Imagine for a moment that someone other than Benjamin Netanyahu had been prime minister this past week, a week during which the Saudis received an American pledge to purchase fifth-generation stealth fighter jets and advanced civilian nuclear capabilities, and a United States-led resolution supporting an independent Palestinian state passed at the UN Security Council.
How would Netanyahu react in such a scenario? It is not hard to imagine. When the Yair Lapid-Naftali Bennett government struck a maritime border agreement with Lebanon in 2022, Netanyahu called it treason, a betrayal of Israel’s national security interests, and vowed to overturn it the moment he returned to power. Three years later, he has not reversed it.
Another example: A year earlier, before Lapid and Bennett formed their coalition, Netanyahu held secret talks with Ra’am party chairman Mansour Abbas, attempting to bring him into a Likud-led coalition. When the move failed and Abbas joined the so-called Change Government, Netanyahu accused the coalition of being led by the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islamists. The fact that he himself had pursued the very same deal only months earlier was dismissed as a detail.
Some people conclude from these episodes that Netanyahu is willing to take any action, adopt any stance, or reverse any principle to stay in power. Others argue that the opposition simply lacks the willingness to fight as ruthlessly as he does.
Opposition not willing to break alliance with US
The more sober truth is this: The current opposition is not prepared to burn Israel’s most important strategic alliance – the one with the United States – in exchange for a few days of headlines and the satisfaction of sticking it to Netanyahu. It has red lines, and chief among them is not undermining Israel’s security and diplomatic foundations for short-term political gain.
Take the government’s silence surrounding the Saudi F-35 deal, which is striking when compared to past arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, Israel and AIPAC waged a fierce battle to block the Reagan Administration’s sale of AWACS surveillance aircraft to Riyadh. That clash went down as one of the toughest confrontations in the history of US-Israel relations, testing the limits of pro-Israel advocacy against a president widely viewed as friendly to the Jewish state.
In 2007, Israel again tried to stop the Bush administration from selling smart bomb kits – known as JDAMs – to the Saudis.
The difference is that Saudi Arabia in 2025 is not the Saudi Arabia of the 1980s or even of the 2000s. The kingdom is no longer a distant regional player. It is a strategic partner for Israel. Israelis travel to Riyadh on business; Israeli planes fly over Saudi airspace; Saudi jets helped intercept Iran’s missile barrage last year; and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman speaks openly about “normalization.”
Moreover, even if approved, the Saudis will not receive their F-35s anytime soon.
The UAE, which was promised F-35s as part of the Abraham Accords in 2020, is still waiting more than five years later, after American concerns that the advanced technology could reach China froze the deal. That same question will hover over Riyadh as well.
That is why Israel’s quiet this week needs to be seen not as indifference but as part of a strategy. First, like with the UAE, the Saudis’ delivery timeline will stretch years and require congressional approval and Pentagon review. Details can change, technology can be downgraded, and conditions can be inserted along the way.
Second, Jerusalem understands that everything announced this week – the nuclear deal, the F-35s, and even the UN resolution advancing Palestinian statehood – is an inevitable part of the trajectory toward a US-brokered Saudi normalization deal. The silence in Israel illustrates that what we are seeing now is not the final act but rather the opening scene.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, US law obligates Washington to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). If Saudi Arabia gets F-35s, Israel will demand – and hopefully receive – a compensatory package of its own.
What Israel wants is already being discussed behind closed doors. One possibility is access to platforms currently off-limits, such as the F-22 Raptor, long considered too sensitive to export. Another is participation at a foundational level in developing future weapons platforms, such as the next-generation US fighter jet unveiled recently by President Trump, called the F-47.
A third option is a new long-term military aid package to replace the memorandum of understanding (MOU) expiring in 2028. Israel is pushing for a 20-year framework that includes financial assistance for purchasing US-made aircraft, along with joint research and development (R&D) programs of future weapons systems.
That kind of cooperation would mark a shift from a buyer-supplier relationship to a true strategic partnership, binding the US and Israel technologically and operationally in ways that endure beyond who is in the White House. The end result may be a mix of these options with advanced platforms, development cooperation, and a long-term funding package.
Either way, Israel has decided not to publicly confront Washington and instead to keep its focus on the potential of normalization while also maximizing what it can gain in return.
What we need to remember is that this moment is bigger than just fighter jets. We are watching the potential contours of a new regional order emerging after two years of war with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
The question is not whether normalization will carry a price – it was going to, always – but rather whether Israel will help shape this new order or merely be forced into it.
Israel has a unique opportunity to benefit from what comes next. Yes, we will need to be vigilant and make sure that the IDF’s qualitative edge is preserved, but the F-35s in Saudi do not need to frighten the nation.
There is a bigger picture, and it is refreshing to see that the government in Jerusalem understands it.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept.