Middle Israel: Can Ahmed al-Sharaa move Syria forward? - opinion

In fact, Syria was a mere six weeks away from the civil war that killed more than 600,000 and displaced more than 12 million, victimized by a tribalist tyranny that robbed the country’s riches, stifled enterprise, created mass unemployment, printed paper money, muzzled the intelligentsia, jailed thousands, and condemned millions to lifelong despair.

Now, a year after Assad’s downfall, the question is what are the chances that his successor will be any better, and the answer is they are low, at best.

The man who, in 2003, joined the anti-American insurgency in Iraq spent more than 20 of his 43 years fighting before morphing into a well-tailored head of state. How much, if at all, this transformation is real is unclear, but his accomplishments en route to the presidency are clear and ominous.

First, Sharaa crafted a military attack that displayed wisdom, daring, and results. The defeat of the Syrian army in a matter of 11 days was swift, displaying quality intelligence, resolute leadership, and efficient command.

Second, Sharaa defeated not only the Syrian army but also a regional power, Iran, and a superpower, Russia. While his troops attacked, Iranian-led militias were present on the ground, and Russian aircraft were in the air.

That Russia’s air force would not interfere, and the Iranian militias would not fight, is easy to say in retrospect. On the eve of the attack, there was no such assurance. Deciding to launch it took guts. It also transformed Sharaa from an anonymous terrorist to a victorious guerrilla.

However, history is laden with successful guerrillas who became failed state builders, from Fidel Castro to Mao Zedong. Judging by his first year in office, Sharaa may be heading their way.

Unlike Castro, Sharaa is not out to confront a superpower, and unlike Mao, he has no penchant for Marxist experiments in economic alchemy. Where, then, is he headed? Is his long-term goal an Islamist republic? Very possibly, considering that during the civil war, his troops reportedly tried to forcibly convert Christians.

Then again, since he took over, alcohol has not been banned in Syria, no dress code for women has been introduced, and non-Muslim worship has not been limited. Combined with the massive release of political prisoners and the dismantlement of Assad’s secret services, Sharaa’s Syria is a nicer place than what it replaced.

But this change is atmospheric, as opposed to the substantive change Syria begs on three fronts: political construction, economic reconstruction, and sectarian reinvention. On all these, Sharaa has said nice things since taking office, promising to protect minorities, encourage foreign investment, hold elections, and also introduce a constitution and assemble a parliament.

Yet a closer look at all these raises the suspicion that Sharaa’s formula is but a variation of Bashar Assad’s theme.

The parliament was not elected by the people, much less did the people get to debate and approve the constitution. Having an omnipotent president rule without a prime minister, Sharaa’s constitution has two-thirds of parliamentary candidates vetted by presidential committees, and the rest appointed directly by the president. This is besides declaring Sharia law as the source of Syria’s jurisprudence.

Worse, the ethnic rifts that fueled the civil war have not been healed. On the contrary, massacres by Sharaa’s troops of Alawites in the west and Druze in the east were foreboding signs that many of his Sunni constituents are less interested in building a new Syria than in settling accounts with the old one.

Equally alarming is the state of reconstruction. The good news for Syria is that the new president has managed to remove a good part of the sanctions he inherited from Assad. The bad news is that in the field, none of the construction drives that Sharaa’s devastated country demands – housing projects, highways, railways, hospitals, factories, power stations – has begun.

What has begun is corruption. Sharaa’s older brother, Hazam, is reportedly overseeing the takeover of large-scale companies through a clandestine committee, aided by a Lebanese-Australian sanctioned by Canberra for financing terrorism (“Syria is secretly reshaping its economy. The president’s brother is in charge,” Reuters, July 24, 2025).

This suggests that, while Assad is gone, his model of government is alive and well.

Evidently, millions of Syrian Sunnis want to impose themselves on the rest of Syria, the way the Alawites did under Assad. Sharaa claims he does not share this quest. That remains to be proven in deeds rather than words, but whatever his intentions, it is worth noting that such imposition is not only evil but also unworkable.

Yes, the Sunni Arabs are more numerous than any other sector in Syria. However, the rest are too sizable for them to swallow. Before the war broke out, the Kurds (who are Sunni, but not Arab), Alawites, Druze, and Christians constituted one-third of Syria. The war has only increased their share, because its refugees are believed to be predominantly Sunni Muslims, as were most of the fatalities.

Sharaa’s only way forward, it follows, is to create an ethnic confederation where the Sunnis will dominate, but the Alawites, Kurds, and Druze will govern, respectively, Syria’s west, north, and east. The alternative, one sector’s subjugation of the rest, would mean emulating Assad’s formula, and meeting his fate.