On January 15, then-secretary of state Antony Blinken spoke at the Atlantic Council in Washington. His term was coming to an end just days before the inauguration of a new administration. With final preparations for the transfer of power underway, Blinken outlined his vision for how the war in Gaza – by then grinding close to its 500th day – could potentially end.
The plan he presented was not entirely new. Blinken had referred to parts of it in the past. But here, in one of his final appearances as secretary of state, he tried to pull the pieces together. The Palestinian Authority, he said, would invite “international partners” to establish an interim governing authority to run Gaza, oversee essential services, and stabilize the territory. Arab states would contribute forces to ensure security.
That security mission, he said, would offer a political horizon including a pathway toward a Palestinian state one day. In the meantime, and until that would one day be possible, the interim mission’s responsibility would be to create “a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security.”
Meanwhile, the United States would lead a new initiative to train, equip, and vet a Palestinian-led security force that could take over from the interim mission and focus on maintaining law and order. He stipulated it by saying that the PA would need to undergo major reforms – it would need to be transparent, have accountable governance, and more.
The plan was clear: No forced displacement of Gazans, Hamas would be removed from power and disarmed, and a new governing entity would come in its place.
TRY FOR a moment to forget the fact that this was a plan drafted under former president Joe Biden and presented by Blinken, and simply compare it to what was unveiled this past Monday night in Washington in what is known now as the 20-point Trump plan. Is it really all that substantively different?
This is not to suggest that Israel should have embraced Biden and Blinken’s vision back then. Blinken started talking about getting back on track to a two-state solution just weeks after the October 7 massacre, something that sounded crazy to Israelis at the time. This made resistance even in January to his idea somewhat natural. It is also far from clear that Biden would have managed at the time to bring Arab countries on board, as Trump now claims to have done. In January, dozens of hostages remained in Gaza. Would Israel or Hamas have agreed to such a formula? No one can say.
There were also practical questions unresolved at the time. Would the US under Biden have been able to convince Egypt to allow Israel to retain a security presence along the Philadelphi Corridor – the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt that for decades has been the main artery for weapons smuggling? If Israel had been denied such a presence, would Hamas’s rearmament have simply resumed? And what of the looming confrontation with Iran, which six months later erupted into a 12-day war? If the Gaza War had ended in January, would Israel have been able to go ahead with the strike on Iran?
WHILE THIS is important, it is not the core issue. The deeper point is that the outline for how this war needed to end was visible from the start. The broad contours were never a secret. Yet instead of preparing Israelis for that reality, the leadership in Jerusalem tried to sell illusions.
We were told to believe in “Total Victory,” a slogan printed on hats and repeated endlessly by the prime minister. Ministers spoke of annexation “just around the corner” and the rebuilding of settlements inside Gaza, almost two decades after disengagement. We now know that these were fantasies, not strategies.
Imagine if a different path had been taken. Imagine that early in the war, Israel acknowledged that Hamas’s rule would eventually be replaced and that the Palestinian Authority, thoroughly reformed, would play a role. Imagine if, together with Washington and European capitals, Israel had already begun the work of reforming the PA – in governance, in transparency, in ending the terrible “pay-for-slay” program that rewards terrorism and stains Mahmoud Abbas’s leadership.
Think of how much time could have been used for real preparation: education reform, building institutions, and creating a governing alternative that would maybe even be ready to step in once Hamas was removed. Imagine if the Israeli government had spoken clearly from the beginning: not about the vague “elimination” of Hamas, which no one could define in operational terms, but about replacing its rule with a real alternative. Imagine if it had tied that to a political horizon, one that could return the region to the normalization track that was within reach with Saudi Arabia back on October 6.
Instead, the message projected to the world was one of destruction without a day after. Ministers spoke of annexation and settlements in Gaza and left the impression that this was what the war was about for Israel.
Would a more honest articulation of the endgame have reduced global hostility? Maybe. At a minimum, it would have given Israel stronger ground to stand on in international forums. Instead, by clinging to slogans and fantasies, Israel contributed to its increasing isolation.
Despite all of this, today, the “what if” question is less relevant. On the eve of Yom Kippur – when this is being written – we are still waiting to hear if Hamas will accept the Trump plan, release the hostages, and bring this war to an end. If not, we know that the fighting will continue.
Even Donald Trump backs a Palestinian state
BUT THERE is another point Israelis should take in. Even from Donald Trump – the man Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls Israel’s “greatest friend ever” in the White House – we heard support for a Palestinian state. This was not the first time. In his first term in office, Trump unveiled the “Peace to Prosperity” plan, which also included Palestinian statehood. Then, too, Netanyahu was also surrounded by people who thought they were about to get annexation and instead got a plan with a future Palestinian state.
Now, again, Trump has said openly that he backs a Palestinian state. He even acknowledged that Netanyahu does not support it – but reiterated that he believes it is ultimately the right path.
This should force us to confront a serious question: where do we want to be in 10, 15, or 20 years? I recognize that this is difficult to ask when the war is still being fought, hostages are still in captivity, and soldiers continue to put themselves in harm’s way. The wounds of October 7 are still raw.
Yet precisely because of that, it is worth asking. If even Trump – Israel’s supposed best friend – is telling us twice, both before and after October 7, that he supports a Palestinian state, should that not signal to Jerusalem where the international consensus lies? If Israel keeps refusing to present its own plan, others will continue to present theirs.
Israel can either lead or be led. It can shape the outcome of this war and the future of Gaza and of this conflict, or it can wait until everyone else – in Washington, Cairo, Riyadh, and elsewhere – decides for it. The slogans of “total victory” will not change that reality. What will change it is the courage to speak honestly about where we are heading and to prepare the Israeli public for the choices that lie ahead.
As of this writing, the war is still ongoing, the hostages are still in captivity, and we do not know if the pain of October 7 will ever completely disappear. But the time is here to grapple with the question not just of how to fight Hamas, but also what it is that we want to see happen here. As we saw this week, when we don’t, the job is done for us.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His newest book, While Israel Slept, is a national bestseller in the United States.