On August 8, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the United States announced the Trump International Peace and Prosperity Path (TRIPP), a new transit corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory. Unlike the proposed Zangezur Corridor – promoted by Baku and Ankara in recent years – TRIPP will operate under Armenian sovereignty and be developed and managed by an American-led consortium.
The framework functions as a public-private partnership under Armenian law, with an external operator responsible for construction, operations, and maintenance. Disputes over tariffs, access, or operational standards are steered to international arbitration, and compliance is audited by a tripartite oversight board representing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the operating entity.
The Zangezur Corridor, conceived after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, envisioned a direct link between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik province, bypassing Armenian customs and border controls. Such a route would have expanded Turkey’s land connectivity to the Caspian basin and Central Asia while reducing Armenia’s sovereignty over its own territory.
For Iran, Zangezur posed an additional challenge: it could have severed its short but vital land border with Armenia, the only direct overland connection to Europe via Georgia.
TRIPP diverges sharply from this model. By keeping the route under Armenian jurisdiction and placing operational authority with a US-linked consortium, the agreement provides Azerbaijan with a functional connection to Nakhchivan without granting it, or Turkey, direct governance over the corridor.
Non-discriminatory access is built into the framework, using common transit documentation, predictable tariffs, and electronic pre-clearance administered by Armenian customs.
The arrangement preserves Armenian sovereignty while establishing a physical link intended to promote regional trade and connectivity, with integration hinging on Armenia’s rail and road links through Georgia to Black Sea ports – currently a critical capacity constraint.
Strategic costs for Iran
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, TRIPP carries strategic costs. It reduces Tehran’s scope to shape east-west transit in the South Caucasus by offering an alternative route managed outside its influence, undermining efforts to position Iran as a primary overland bridge between Asia and Europe.
The presence of US-affiliated infrastructure close to Iran’s northern border introduces new monitoring and oversight capabilities into a region important for tracking sanctions evasion, arms trafficking, and proxy activities.
Operator compliance with anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing, and sanctions screening standards is aligned to OECD and EU requirements, with real-time data sharing to deter illicit flows. Additionally, by enabling Armenia to diversify its trade and transit options, the agreement potentially limits Tehran’s economic and political sway over Yerevan.
Benefits of TRIPP for South Caucasus countries
For Armenia, TRIPP offers a pathway to improve connectivity while retaining control over its borders and infrastructure. The US role in development may encourage investment and provide a measure of security assurance in a volatile neighborhood.
For Azerbaijan, the route delivers a long-sought physical connection to Nakhchivan, strengthening operational connectivity and regional mobility, but within a framework that tempers direct control and requires adherence to internationally managed conditions.
For Turkey, TRIPP secures a functional east-west link through its ally Azerbaijan, but because Armenian jurisdiction governs operations and an external operator runs the asset, Ankara’s influence is indirect and channeled through Baku rather than corridor governance.
For the United States and European partners, TRIPP is a strategic gain that diversifies transit routes, reduces the ability of Iran and Russia to shape east-west infrastructure, and demonstrates that diplomatic engagement can yield tangible results.
For Russia, the arrangement reflects a gradual erosion of its traditional primacy in the South Caucasus, as the US-brokered deal underscores shifting alignments in the post-Ukraine war environment. Moscow retains levers via energy pricing, migrant flows, and security relationships, suggesting any spoiler activity would likely be economic or political rather than overtly military.
If implemented effectively, TRIPP could contribute to de-escalation by embedding Armenia-Azerbaijan connectivity in a framework backed by a third-party stakeholder with an interest in maintaining stability. The structure reduces the likelihood of disputes over corridor control and creates an incentive for all parties to safeguard the route’s operation.
Civilian status is preserved through on-corridor verification measures, vehicle scanners, and prohibitions on armed deployments or dual-use consignments without transparent notification.
The economic potential is also notable. Initial throughput targets are modest – measured in single-digit millions of tons annually – focused on time-sensitive goods between the Caspian basin and the Black Sea via Armenia and Georgia, with phased capital expenditure tied to traffic milestones.
Enhanced trade flows, reduced transport times, and improved market access could benefit not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also neighboring states and regional markets, provided governance mechanisms remain robust and political will is sustained.
Risks of TRIPP
Key risks include renewed border incidents, politically driven access restrictions, cyber interference with corridor IT systems, and bottlenecks in Georgian transport capacity. Land acquisition and environmental safeguards will require transparent impact assessments and community benefit agreements to avoid local resistance.
A standing incident-prevention mechanism, transparent tariff policy, and integration with other regional transport and energy projects will be necessary to keep commercial flows insulated from political shocks and to increase the corridor’s economic viability while reducing dependence on any single route.
The TRIPP agreement marks a notable shift in the South Caucasus transit and security landscape. By preserving Armenian sovereignty, providing Azerbaijan with a vital connection, embedding compliance mechanisms, and introducing US-led operational management, it changes the regional balance in ways that limit the Islamic Republic of Iran’s leverage while offering a structured framework for cooperation.
Whether TRIPP becomes a stabilizing force or another contested flash point will depend on careful implementation, sustained engagement from all stakeholders, and adherence to transparent, rules-based management. As regional actors adapt to this new reality, the corridor’s success or failure will serve as a measure of the South Caucasus’s ability to reconcile strategic competition with shared economic interests.
The writer is an Iranian-American research professor and energy policy expert. He is also active in political and human rights advocacy. Follow him on X: @Aidin_FreeIran.