Why Washington’s Gaza strategy ignores the facts on the ground - opinion

With no nation willing to participate meaningfully in an international stabilization force capable of disarming Hamas or destroying its tunnel networks, and with the US-led command center in Kiryat Gat focused primarily on facilitating humanitarian aid, Gaza today is not experiencing a genuine ceasefire. It is instead in a tense pause.

This reality is shaped by what is happening in the 41 percent of western Gaza, the so-called “Red Zone”, still controlled by Hamas, where virtually 100 percent of Hamas operatives and roughly 99 percent of Gaza’s civilian population now reside.

After generations of indoctrination and radicalization, even Israeli intelligence officials acknowledge how difficult it has become to distinguish between Hamas infrastructure and the civilian environment in which it is embedded.

Since the American-brokered cessation of hostilities in October 2025, Hamas has been steadily reorganizing, rearming, reopening damaged tunnels, and reasserting full control over every area of western Gaza under its authority.

Largely unnoticed in the West, a vast subterranean terror network remains intact, now shielded by an even denser civilian presence as nearly the entire population has been compressed into shrinking territory. Hamas is once again rebuilding terrorist hubs inside civilian infrastructure–hospitals, UN facilities, and schools–patterns repeatedly verified by Israeli intelligence.

The international silence in response has been deafening.

Despite approximately 600 aid trucks entering Gaza daily, the international community continues to claim widespread food insecurity. What goes largely unreported are the massive underground food stockpiles uncovered by Israel inside Gaza, including one in Beit Hanoun alone estimated to contain a six-month supply.

Hamas has also learned from the past two years of fighting. It has adapted its tactics to counter Israel’s defensive posture, closely observing IDF movements. Israel, in turn, avoids static positioning, engaging in a constant cat-and-mouse effort to deny Hamas targeting advantages. Contrary to international media narratives, Hamas still possesses significant weapons caches and maintains the capacity to innovate, including by repurposing unexploded Israeli ordnance.

During this visit, I conducted an in-depth review of Israel’s Northern Brigade under Southern Command. Its frontline positions sit atop a natural 70-meter-high ridge in northern Gaza, backed by multiple defensive layers extending to the Gaza border itself.

The so-called “yellow line” initially placed approximately 53 percent of Gaza under Israeli control; operationally, that figure is closer to 59 percent. Fewer than one percent of Gazans reside in this area, mostly members of Palestinian militias hostile to Hamas.

In the summer of 2025, Hamas shifted much of its command structure southward. Since the October ceasefire, it has returned north, reconstituting terror hubs in areas Israel previously cleared–echoing a painful pattern from the past two years in which Hamas rapidly reoccupied vacated sites.

The Red Zone areas handed back to Hamas since October 2025 are now saturated with military-age fighters. When asked about reports of widespread child and teenage soldiers, Israeli intelligence officials stated that the overwhelming majority of observed operatives are adult males of fighting age.

Even within the territory currently controlled by the IDF, significant tunnel networks continue to be discovered, an effort likely to take many months, if not years. Any movement of civilians or Hamas operatives from the Red Zone into IDF-controlled areas would dramatically compound this risk. The scale of the tunnel system in western Gaza alone would require years to fully dismantle, placing severe constraints on any future military campaign.

Any new Palestinian security entity formed inside Gaza would almost certainly be dominated by Hamas. According to IDF assessments, Hamas commanders would likely reemerge under new names and insignia, preserving jihadist control behind a thin facade of reform.

The IDF has little desire to relinquish the yellow line, which currently provides a strong defensive posture. Yet this is ultimately a political decision. US pressure to advance to Phase Two and push Israel closer to the Gaza envelope border is inevitable.

While residents of southern Israeli towns and kibbutzim are slowly returning, many remain hesitant. If IDF withdrawal reduces the buffer zone to the point where Palestinians are once again within eyesight of these communities, another wave of displacement is likely.

What comes next for Gaza may be driven by illusory signs of progress, such as Hamas allowing “independent” Palestinians to manage daily affairs while it governs from the shadows through intimidation.

The reality on the ground suggests that this would be more illusion than substance. And it is that reality, not diplomatic theory, that should guide decisions about Gaza’s future.