One of the most frequently cited observations about war and its outcomes is from Carl von Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” It is sometimes rendered as: “War is diplomacy by other means.” Wars do not erupt in a vacuum. They are instruments used by states when diplomacy fails, collapses, or is deliberately abandoned. The expectation, at least in theory, is that war still serves political objectives.
Otto von Bismarck expressed this more bluntly: “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” President John F. Kennedy offered a moral counterweight: “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.” Henry Kissinger summarized the essence of statecraft succinctly: “The task of diplomacy is to restrain power.”
Since the outbreak of the current war, launched with a preemptive US-Israeli strike against Iran, President Donald Trump stated in several interviews that he is willing to engage in negotiations with Iran. He has claimed that Iranian leaders want to talk and that he is prepared to do so, although the details and timing remain unclear.
I believe that the real intention of both Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is to force Iran into surrender through overwhelming military pressure, applied by the combined might of the United States and Israel, and reinforced by the involvement of countries attacked by Iran, including the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and others hosting US military bases and assets. Iran, however, is unlikely to surrender; it is not within the DNA of the regime of the ayatollahs.
I know from direct experience that in the lead-up to ending the war in Gaza, both Netanyahu and Trump believed Israel’s military power would compel Hamas to surrender completely. In my conversations with senior American officials, I consistently argued that Hamas would never surrender but that it was willing to reach an agreement to release all the hostages in exchange for ending the war.
Hamas also indicated a willingness to relinquish control over Gaza. But without admitting defeat (in fact, Hamas declared victory), Hamas was effectively defeated in Gaza, much as Iran is being militarily weakened today.
The Iranian regime will not voluntarily relinquish control over Iran. As Trump himself has stated, regime change ultimately depends on the Iranian people. The most hopeful historical model for Iranian regime change is what happened in Egypt in 2011, when president Hosni Mubarak resigned after 18 days of mass protests during the Arab Spring. That outcome became possible only when the Egyptian army chose to stand with the people rather than suppress them. That perhaps remains the most plausible scenario for Iran.
Even if the war does not lead to regime change, Iran will emerge significantly weakened, with its economy in devastation. This military defeat can and should be leveraged to initiate a rapid process of regional diplomacy enabled by the use of force. Iran’s strategic mistake in attacking its Arab neighbors, assuming they would pressure Washington to end the war, has boomeranged. Instead, several of those states have chosen to actively confront Iran.
Even before being directly attacked, in April and October 2024 and again in June 2025, when Iran launched missiles toward Israel, neighboring states, including some without diplomatic relations with Israel, helped intercept Iranian missiles and drones. A de facto regional defense pact emerged without formal negotiations or signed agreements. This was remarkable. Unfortunately, it was not used as the foundation for a broader regional diplomatic framework.
At the time, Arab states and the US administration were focused primarily on ending the war in Gaza. The decisive American push to end the Israel-Hamas War came only after Israel attempted and failed to assassinate the Hamas leaders on sovereign Qatari soil on September 9, 2025. Following that incident, Arab governments insisted that Trump end the war, and he did.
What new opportunities exist today?
Today, new opportunities exist. Trump and his Steve Witkoff-Jared Kushner team must ensure that this war becomes diplomacy by other means – in other words, that what follows war is diplomacy. Regional diplomacy will become real when Trump will commit to implementing point 20 of his 20-point plan. That opportunity is right in front of us.
Point 20 states: “While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.”
The most effective and fastest path forward would be for Trump, together with the Arab states attacked by Iran, to insist on conducting Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections within three months, to be held in the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and Gaza. It must be made clear that if those elections produce a Palestinian government committed to a two-state solution, peace with Israel, genuine reform, clean governance, and reconciliation, the new regional alliance will support the full implementation of point 20.
That process would then enable the full implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative from March 2002 that proposed to Israel that in exchange for enabling the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel based on the June 4, 1967, lines, “the Arab countries affirm the following: (a) Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. (b) Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.”
Such steps should also profoundly affect the Israeli electorate, allowing the people of Israel to confront a new regional reality – one that will no longer tolerate the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is prepared to take decisive action to secure a stable Middle East, promote deep economic development, and ensure shared prosperity for all states in the region.
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process would no longer be bilateral; it would become regional, with regional defense and security pacts as well as agreements for economic development for the benefit of all states in the region.
Even if a regime change in Iran is slow to occur, the scenario outlined above is the best possible outcome for Israel and for all of the peoples of the Middle East.
The writer is the Middle East director of the International Communities Organization and the co-head of the Alliance for Two States.