For decades, Saudi Arabia has tried to manage and contain the risks posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran to Saudi interests and its existence. Riyadh’s posture was calibrated: deter when needed, isolate when possible, and accommodate when necessary.
At times, this meant indirect support for the status quo, under the theory that either a change of regime was not feasible or that a weak Islamic Republic was preferable to a revolutionary vacuum or a nationalist successor. That logic no longer stands. The Iranian regime is moving toward collapse, and Riyadh now has to plan for the aftermath.
Iran’s internal stability has eroded in ways the Islamic Republic can no longer disguise or offset. The regime’s economy is unraveling, its currency is in free fall, and its budget is dependent on shadow oil shipments. Major factions within the system are increasingly unwilling to absorb the costs of its crises, and the authority that once held the structure together is no longer functioning.
Last month, two Iranian army soldiers unfurled the pre-revolution Lion and Sun flag on the Tehran metro, an act that would have been unthinkable for uniformed personnel only a short time ago. These dynamics have pushed Iran into a period where meaningful recovery is unlikely and where systemic political transition, in one form or another, must be anticipated rather than dismissed.
Riyadh need not make a formal endorsement of regime change. But quiet, early engagement now carries obvious advantages.
Those who open discreet communication channels with Iran’s opposition today will have strategic opportunities in a post-regime Iran. Israel has already begun to position itself accordingly. The United States and Europe are slowly moving in that direction. Further delay will not slow the shift already underway inside Iran. It will only reduce Riyadh’s ability to influence what follows.
Saudi Arabia pursues normalization
After the failed intervention in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has pursued tactical normalization with the regime, largely to de-escalate flashpoints and avoid direct confrontation. That was a prudent risk-reduction maneuver that successfully managed tensions, but it fails to address the fundamental threat posed by the Islamic Republic. The normalization served only to buy time.
Saudi Arabia, as a key player in West Asia, is uniquely positioned to contribute to and benefit from a smoother transition in Iran. This requires shifting from reactive containment to proactive engagement with credible opposition forces and regional and international players who benefit from the removal of the Islamic Republic.
For the first time in over four decades, there is a prominent, nationally recognized alternative to the regime: Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, whose name is chanted inside Iran and who commands legitimacy across ideological, ethnic, and generational lines.
Pahlavi has actively begun the groundwork for a transition. His national cooperation platform encourages civil servants, technocrats, and military officers, offering them a path to find their place in post-regime Iran.
His Iran Prosperity Project plan has gathered teams of experts and produced a detailed road map for transition to democracy and economic reconstruction. His Eternal Guard initiative educates Iranians on how to coordinate and organize discreetly for what he calls “the final battle.”
He has pledged to pursue secular governance and foster regional cooperation. “We want to live in peace and partnership with our Arab neighbors,” he declared at the IAC summit in Washington, DC, a statement that stands as a direct guarantee to the Arab leaders neighboring Iran.
His diplomatic visit to Israel in 2023, subsequently followed by members of the Iran Prosperity Project team, sends a clear message to the region: he is preparing for statecraft, not permanent exile.
The economic upside is considerable. The removal of the Islamic Republic as the biggest state sponsor of terror, with a deeply entrenched enmity toward Saudi Arabia, fundamentally reduces the risk of doing business in the region, a goal central to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s long-term vision.
Iran’s energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications sectors will require massive reinvestment and offer significant contract opportunities, conservatively estimated at over $800 billion in the first decade. Saudi engineering firms, financiers, and construction leaders are positioned to benefit significantly from this recovery if they establish the right relationships now.
Riyadh currently faces a clear choice: Initiate discreet communication channels and offer selective, strategic support to a credible opposition framework, or continue betting on an imploding regime that has consistently threatened Saudi Arabia’s national security and existence. Failure to plan for a post-regime scenario risks missing out on a historic opportunity while forfeiting the ability to shape what follows.
Dr. Aidin Panahi is an energy and industrial policy expert, and a political and human rights advocate. Follow him on X: @Aidin_FreeIran. Andrew Ghalili is a senior policy analyst at the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI).