Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar pauses for a moment before answering the first question of this interview. Not out of caution – though he has had enough of that this year – but because the year he is being asked to summarize refuses to be condensed. The past 12 months in Israeli diplomacy have been, by all accounts, among the most turbulent since the Second Intifada. Yet Sa’ar speaks calmly, without dramatics, as he reflects on a year he describes as “relentless, high-stakes, and defining.”
We meet him in his Jerusalem office, when, at the beginning of the meeting, his aide shows him a tweet on X/Twitter: “Breaking news – Germany will lift its partial arms embargo on Israel.”
“We worked on it for months,” he tells the Magazine. “This is an example of the war Israel is in the last year – in the diplomatic sphere.”
There were many dramatic moments, Sa’ar says, but the most dramatic were those hours after the June 12 decision to strike Iran at the start of what would become the Israel-Iran War. “We were waiting for the results of the first strike, knowing what failure or success would mean not only militarily but diplomatically.”
This juxtaposition – military events that reshape diplomatic landscapes – has been the defining theme of his tenure. Another dramatic moment Sa’ar mentions is a diplomatic fight that took place not in the Middle East but in Brussels. “Stopping European Union sanctions was far more difficult than the public knows. We were closer to sanctions than anyone in Israel realizes,” he says.
Sa’ar explains that the internal dynamics inside the European Union are not well understood by the Israeli public. The “pro-Palestinian reflex” of certain Western European states is longstanding, almost institutional. But Central and Eastern European states – like Germany, the Balkan states, Czechia, Hungary, and even Italy and Austria – form the counterweight that has allowed Israel to prevent deeper isolation. “The entire backbone of Eastern Europe – starting in the south with the Balkan countries and ending in the north with the Baltic states – is friendly toward Israel and is less obsessed with the Palestinian issue than certain countries in Western Europe. Therefore, you must shift the center of gravity there.”
This understanding guided one of Sa’ar’s boldest decisions: repositioning Israel’s diplomatic center. As a result, Israel closed its embassy in Ireland but opened new missions in Estonia and Moldova, and even in Zambia, in southeastern Africa. “You cannot operate with a map from the past. Europe has changed. Global politics have shifted. We must shift as well,” he says.
A Palestinian state
The interview with the foreign minister is taking place the same week that the UN Security Council voted on the draft resolution on the multinational force (International Stabilization Force) to be deployed to Gaza. The resolution includes the phrase “a pathway toward a Palestinian state” – a concept opposed by the governing coalition and by many in the opposition: “There will be no Palestinian state,” he says.
“Clearly, this isn’t a success,” Sa’ar says, referring to the fact that quite a few countries have recognized a Palestinian state over the past year. “But our influence over the governments of Britain, Canada, or France is negligible.”
He says the public knows which countries chose to recognize a Palestinian state but is unaware of the states he and the Foreign Ministry managed to persuade not to do so. “In countries like Germany, Croatia, the Baltic states, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe – as well as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea – we fought a very difficult battle, and we avoided a diplomatic collapse. With the diplomatic raw material we had, we managed to wage a very effective containment effort.”
Sa’ar notes critically that even in previous rounds, “waves” of international recognition for a Palestinian state came after the First and Second Intifada. “Every time there is a wave of violence, it pays off politically,” he notes.
Regarding the question of whether Israel will now face pressure – after the end of the Gaza war – to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority over the West Bank as well, the minister says clearly that at the moment, Israel is not under significant pressure. “Following my meetings in Washington, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on PA Chairman [Mahmoud] Abbas and other senior Palestinian officials, preventing them from attending the UN General Assembly in September. Pressure on the issue of payments to terrorists is also increasing. Abbas was forced to dismiss his finance minister over the matter of salaries for terrorists. The world accused him of misleading them.”
Gaza
“If Hamas does not disarm, the United States will support renewed military action,” the minister explains. Therefore, he says, contrary to Israel’s instinct to treat every Hamas violation as grounds for immediately breaking the ceasefire, Israel must give this process a chance. “Israel has to show that it gave the Trump plan a real opportunity – to convince the world that we are trying to achieve the war’s objectives first through diplomatic means. If that fails, we can act militarily and with much stronger international legitimacy. That is Israel’s clear strategic interest right now.”
Sa’ar admits he is skeptical that Hamas can be disarmed through diplomacy. “We see how the Lebanese government is struggling to do this with Hezbollah. But in the end, we must show the world that we are giving this a chance.”
The US does not make decisions in Gaza on Israel’s behalf, he emphasizes. “We have responded – and will respond – firmly when there are violations. But right now, maintaining the ceasefire is in Israel’s interest. I’ll remind you that the Israeli government once defined the goals for ending the war, and they were reflected in the Trump plan.”
Violence by extremists in the West Bank
“We simply cannot accept this,” Sa’ar says unequivocally when asked about recent violence by Jewish extremists in the West Bank. “Beyond the fact that we cannot tolerate violence against soldiers or civilians, it causes enormous damage to the entire settlement enterprise.”
However, he criticizes the European Union, saying it is exaggerating the number of incidents. “The EU has a preconceived narrative; it wants a Palestinian state. There is also an attempt to ‘create new issues’ now that the Gaza topic has faded somewhat with the ceasefire.”
Abraham Accords and Turkey
“I want to tell you something interesting,” Sa’ar says. “During the two years of the war, trade between Israel and the UAE did not decline – it actually increased.” He describes the Emiratis’ desire to maintain normalcy even after Oct 7. “They kept airline flights operating as usual. I visited there publicly twice during the war.”
Now, after the ceasefire, the foreign minister says that other Abraham Accords countries are slowly returning to public engagement with Israel. “Morocco is renewing flights; Bahrain is sending an ambassador. I hope we will soon see a call or meeting between Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu and Egyptian President [Abdel Fattah] al-Sisi. It’s a gradual warming – everyone is watching Gaza to see if the ceasefire holds.
“In the end,” the minister says, “despite the images from Gaza and despite public opinion in the Arab world, not a single country that signed a peace agreement with Israel cut diplomatic ties. That is worth noting. For them, too, the relationship is important.” Sa’ar says he believes that eventually more countries will join the accords, but “it requires patience and distance from the Gaza situation.”
According to Sa’ar, there is one country in the region, with which Israel has diplomatic relations, where it is hard to envision improvement: Turkey. “Just a few days ago, Turkey issued arrest warrants for the prime minister, the defense minister, and IDF generals. It is a country with an anti-Israel policy. They will not be part of the multinational force in Gaza – Israel will not change its position.”
Sa’ar also reveals that Israel expressed opposition in talks with senior US officials to the possibility of an F-35 fighter jet sale to Turkey. “I think our American friends understand the difficulties such a deal would pose.”
Regarding the US administration’s desire to advance F-35 deals with other regional states – including Saudi Arabia – Sa’ar says Israel can explain the importance of its aerial superiority, but there is a limit to what Israel can block. “We can influence up to a certain point. The situation is not as some claim, with antisemitic undertones – that Israel controls the US. President [Donald] Trump has his own interests, and there are issues where our perspectives differ.”
Iran
In recent months, satellite images and reports have shown Iran working to rebuild its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. “They are acting to restore the program, and even now they can produce ballistic missiles to some extent – but clearly not at the scale they once did, nor at what they intended.” Sa’ar acknowledges that Israel has no illusions that the Iranian threat will disappear – but at the moment, Israel does not intend to strike Iran.
At the end of the interview, Sa’ar discusses “the year after the ceasefire.” “We must respond to global public opinion and the criticism directed at Israel. It’s a very difficult battle.”
aHe reveals that ahead of the budget discussions, he already knows where he wants to open new embassies. “In the end, the world understands Israel’s values and its importance – and it seeks closer ties.” ■