Following the successes in the war waged since October 7, 2023, a growing number of Israelis describe Israel’s strategic upgrade as heralding Israel’s rise to the status of a regional power. There are also presumptuous claims that Israel’s actions have changed the Middle East.
Such discourse is reminiscent of the post-1967 euphoria, for which Israel paid dearly in 1973. These dispositions are rooted in intoxication with power and excessive self-confidence; overestimation of the interim results of the war; misunderstanding of Israel’s basic strategic situation; and a combination of military successes against Hezbollah and Iran, which were impressive and contributed to Israel’s deterrence capability.
Israel had stunning success in Iran by causing significant damage to the main nuclear facilities and by eliminating the nuclear scientific leadership.
However, it is clear that despite the importance of stopping the Iranian race for the bomb, it does not appear that Iran has given up its nuclear dream. If the regime in Iran survives, it will be intent on renewing the nuclear project and might renew attacks on Israel.
If Israel needs to act again, it is not certain that circumstances in the future will be as auspicious as in 2025. Iran seeks to acquire more advanced air defense systems, and US participation, especially under another president, is not guaranteed.
A WELCOME side effect of the war was the fall of Assad’s regime, an Iranian ally. This opened the way for the Israel Air Force to attack Iran. Israel took advantage of this development to destroy large parts of Syria’s army and to capture land to create a buffer zone. However, Turkey also exploited the vacuum to install its proxy in Damascus.
This reality created a friction point between large and powerful Turkey and Israel and heralds the rise of an extremist Sunni axis inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose strength draws from Turkey’s power and Qatar’s financial backing.
Qatar, owner of the Al Jazeera network – a media superpower that has caused great damage to Israel. The implications of the expansion of the extremist Sunni axis should not be underestimated.
Unfortunately, Syria is also becoming a source of friction between Washington and Jerusalem, as they have different views on Syria’s future.
The US, like Turkey, is interested in turning Syria into a centralized state, while Israel, committed to minorities (mainly Druze and Kurds), has a different vision.
EVEN HEZBOLLAH’S defeat, which greatly weakened the Shiite axis led by Iran, does not guarantee a fundamental change in Lebanon. The willingness of Lebanon’s political system to be drawn into civil war to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons is questionable, even if US pressure will grow.
Israel’s ability to engineer the political entities beyond its northern border – Syria and Lebanon – is very limited, and Israel should not be deluded that its military power can change the political reality there. These countries will continue to pose a security challenge in the near future. The Middle East has not changed. It is still conflict-ridden and the use of force is one of the rules of the game. The Middle East continues to be a source of Islamic zealotry and nuclear proliferation.
Furthermore, the war in Gaza has not yet ended, and Hamas still controls parts (albeit only 30%). Apparently, the reluctance to conquer all of the Gaza Strip and the hostage issue have prolonged the war, eroding legitimacy at home and abroad.
Leaving Hamas in Gaza City is a victory for the resistance movement - Muqawama – and would reinforce aspirations to eliminate Israel.
It is very unfortunate that Israelis forget that they live in a small country. This becomes very clear when referring to the manpower required by the IDF. Israel’s flourishing economy is too small to supply all its needs. Like other small states, it depends on international markets and imported products. Moreover, the arms market, in particular, does not behave according to supply and demand, and intervening variables of political nature prevail. Therefore, dependence on the US is more significant. When about half of the Democratic Party’s caucus in the Senate votes for an arms embargo on Israel, there is reason for concern and caution.
American aid to Israel in the political, security, and economic spheres has an existential dimension. Israel’s situation in the US is still good, but negative processes exist that do not bode well. Hard work is needed to preserve American support for the Jewish state.
Israel lives within a huge Muslim space (1.5 billion). The Muslim bloc is not united; it is not easy to mobilize it for political and military activity against Israel, as Turkey is trying to do today. Nevertheless, Islam has an ambivalent attitude toward Jews, and many Muslims display a hostile attitude toward Israel. Moreover, the existing hostility will not disappear quickly.
Israel’s integration into the region – peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Abraham Accords, relations with Central Asia states – depends on the interests of the Muslim countries, Israel’s strength, and its closeness to the US, a global power. The direction of these variables is not deterministic.
National resilience
The power Israel projects does not depend only on its military strength and its technological prowess but also on its national resilience.
The rifts within Israeli society during the attempt to legislate a judicial reform and the behavior of Israeli society regarding the hostages issue convey an image of a divided and soft society that is unable to bear the price of war.
Will such a society be ready to send its sons and daughters to fight for far-reaching political purposes in the region as required of a regional power?!
Israel can be proud of its tremendous achievements in many fields. However, there have also been thunderous military failures. Israel should be modest and try to attain realizable goals. Sometimes, there is no escape from decisions that constitute historical gambles, but one must remember that the most important virtue in the game among nations, according to the realist outlook, is prudence.
The writer is head of the Program for Strategy, Diplomacy and Security at the Shalem Academic Center and a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.