First, the facts. From the perspective of the president of the United States, the war in Gaza is over. Yes, it could resume, and yes, he might still give Israel the green light to do so, but for now, it’s over.
From Hamas’s perspective, the war is also over, and the group has survived. It released the 20 living hostages it had held as insurance in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners. More importantly, it has begun reasserting control in Gaza in the days since the ceasefire went into effect. The most chilling illustration came in a recent video: Masked Hamas men – some wearing the group’s trademark green headbands – lined up eight Palestinians and executed them in the middle of a Gaza City street.
Hamas' presence remains in Gaza
If proof was needed that Hamas remains present, armed, and capable of terrorizing its own people, that was it. The fact that, at the time of this writing, the remains of 19 Israeli hostages remain in Gaza and that Hamas now claims it “cannot find them” – a claim Israel rejects as false – underscores that Hamas continues to play games with Israel, the world, and the future of Gaza.
Gone? No. Defeated? That’s more complicated.
On a basic level, Hamas has lost the war. It is broken as a military force, a shadow of its former self. Its leadership is in hiding, its tunnels are largely destroyed, and it has been forced to release all living hostages. If the Trump plan moves forward as outlined, Hamas will also lose control of Gaza’s governance and, in time, its hold over the territory’s social and economic institutions.
Yet even with those gains, the question remains: What comes next?
Even if a new government is formed in Gaza without Hamas, after the images of Hamas gunmen retaking the streets, which country will send troops to the proposed International Stabilization Force? Do we really imagine Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan sending soldiers into Gaza to confront Hamas? This is a terrorist organization that executes people in the open. Will it hesitate to shoot at foreign troops who challenge its power?
The result could be a new version of Lebanon. There, Hezbollah still exists – battered but intact. It has lost much of its leadership and capabilities yet remains an armed power operating alongside and under an officially sovereign government. Lebanon’s cabinet recently endorsed an army plan to disarm Hezbollah, though without any timetable. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and France are all involved, pressing Beirut to act even as Hezbollah warns that any such effort could lead to civil war.
This Lebanese model – where a weak government coexists with a dominant guerrilla force – could soon find its counterpart in Gaza. A government opposed to Hamas might rule in name, while the group remains in the background, armed and waiting.
What is Israel’s ideal outcome?
IS THAT what Israel wants? Of course not. Israel’s ideal outcome is clear: Hamas eradicated, its leaders exiled, its weapons surrendered, Gaza demilitarized, including arms collected and tunnels destroyed, and reconstruction managed by a responsible civilian authority. But such an outcome is unlikely without overwhelming force, a level of intervention no multinational stabilization mission will provide.
The dilemma Israel faces is not just about Gaza’s future but its own strategic posture. After two years of war, Israelis crave calm and normalcy. Yet history shows how fleeting “quiet” can be when it’s not real. All we have to do is look at the years that led up to October 7.
The challenge now is to balance military vigilance with political realism. Israel cannot afford to slip back into the pre-October 7 complacency, but it also cannot rush into another war that will strain its alliance with the Trump administration and undermine potential opportunities in the region from being realized.
The Trump plan, for all its flaws, has opened new possibilities: direct Arab involvement on the ground in Gaza, potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and an international coalition willing, for the first time in years, to take responsibility for the Palestinians.
If Gaza does become another Lebanon, an uneasy coexistence of governance and terror, it will mark a profound failure. The stakes could not be higher. Gaza’s future will be a test of whether the region has learned from Lebanon – or is doomed to repeat it.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His newest book, While Israel Slept, is a national bestseller in the United States.