The last 20 live hostages and the remains of 12 of 28 deceased hostages have been returned by Hamas, including the two murdered hostages returned on Saturday night. This does not end the struggle to bring back the remaining 16 hostages – a struggle that might or might not succeed.

This is because, as Hamas claims, some of the hostages are unreachable as a result of remains left under the rubble following Israeli bombardments in the areas where they were held. Others, Hamas says, are/were held by smaller terror organizations over which it has no control, or whose keepers were killed and are unavailable to provide information about the whereabouts of remains.

There might be some truth in what Hamas says, but Israel believes that the number of hostages to whom this might apply is far fewer than 16.

Whatever the truth, the hostage problem has not yet been resolved, and the gesture by Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana of removing his hostage ribbon during US President Donald Trump’s Knesset visit last Monday was, at best, premature. It was certainly not viewed favorably by the families who had not yet received the bodies of their loved ones for proper burial.

Nevertheless, perhaps we should give Ohana the benefit of the doubt – that he let his desire to express his appreciation for Trump’s contribution to the release of the hostages get the better of his perception of reality.

Hamas terrorists stands guard, as heavy machinery operates at the site where searches are underway for the bodies of hostages killed after being seized by Hamas during the October 7, 2023.
Hamas terrorists stands guard, as heavy machinery operates at the site where searches are underway for the bodies of hostages killed after being seized by Hamas during the October 7, 2023. (credit: REUTERS/STRINGER)

Israel's dilemma with the peace plan

Hopefully, all the hostages will end up being released. The real dilemma Israel faces is whether the continued process of Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan afterward will sufficiently take into account Israel’s concerns regarding some of the plan’s provisions.

For example, one may wonder whether Trump is sufficiently sensitive to Israel’s concerns with regard to Turkey’s and Qatar’s diplomatic and material support for Hamas, when he demonstrates great eagerness to reserve for these two states major roles in the future administration of the Gaza Strip.

Even before the release of all the hostages has been completed, Hamas is reported to be rebuilding its administrative and military hold in the territories from which Israel withdrew just over a week ago. Even if the reports on this issue are exaggerated, one cannot help wondering whether the leaders of both Turkey and Qatar might be actively supportive of Hamas in its current survival endeavors.

It should not be ruled out that Israel also feels that Trump’s blooming relations with Turkey and Qatar, which involve both diplomatic and business interests, have downgraded its own status as the closest ally of the US in the Middle East.

Yet the opposite might also apply. We have indications, both from Trump himself and from his two key negotiators in the attempt to implement his plan – Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – that they consider many of Israel’s moves to be inconsistent with American interests.

Regarding Israel’s decision to attack part of the Hamas leadership in Doha on September 9, while negotiations were in progress there on a deal for the release of the hostages, Witkoff stated in an interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes show, which aired yesterday, that he and Kushner had heard about the attack only after it had taken place and “felt a little bit betrayed.”

It was a typical Witkoff understatement. Kushner added, after the interviewer remarked that he heard Trump had been furious on that occasion, “I think he felt like the Israelis were getting a little bit out of control in what they were doing, and that it was time to be very strong and stop them from doing things that he felt were not in their long-term interests.” This, too, was a diplomatic understatement.

Israel lacks a plan for the Gaza Strip

Amid Hamas's attempts to regain power in the Gaza Strip, especially shocking have been its acts of revenge against the members of several local Gazan militias and extended family clans that Israel had armed and used in various parts of the Gaza Strip.

Many such militia and clan members are being shot dead these days in public, in an effort to frighten off opponent groups. Israel has apparently done nothing to try to save its former lackeys, whom it had previously tried to present as possible alternatives to Hamas.

So, we are back to one of Israel’s lacunae since the war in Gaza began, which is to prepare a plan for an alternative administration for the Gaza Strip after Hamas is finally beaten and ousted.

As mentioned above, the next stage of Trump’s Gaza peace plan includes the setting up of a temporary administration for the Gaza Strip.

Israel does not have any clear ideas of its own for such an interim administration, besides the option of reestablishing an Israeli military administration for the Gaza Strip for the third time – the first such administration existed in 1956-1957, following the Sinai Campaign, and the second existed in 1967-2005, following the Six Day War – an idea which IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir does not support.

Israel was not party to what is written in the Gaza peace plan on this subject, because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ultimately declined to join Trump in his trip to Sharm el-Sheikh after the president’s brief visit to Israel last Monday, where the plan was formally signed.

If and when negotiations are actually opened on the implementation of an international administration for the Gaza Strip as proposed within the framework of the plan, the Israeli negotiators will undoubtedly have a difficult time accepting some of the ideas presented on the subject. For example, Israel will certainly reject the idea that eventually the Palestinian Authority, after undergoing reforms, will become part of this administration.

Thus, the prospects for any progress being made in negotiations on the second stage of the Gaza peace plan, with Israel’s consent, are almost nonexistent, even if Trump will try to use the same negotiating tactics that he used to get the first stage of the plan through.

The writer has written journalistic and academic articles, as well as several books, on international relations, Zionism, Israeli politics, and parliamentarism. In the years 1994-2010 she worked in the Knesset Library and the Knesset Research and Information Center.