfaced through official statements and unfolding events, they have yet to coalesce into a coherent strategy for ending the war and building a peace in which Israel no longer lives under the threat of perpetual conflict. On the contrary, the war has widened, drawing in Iran, the Red Sea, the Syrian Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon.
At times, discussions around the “day after” have shifted toward the United States, particularly following President Trump’s historic visit to the Gulf and the subsequent discourse around expanding the Abraham Accords, alongside tentative steps toward the idea of a Palestinian state. However, today, the lines between war and diplomacy have become increasingly blurred, with peace negotiations unfolding against a backdrop of escalating military tensions and political coercion.
What is critical now is the recognition that the “day after” must not be treated as an exclusively Israeli or American initiative. It must be a collective regional effort, involving Arab nations, particularly those that have already signed peace agreements with Israel or are on the path toward normalization, and who share an interest in advancing regional development and long-term stability.
Allowing Israel or the United States to monopolize the postwar agenda risks perpetuating cycles of violence and expanding the scope of future conflict to include volatile issues such as the Iranian nuclear program, thereby locking the region into a state of war for years to come.
The essential task of the Arab “day after” is to safeguard Palestinian presence on the land and to prevent any form of ethnic cleansing or large-scale violence. Other regional battles or strategic distractions must not dilute this mission.
What we are witnessing, and have witnessed throughout this conflict, is that many have yet to fully comprehend the true nature of the current war, let alone learn from the patterns of past wars. More alarmingly, there remains a profound lack of engagement with the history and nuances of peace-building efforts, whether warm and active or cold and detached.
This moment demands deep reflection and strategic clarity from the Arab world, especially from those nations already affected by the ongoing war and those that will inevitably be shaped by the contours of the peace that may emerge, not just from Gaza or Ramallah, but even from faraway capitals like Baku. – Abdel Moneim Saeed
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.