For two years, Israeli leaders spoke with confidence about “the day after the war.” They promised accountability, national repair, and a serious effort to rebuild public trust. Government ministries drafted plans, committees met, and commentators outlined ambitious frameworks for renewal.
Yet now that Israel is supposedly entering this long-discussed phase, much of the conversation has been misplaced. Rather than shaping a different future, the political system appears to be reverting to the conditions that prevailed on October 6.
To start, this is not the “after.”
Three hostages remain in Gaza as bodies whose deaths have been confirmed but whose remains have not been returned. Their families are not living in a postwar reality. They are waiting for the most basic function of state responsibility: bringing its citizens home for burial. It is difficult to speak credibly about a “day after” when a terrorist organization still holds the bodies of Israeli civilians.
Meanwhile, events in the North underscore that the conflict is ongoing. The IDF has acknowledged recent strikes on Hezbollah targets deep in Lebanon, even as northern communities remain vulnerable to rocket fire, infiltration attempts, and a general atmosphere of instability. Officials may describe this period as transitional, but on the ground, it continues to resemble active conflict.
Security will remain a dominant concern for the foreseeable future, but it was never the full extent of what Israel needed to confront. The real “day after” agenda involves the essential, less visible components of national resilience: mental-health care, long-term rehabilitation, support for displaced families, and a realistic plan for communities in the North and South. It also requires addressing the deep internal divisions that weakened public cohesion even before the war.
Troubling domestic situation
On these domestic fronts, the situation is troubling.
Recent figures presented to state bodies point to a severe mental-health burden, with tens of thousands formally identified as suffering war-related psychological wounds. Many more are seeking treatment in an already overstretched public system. Knesset committees have heard testimony about untenable caseloads in rehabilitation services, with individual staff members responsible for hundreds of trauma patients. The state comptroller has warned of a mental-health infrastructure that is fragmented, underprepared, and unevenly distributed – especially outside the center, where needs are acute.
Border-area residents face similar uncertainty. Many remain displaced, and those who have returned home often encounter communities that are damaged, understaffed, and economically weakened. Despite government statements regarding “resilience,” thousands of families continue to live in temporary housing, cope with interrupted schooling, and navigate the uncertainty of when – or whether – normal life will resume. Reconstruction plans remain largely theoretical, their implementation slowed by disagreements over budgets and policy priorities.
Politically, the contrast between rhetoric and action is stark. Instead of confronting the structural issues exposed by October 7, the government, as well as the coalition, has slipped back into pre-war habits: coalition bargaining, sector-specific demands, and delays on essential legislation. Economic planning for frontline communities is inconsistent, and proposals for targeted tax relief are tied up in political negotiations rather than grounded in long-term strategy. Even the significant effort invested in expanding tax credits for reservists – important on its own terms – highlights the absence of parallel attention to civilian recovery.
The result is a political environment that mirrors the one that existed before the war: the same disputes, the same competing interests, and the same reluctance to engage with the deeper social and psychological challenges confronting the country.
The “day after” cannot be reduced to a slogan or a talking point. It reflects the daily lives of families still waiting to bury their loved ones, communities living under continued threat, and tens of thousands of Israelis managing the psychological toll of the past two years.
Israel needs to invest heavily in its citizens. Whether it is children who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or adults who have lost their businesses. Israel needs to rebuild itself, post-October 7, 2023, post-war.
If Israel continues to treat the “day after” as secondary rather than central to its national agenda, it risks emerging from this war with the same vulnerabilities that defined it on October 6 – only now, with additional layers of trauma and division.