The flight from the navigator’s seat in the F-16I aircraft, at an altitude of 20,000 feet, was initially fairly calm. The instrument gauges, the control panel, the observation systems that require supreme concentration, and the constantly changing in-flight data all quickly raise the question: what went through the minds of the fighter pilots on October 7, and how do stationary objects, terrorists, or pickup trucks on the ground look from the air?
They are almost impossible to see. To scan the area and precisely aim various munitions on rare occasions, you practically have to dive toward the ground.
During the flight, a target was detected on the northern border. The engine thrust increased for acceleration, pressing the seat backward for a brief moment. English code words warned of rapid altitude loss, and at the moment the bomb was released, a few seconds of vibration were felt in the simulator's cockpit.
The smoke plume was clearly visible on the screen, and again the question sharpened: what does a pickup truck look like to a fighter pilot? At my request, we descend further and further. The system continues to warn of altitude loss, and at 300 feet, when the aircraft is already exposed to missile fire and anti-aircraft guns, you finally see the ground, but the flight speed is relatively high, and the objects are small. It’s a kind of glimpse into what happened on October 7, when fighter pilots were scrambled to the Gaza Strip. The Air Force has been trying to close that gap by leaps and bounds over the past two years.
In an interview with one of the fighter pilots who trains the squadrons on the Air Force’s advanced simulators, we get a glimpse into the emerging ability of the pilots to stop Hezbollah’s Radwan forces in southern Lebanon if they approach the border, to disrupt the arrival of 100 pickup trucks carrying Houthi or jihadist fighters from Syria, and even to prevent Hamas terrorists in Gaza from crossing the “yellow line.”
Captain D., 27, a fighter pilot in an F-16I from Squadron 107 (the Knights of the Orange Tail), has served as a training officer in addition to his current operational role for the past year and a half, and each week he trains several F-15 and F-16 fighter squadrons using Elbit’s simulators. One of the newest and most complex training scenarios for fighter pilots, who are accustomed to flying at 20,000 feet over enemy states, is the “explosive event” scenario in the border areas, a framework based on the events of October 7.
In the critical first hours of the massacre on October 7, most of the fighter aircraft remained on the ground. The fighters did not take part in immediate defense or strike missions; instead, they prepared for the possibility of a broader escalation, alongside patrols around the gas rigs due to fears of drone attacks.
That Saturday morning, Captain D. woke up at his home in Tel Aviv to the sound of rocket sirens. He initially thought Home Front Command would soon report a malfunction. He looked out the window and saw a live interception, and understood this was war, and rushed to “pack a bag for a week.”
At the same time, he received messages from his fellow squadron members and rushed toward the Hatzor Airbase in the Negev. Near Beit Kama Junction, on his way to Ofakim and from there to the squadron, he got a phone call from his mother, who told him there were terrorists in the town, so he made a detour and drove through Beersheba.
When he arrived at the base, which was under rocket-impact readiness, the emotions were tense and uncertain. The first mission was planning a military offensive named Operation Sword of Damocles, a contingency plan to strike Hamas headquarters and defensive and offensive underground systems. “When I got to the base, I very quickly understood that this wasn’t just rockets but something else. Very different,” he said. “I’m a regular squadron pilot; I plan what they tell me, and that’s what we do best. Targets were sent down to us. But at that moment, we really had no idea what exactly was happening.
"The situation wasn’t clear: ‘there are many infiltrations.’ What did we know? That we were about to arm all the aircraft and plan strikes. From that moment, it was total focus.”
Captain D. participated in the first major flyover strikes deep inside the Gaza Strip, landed again at the base, continued planning for another flyover, and took off again. Most of the initial strikes were aimed at offensive tunnels intended for border crossings. In the background, he received word that the brother of one of his friends, who had been at the Nova festival, wasn’t answering; he was later discovered to have been murdered by terrorists.
Since October 7, he has taken part in a very large number of strikes far from Israel’s borders, many of them extremely complex, and during this time, he was also appointed a training officer at the Hatzor Airbase. “We build training sessions for the entire fighter array. Some deal with the third circle (Iran), others with border defense (similar to October 7). The individual training is done within the squadrons,” Captain D. explained. “Here, we don’t train on Syria or Lebanon.”
Reality in the cockpit during a border-defense mission demands much more attention from the pilot and navigator because to operate without intelligence, with short warning, in an area that’s not necessarily familiar, and in a dynamic infiltration scenario, the aircrew must act calmly, creatively, and simultaneously generate their own intelligence. As the seconds pass and the pilot descends, he has an ongoing “internal debate”: whether to look outside the cockpit to see what’s happening on the ground, or to look at the control panel to understand what’s happening in the aircraft and around it.
“There is no longer any ‘scenario that couldn’t happen’”
In initial discussions about how to build the new border-defense training files for IAF personnel, everyone understood this was something different, something the pilots had never encountered, and that the change would first and foremost be mentally challenging. No more meticulously planned missions or ones they had trained for in the past.
“The first notable thing in the training is that there’s no one giving us the targets we need,” Captain D. says. “What will happen when we work with other aircraft like helicopters or drones? Do we know them well enough to complete the mission? Because I know they work with all the ground forces. They were the ones who were really effective, and they were the heroes on October 7. In the flight formation, we look from 20,000 feet, and we don’t really know how to identify who is ours and who is the enemy. So every training includes a clear explanation that this is an explosive event on one of the state’s borders, and therefore, they need to know the characteristics of each sector: the yellow line in Gaza, the Lebanon border, Syria, and more. Everyone says openly: ‘There is no scenario that won’t happen anymore; there is no longer “illogical”—there is maybe low probability. Here we train for everything.’ In the simulator, this is the place to make mistakes and wrestle with the scenario. Just like we train for Iran, we train for border defense.”
The essential difference is understanding that in a border-defense mission, there is a “golden hour,” and each minute of response time is critical. If an infiltration occurs, the scenario won’t be foreign or surprising at a basic level. To be ready, they usually choose to train for the hardest scenario.
“The main change in all fighter squadrons is decentralization of authority. In the past, a pilot on regular alert would wait for instructions from the command center (‘the pit’). Today, authority has been decentralized and given to the pilots in this scenario. This means that communication with other forces will be faster, and the pilot won’t circle back airborne while waiting for instructions, but will make decisions himself. That gives us great responsibility, since everyone understands the first hour is critical, and we can see that because of what happened on October 7,” Captain D. said, adding, “Flight squadrons will not prevent an infiltration on a scale like October 7, but it can significantly disrupt it even before reaching the border.
Change of focus from disrupting singular suspicious vehicles to broader threats
"Our goal has changed: we are less focused on responding to a single suspicious vehicle and more on broad disruption. For example, dropping heavy munitions to block a route and delay a convoy of 100 vehicles until ground forces arrive. It’s a tough dilemma because our one-ton bombs cause enormous damage, and we have to make fateful decisions in the field when entering the hardest scenario—one with no coordination with the command center.”
Captain D. explains that since he’s a young fighter pilot, the mental-transition process is less complex for him than for older pilots, including reservists, who grew up under a highly centralized mindset geared toward threats like Iran, not border-defense missions. “Reality has changed, and we need to change with it.”
The next stage of the process involves a closer, more intimate understanding of combat helicopters and drones. “This process teaches the pilot who all the other operators are talking to, what they’re capable of, and with whom they’re coordinating on the ground, such as the security coordinator, battalion commander, etc.
"At some point, when the fighter pilot decided (while I served as navigator) to drop a one-ton bomb on one of the hills to deter terrorists in a populated area, when it wasn’t clear who the terrorists were. I had to patiently watch the screen. Long seconds passed until the aircraft entered the circle (on the control panel), and then I pressed the button to release the heavy bomb. When you realize how close you are to the ground, you feel how exposed you are to ground fire and what level of risk you’re taking. During the flight, you can also exchange information with drone operators and attack helicopter pilots to see what’s happening on the ground."
'We want to be the best, but we weren’t'
Captain D. emphasized that the clear advantage of any fighter jet is the ability to reach any point in the country within minutes: “If the command center doesn’t have a clear picture because their systems were blinded, we can help build it."
The hardest dilemma is terrorists infiltrating a town. “When they tell you and pressure you: ‘I need that bomb here,’ and even if you don’t have authorization, and you’re not sure it’s right to put a bomb there, they tell you, ‘I need it here.’ What do you do? That’s a dilemma,” Captain D. said from his small office at the training center. “We’re not training for the same scenario as October 7. We expect the next scenario to surprise us from another direction. My goal is to practice principles and understand what’s different now.
When asked whether a fighter pilot would prefer striking the Islamic Republic in Iran or a border-defense mission, Captain D. said, "You’d be surprised - border defense. What happened is a national stain we all experienced. All of us. We truly want to be the best, and we weren’t. We state it plainly. We need to raise our level here, and we’re improving, debriefing, training here, training for Iran, training for border defense, and also for routine security missions. We divide the training as needed and don’t skip anything.”