One of the most debated issues in the South Caucasus in recent years has been the project to establish the Zangezur Corridor (or Zangezur Route), which would provide Azerbaijan with direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave and, from there, to Turkey and Central Asia. This project is not only significant for Azerbaijan and Armenia but also draws the interest of Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the United States.
Following the Washington Declaration between Azerbaijan and Armenia, signed under US mediation, the discussions have intensified. Iran, which had long opposed the project in the strongest terms, has in recent months softened its rhetoric.
For a long time, the Islamic Republic voiced strong opposition to the corridor project. Its objections were based on several points.
Tehran feared the corridor could undermine Armenia’s sovereignty and place the Iran-Armenia border at risk. The strengthening of Azerbaijan and Turkey’s roles in the region might embolden Iran’s sizable Turkic-speaking population. The participation of US companies and long-term lease rights within the project were seen by the Islamic Republic as crossing a “red line.”
Iran repeatedly stressed that the “corridor” concept was incompatible with Armenia’s sovereignty and, therefore, unacceptable. It conducted diplomatic campaigns to object to the initiative.
Why Iran shifted its posture on the Zangezur Corridor
By 2025, several Iranian diplomats and officials began adopting softer rhetoric. Instead of the term “corridor,” they increasingly used the phrase “transport route.” While this may seem a minor change, it reflects a significant adjustment in Iran’s diplomatic stance.
Iranian officials now emphasize that the route would remain fully within Armenia’s sovereign territory, with Armenian customs and passport control intact. This directly addresses one of Tehran’s principal concerns.
In practice, Iran has shifted from open confrontation to a posture of “watchfulness and cautious engagement.” This change reflects both diplomatic maneuvering and pragmatic adaptation to the evolving balance of power in the region.
The Islamic Republic is under simultaneous pressure on several fronts: confrontation with Israel and the US, Western sanctions, and internal social and economic problems. In such a context, opening another regional front of confrontation is counterproductive for Iran.
Tehran is seeking to manage its relations with its neighbors more cautiously, maintaining ties with Armenia, avoiding escalation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, while also accounting for US and Russian roles in the region.
The rise of Iran’s reformist and moderate factions and the Pezeshkian administration’s focus on stability and diplomacy have encouraged a less confrontational stance on the corridor issue. Armenia can use the Islamic Republic’s engagement to safeguard its sovereignty while facilitating the project’s implementation in a more stable environment.
By softening its stance, Tehran reduces the risk of being isolated regionally. Had it continued with outright rejection, it could have distanced itself from both Western and regional partners.
The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity could give the US new leverage in the South Caucasus. For Iran, this represents both economic and security risks.
Russia has traditionally been a key broker in the South Caucasus. However, a US-backed corridor may sideline Moscow. This complicates Iran’s position, as it still needs Russian support but may face a diminishing Russian role.
Replacing “corridor” with “route” may ease diplomatic tensions, but if the substance of the project remains unchanged, Iran’s concerns continue. US companies’ long-term involvement raises sovereignty questions for regional states. The control and monitoring of logistic routes near the borders of Iran and Russia remain unresolved.
Iran’s policy shift is partly a tactical concession and partly a realistic adjustment. With limited resources, Tehran cannot afford an open confrontation. In diplomacy, changes in tone and terminology often precede actual policy shifts.
If Iran seeks to protect its interests, it must closely monitor the project’s details, reinforce cooperation with Armenia, and seek ways to balance the growing Azerbaijan-Turkey partnership, potentially with Russia’s continued involvement.
Iran’s position on the Zangezur Corridor has shifted from sharp opposition to cautious diplomacy. This change reflects both domestic realities and the evolving balance of power in the South Caucasus. However, key questions remain unresolved: the legal status of the project, the role of foreign powers, border control, and whether Iran’s economic and transit interests will truly be safeguarded.
The answers to these questions will determine the region’s future.
The writer is a Middle East scholar and commentator on the region.