Israel’s opening in Lebanon, Syria may not last long - opinion

These unexpected developments have created an opportunity for Israel to move from a situation of “out of the North evil shall break forth,” in the words of the prophet Jeremiah, to one in which “out of the North good shall break forth.”

From the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 until 2005, Syria was the dominant power in Lebanon. The Syrian Ba’ath regime viewed Lebanon as part of “Greater Syria.” As a result, all rounds of negotiations between Israel and Syria were conducted under the assumption that no arrangement in Lebanon was possible without a prior agreement with Syria.

After Syria withdrew from Lebanon, Hezbollah – backed by Iran and Syria – became the decisive force in Lebanon’s sectarian politics. However, the rise of the al-Sharaa regime in Syria on the one hand, and the weakening of Hezbollah following the war on the other, have led to a separation of the two arenas, each now offering Israel a diplomatic opportunity.

So far, none of these measures has been implemented. At the same time, the aftershocks of the war are evident in growing internal anti-Hezbollah discourse. Beyond the usual suspects – figures from the Christian camp and parts of the Sunni camp opposed to the organization’s political power – criticism is also beginning to penetrate the Shi’ite community.

This stems from several factors. First, Lebanon has been in a severe economic, political, and social crisis at least since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019. The massive explosion at the Beirut port in the summer of 2020 that devastated parts of the city and the war have also taken a heavy toll on the state and society.

Second, more than one million people – many of them Shi’ite, particularly from southern Lebanon and the Dahiyeh district of Beirut – have been displaced from their homes.

Finally, there is growing criticism of Hezbollah. The organization has built a civilian apparatus that has largely replaced state institutions, such as schools, youth movements, financial institutions, gas stations, retail networks, and even pharmacies.

Moreover, the salary paid to its fighters – about $1,500 per month – was many times higher than that of a junior officer in the Lebanese army, about $150 per month. Today, following the fall of the Assad regime and ongoing Israeli strikes on its economic infrastructure, Hezbollah is struggling to compensate its displaced supporters.

Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah strongly opposes any political settlement with Israel. Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the organization’s political council and one of its representatives in parliament, warned against internal division.

He stressed that the Lebanese people are committed to the path of “steadfastness and resistance [to Israel].” He concluded with an implicit threat that Hezbollah “will not allow anyone to play with the fate of the homeland and the future of coming generations.”

In doing so, he evoked the traumatic memory of Lebanon’s civil war, which lasted about 15 years. This fear weighs heavily on many Lebanese across sectarian lines, who ask whether an agreement with Israel is indeed worth the risk.

Hezbollah is at one of its lowest points and is accused of dragging the country into yet another round of destruction. It has also demonstrated that it is more an Iranian than a Lebanese organization, and in this sense has betrayed Lebanese identity. The idea of recognizing Israel and negotiating with it, which was once a unifying factor among Lebanese, now contributes to Hezbollah’s isolation.

At the same time, the Lebanese army is too weak to implement government decisions regarding Hezbollah. There is a real fear of the disintegration of the army and state institutions along sectarian lines, as occurred during the civil war.

The opportunity, therefore, depends on the delicate and fragile fabric of Lebanese politics. Whereas in the past Israel cooperated mainly with the Maronite Christians, today it must find channels to Sunnis, Druze, and even elements within the Shi’ite community that have grown disillusioned with the organization.

Hence, dialogue should be as broad as possible – even if it means agreement on the lowest common denominator. Moreover, two obstacles stand in the way of an agreement: how to deal with those who will try to sabotage it from within, as happened in 1983, and how to ensure the security of residents in northern Israel while Lebanon will demand an Israeli withdrawal to the international border and resolution of border disputes.

The Syrian arena also presents an opportunity. Many in Israel view Ahmed al-Sharaa as a “jihadist in a suit” and are not impressed by his moderate political statements, as well as by the fact that he has taken no military action against Israel – even as Israel has effectively nullified the 1974 disengagement agreement and seized additional territory for security purposes.

The main problem between Israel and Syria today is not necessarily military but rather psychological – namely, the deep mistrust existing between the sides. A similar situation existed between Israel and Egypt, where a series of agreements in the post-1973 war eventually led to peace, but also to Israeli withdrawal.

Military achievements and unexpected developments have created opportunities vis-à-vis Syria and Lebanon. Timing is crucial: the internal weakness of both countries increases the chances for a settlement, whereas the passage of time may allow opposing forces to regroup and thwart the process.

To seize these opportunities, Israel must undertake bold and creative diplomatic initiatives. Only sustained dialogue and a credible mediator can bring them to fruition.