Late last December, Saudi Arabia laid down a redline in Yemen. It carried out airstrikes near the Port of Mukalla. The goal was to push back the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC).

The STC controls part of southern Yemen, while Saudi Arabia backs the Yemen government, which controls another part of Yemen.

The strikes on the STC were a major shift for Riyadh. Prior to the strikes, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had ostensibly been on the same side in Yemen.

Over time, however, their roles and who they supported on the ground grew to differ. Now, Saudi Arabia has not only confronted the STC, but appeared to roll it back all the way to Aden and essentially defeated it in a week of rapid changes on the ground.

The Yemeni government, embodied by the Presidential Leadership Council, now controls southern Yemen and has seized areas from the STC.

A fighter loyal to Yemen's Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces as they deploy in the Crater district of the southern Yemeni city of Aden, on October 3, 2021, following clashes with an STC splinter group.
A fighter loyal to Yemen's Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces as they deploy in the Crater district of the southern Yemeni city of Aden, on October 3, 2021, following clashes with an STC splinter group. (credit: SALEH AL-OBEIDI/AFP via Getty Images)

Riyadh no longer pulling punches

Riyadh is not pulling punches now. On Thursday, the front page of Saudi Arabia-based newspaper Arab News was emblazoned with the word “Wanted” across the cover. It was in the style of one of those Old Western posters.

The target of the story was Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, head of the STC. He was supposed to fly to Riyadh on Wednesday for talks. Perhaps sensing that he might be detained upon arrival, he appears to have fled. He went to Abu Dhabi, Arab News reported.

“At a time when he should have acted like a statesman and boarded the plane scheduled to take him to Riyadh on Tuesday evening to meet and shake hands with Yemeni President Rashad Al-Alimi – agreeing to prioritize the interests of the Yemeni people and seek forgiveness for actions taken for personal gain at the expense of the nation – Aidarous Al-Zubaidi chose instead a ‘no-show,’ cementing his image as a traitor to his country,” the report said.

Arab News accused Zubaidi of supporting the secession of southern Yemen. The STC are seen as “separatists.”

Members of the Yemen government, embodied by the PLC, attended a meeting in Saudi Arabia on Wednesday.

“The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, headed by Al-Alimi, held an emergency meeting attended by members Sultan Al-Arada, Tariq Saleh, Abdulrahman Al-Muharrami, Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi and Othman Mujalli,” Arab News reported.

The PLC is now consolidating power. This comes after many years in which the Yemen government appeared weak and divided.

The UAE-backed STC had appeared to be on the rise. The collapse of the STC in a week of clashes would appear to be a message for the region: Many structures that appear strong are actually weak. This was also true of the Assad regime in Syria. It collapsed within a week in early December 2024.

The STC and the Assad regime are obviously very different entities. The Assad regime was a feature of the region for 50 years.

South Yemen has its roots in the 1960s and was once an independent state. It joined with North Yemen to become what is present-day Yemen in 1990. The attempt to recreate South Yemen concerned the Saudis.

The STC’s gamble to seek more autonomy and even independence appeared to have set off alarm bells in Riyadh in December. The STC made major gains on the ground in early December. This led to the airstrikes by Riyadh and demands that the UAE leave southern Yemen.

Without the UAE’s backing, it appears the STC collapsed amid pressure and intrigue.

Just days before the apparent collapse, Rudaw Media Network, a news channel in the autonomous Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq, reported: “The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has consolidated control over southern Yemen and is stepping up its international outreach to advance what it describes as the South’s ‘legitimate right to self-determination,’ a well-placed source in Aden told Rudaw on Tuesday.”

How could things change so quickly?

The relative weakness of the STC without UAE backing appears to have been an Achilles’ heel. There was more at stake, however, and reports have circulated in the region that painted Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December as part of a wider process that could lead Israel to also back the UAE’s role in Aden in Yemen.

Maariv “says recognition of Somaliland could pave way for similar move in south Yemen against Houthis,” Middle East Monitor reported. Iran’s semiofficial Mehr News Agency also accused Israel of “eyeing” southern Yemen.

Is it possible that Riyadh’s decision to move quickly to stop the STC in late December was linked to larger strategy issues in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden?

After Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, there was talk about how this might shift the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. This is because Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and other countries all play a role in this area.

For instance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia also appear to have a different view of Sudan’s civil war. Riyadh likely wants a ceasefire there and may back Egypt, which backs the Sudan army. The UAE has been accused of backing the RSF.

As such, the two Gulf countries appear to have differences on both sides of the Red Sea. The same is apparently true in Somaliland, where the UAE has interests.

Riyadh doesn’t want to see its power slowly eroded throughout the region. It has worked to patch things up with Iran via talks backed by China. It gets along with Turkey better than in the past. Riyadh has helped the new Syrian government’s outreach to Washington.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister was in Washington on Wednesday.

“Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, arrived in Washington on Wednesday on an official visit to the United States,” Saudi Arabia’s official Saudi Press Agency reported.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Farhan on Wednesday.

“Just concluded a meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to discuss continued coordination in support of Middle Eastern security and stability, including in Gaza, Yemen, Sudan, and Syria,” Rubio wrote on X/Twitter.

There are many issues that may be linked. The UAE and Ethiopia have called for dialogue in Sudan.

“The General Secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation announced that an extraordinary meeting of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers would take place in order to discuss the rapidly escalating developments in Somalia,” Arab News reported.

This came a day after Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Somaliland on Tuesday.

Saudi Arabia is clearly reasserting its regional and global role. This comes as the US backed a trilateral meeting in Paris between Israel and Syria.

Sa’ar also expressed concerns over clashes between the Syrian government and Kurds in Aleppo. Riyadh is likely following events in Somaliland, Yemen, Sudan, and other countries closely.

Amid this context, the more Riyadh feels in the driver’s seat of regional shifts, the more it may weigh how to respond to the monthly reports about possible normalization with Israel.

Riyadh wants to see changes in Gaza and in Jerusalem’s approach to the Palestinians. It is clear about what it wants. The idea that it will normalize and get nothing in return is likely a fantasy.

In addition, Riyadh has not been impressed by some of the insults thrown its way by some Israeli politicians, such as a cabinet minister who told the Saudis to “keep riding camels.”

Riyadh has shown in Yemen that it won’t take insults or threats, and that when it has a redline and a demand, it will act. Countries in the region that may have underestimated Riyadh’s commitment to its foreign policy may now think again.

It has been a long road to here – from Saudi Arabia leading an intervention in Yemen in 2015, an intervention that did not always go Riyadh’s way – but Saudi Arabia is now back in the driver’s seat.