Proposals to split up the responsibilities nestled in the Attorney-General's Office would strip Israel’s top legal gatekeepers of their independence and undermine the core safeguards that protect democracy, Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara said late Monday night.
Her comments were published alongside a sweeping, nearly 130-page advisory opinion warning that the bills would constitute “a fundamental regime change,” replacing an independent A-G with politically dependent legal officers whose primary loyalty would be to the government - rather than the public.
Her announcement, publicized with an advisory opinion on the matter, came ahead of scheduled discussions for Tuesday morning on bill proposals to do exactly that. The proposals were discussed in a heated debate in the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on Tuesday. They intend to split the role into three separate positions - a legal advisor to the government, a state prosecutor, and a government litigator (the state’s representative in court).
The committee meeting broke into clashes between MKs and senior legal officials regarding the advancement of the legislation at the Knesset panel. Meetings have been taking place weekly, led by committee Chairperson MK Simcha Rothman (Religious Zionist Party), who is among those who submitted the various proposals to split the role of the A-G.
The legislation would also reshape the appointment process, qualifications, term length, and powers of each role, marking a sweeping overhaul of Israel’s legal advisory and prosecutorial structure. According to the advisory opinion, the changes would give the political echelon “exclusive control” over appointments and dismissals, remove the binding force of the A-G’s legal opinions, and turn all three new positions into roles “subordinate to political interests” rather than independent guardians of the law.
Bill to 'abolish institution of Attorney-General'
The opinion, authored by Deputy Attorney-General Dr. Gil Limon, stressed that the government’s framing of the reform as a technical division of labor is misleading. The bills, he wrote, “effectively abolish the institution of the Attorney-General,” splintering it into three weakened posts that could be appointed and dismissed at will, with no search committee, professional vetting, or insulating mechanisms - a dramatic break from the model developed over decades of Israeli governance.
That model is rooted in the 1962 Agranat Committee, which first articulated the A-G as an independent legal authority protecting the public interest - rather than the government’s political needs. It was reinforced again after the Bar-On Hebron affair in 1997, when the Shamgar Committee recommended a professional search committee, a fixed six-year term, and clear grounds for dismissal to prevent political interference. These guardrails, later adopted in government resolutions, were meant to ensure that an A-G could stand firm against unlawful directives without fear of retaliation.
Because Israel lacks many of the checks and balances common in other democracies - including a full constitution, a bicameral legislature, and an independently elected executive - the A-G’s independence became over the years a central stabilizing pillar. The advisory opinion emphasizes that the A-G’s binding legal interpretations, oversight of government actions, and unified authority over prosecution and state representation emerged precisely to counterbalance the structural weakness of Israel’s separation of powers.
Supporters of the reform - including members of the coalition - argue that the A-G has amassed too much power, exercising what they see as an undemocratic veto over government policy. They contend that in many democracies, prosecution, government legal advice, and state representation are separate functions - and that Israel should align accordingly. Some also argue that the search committee model is outdated and elitist, giving unelected officials disproportionate influence over state policy.
Opponents respond that the comparison is flawed. While other democracies separate these functions, they also have robust constitutional safeguards that Israel does not. Splitting the A-G while simultaneously politicizing appointments, they argue, removes the only effective constraint on government power.
Some legal scholars have warned that the bills would allow political influence over criminal investigations, including those involving senior officials, and would give the government the ability to determine the legal positions presented to courts on behalf of the state. Limon wrote that without an independent A-G, “the executive branch will face no meaningful legal restraint, and the protection of rights, equality, and fair governance could erode irreversibly.”
The opinion concludes that, combined with other legislative initiatives, the package represents a cumulative weakening of the remaining democratic guardrails - especially significant in a year preceding national elections - and would ultimately transform the legal advisory system into one answerable not to the public interest, but to the sitting government.
Baharav-Miara added that the proposals would turn the A-G and prosecution “from state authorities obligated to the public interest into the government’s private lawyers.”
“Passing these bills will harm the foundations of the regime, the rule of law, the fight against governmental corruption, and human rights,” said the attorney-general.