Israel’s then-iconic and eloquent Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, famously quipped in 1973 that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” He was then referencing Arab rejectionism and the failure of Arab states to embrace opportunities for peace with Israel.
52 years later, the world has changed. Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) have long-standing peace treaties with Israel, and in 2020, the Abraham Accords normalized Israel’s diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Israel also has substantial engagement with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, each of whom may join the Abraham Accords upon there being an Israeli-Palestinian agreed roadmap to permanently resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israel-Hamas war ending.
Israel and Syria are currently engaged in tentative discussions to normalize relations following the change of regime in Syria, and Israel is intervening to protect Syria’s Druze community from extremist attacks. Meanwhile, Lebanon is embroiled in trying to end Hezbollah’s stranglehold on the country, effect its disarmament, and remove Iran’s tentacles from around its neck.
Eban’s quip evolved into “the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity,” following Yasser Arafat's failure in 2000 to agree to Ehud Barack’s significant Camp David proposal for permanent conflict resolution and to implement a two-state solution, as well as Mahmoud Abbas's failure to agree to those of Ehud Olmert in 2008. The quip also equally applies to events following Israel pulling its troops and settlers out of Gaza in 2005.
Undoubtedly, Israel’s exit should have been better managed, and there should have been a formal ceremony facilitating the Palestinian Authority and not Hamas being credited with Israel’s withdrawal. But that does not excuse Hamas, after its violent coup in 2007, choosing to create a terrorist state in Gaza, initiating multiple wars by kidnappings, murders, holding hostages captive, indiscriminately firing thousands of missiles at Israeli, and also constructing labyrinthine terror tunnel access to which is denied to Palestinian civilians seeking shelter during Hamas-initiated wars, nor does it excuse Hamas leaders financially profiting from their positions while abdicating all obligations of civilian governance to UNRWA, international charities, and the international community.
Israel’s departure provided an opportunity to illustrate the Palestinian capacity to peacefully govern and develop Gaza for the benefit of all who live there. It also afforded an opportunity to assure Israelis after the Second Intifada that implementation of a two-state solution posed no threat to their security and well-being.
Instead, Hamas chose to validate the genuine fears of many Israelis and to boost support for those opposed to any two-state solution who believe the creation of a Palestinian state poses an existential threat to Israel’s long-term existence. Of course, Hamas missed this opportunity because it, like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups within Iran’s sponsored Axis of Resistance, has no interest in any two-state solution.
Like all Arab states from 1948 until 1979, to the detriment of both Israelis and Palestinians, Hamas remained fundamentally committed to Israel’s ultimate destruction and the one-state delusion that is the creation of a Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea - a delusion embraced globally by anti-Israel ideologues and fundamentalist activists, a delusion to which Hamas’s primary sponsors, the tyrannical Shia fundamentalist regime ruling Iran, remains also firmly committed.
It is that one state that the surviving Hamas leadership envisages when applauding Ireland, Spain, Norway, and Slovenia for recognizing the state of Palestine and the recent declarations of France, the UK, Canada, Portugal, and Malta to do so by September. Hamas has also not hidden its contempt for any conditionality that has been attached to any such recognition and any denials of the declarants that their promises reward terrorism. Its spokesperson, Razi Hamed, in a recent Al Jazeera interview, asserted that “the initiative by several countries to recognize a Palestinian state is one of the fruits of October 7. We have proven that victory over Israel is not impossible & our weapons are a symbol of Palestinian honor."
Within the Hamas worldview, the promises of recognition are not merely a reward for its October 7 atrocities, indiscriminate missile attacks, and barbaric treatment of hostages, but are also an incentive to continue the conflict, retain hostages, ensure Palestinian civilians in Gaza remain in continuing harm's way, and maximise demands that no Israeli government can agree.
The Hamas response, despite it being substantially militarily dismantled, classically reflects the hubris, arrogance, and denial common to authoritarians, dictators, and fundamentalists.
The Hamas response creates an opportunity for Israel that the Israeli government should ensure is not later perceived as equating with Abba Eban’s concept of missed opportunity. That opportunity derives directly from the “ outcome” document published on July 29, following the High Level international conference in New York, co-chaired by the permanent UN missions of Saudi Arabia and France, that neither the US nor Israel attended.
The document contains proposals for “a comprehensive and actionable framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and achievement of peace and security for all”. The “framework” is said to apply to the political, security, humanitarian, economic, legal, and strategic issues of relevance and urges UN permanent missions to express support for its contents. While the “framework” is clearly not definitive, contains many flaws, and remains a work in progress, it deserves Israel’s serious post-conference attention.
The Israeli government should look to the framework document to bring about the political isolation and impotence of Hamas, the release of the hostages, and to adopt a new realistic road map leading to a permanent end tothe Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than responding to Hamas intransigence and provocation by further intensifying the war in Gaza, causing greater catastrophe to Gaza’s devastated civilian population, risking the death of more members of the IDF and the remaining living hostages and exacerbating profound damage already done to Israel’s international reputation.
It is no secret that Israel’s current government is resolutely opposed to the creation on its borders of a Palestinian state, that such a state presently has minimal support within the Knesset, and that it is supported by only a minority of Israelis in opinion polls. That today is a direct consequence of Hamas's rule of Gaza, the Hamas atrocities of October 7, and retention, torture, and starvation of hostages, its war on Israel, repetitive terrorist attacks over many decades, and a fear that Hamas or a similar fundamentalist terrorist group will inevitably rule any independent Palestinian state created.
For a majority of Israelis, there is no two-state solution today, just a two-state delusion. That perspective was reinforced by the bizarre, macabre public ceremonies Hamas performed related to the release of hostages and the recent video images of starved, emaciated, still captive hostages, which Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad delight in. However, a majority of Israelis also yearn for permanent peace, stability, and good neighbourly relations with all states in the region and with Palestinians, and an end to repetitive wars and terrorism.
Save for Israel’s messianic fundamentalists who aspire to incorporate the whole of the West Bank and Gaza into the state of Israel, create new settlements and to expel the entire or most of the Palestinian population, a majority understand a permanent agreed end to conflict must be achieved if repetitive wars and resultant deaths, injuries and destruction is to cease.
While Hamas's rule of Gaza may be ended and its terrorist military capacity significantly dismantled or degraded, there will be no total victory as Hamas’s fundamentalist nihilistic death cult ideology cannot be made disappear, nor can its further recruiting and conducting future terrorist attacks be totally prevented. But tough political decisions by both Israeli and Palestinian leaders, endorsed by a majority of Israelis and Palestinians, can sideline the militant extremists and render them politically irrelevant. That is why there is no realistic alternative to revisiting a two-state solution. That is why the framework document should be utilized.
Included amongst the UN missions parties to the proposed “framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and achievement of peace and security for all” are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and the Arab League, the latter including the four already named and eighteen others, including Turkey and Palestine. All Arab state parties to the Abraham Accords are also members of the Arab League.
An expressly stated agreed objective of the framework document is “to build a better future for Palestinians, Israelis and all peoples of the region” and “to achieve a just, peaceful and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
Whilst undoubtedly, the framework document contains content that no Israeli government can agree to and which are issues for direct Israeli-Palestinian engagement, it contains an unambiguous rejection and condemnation of acts of terrorism and indiscriminate attacks, including Hamas attacks on civilians on October 7 and the abduction of hostages. It asserts that “Hamas must free all hostages” and that their abduction “is prohibited under international law.” It demands that Hamas “end its rule in Gaza and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority,” in which should vest responsibility for “governance, law enforcement and security…across all Palestinian territory with appropriate international support.” This is anchored in a commitment given by the Palestinian Authority.
In a letter preceding the June 9 conference, Abbas condemned Hamas's atrocities of October 7, called for the release of the hostages, expressed his support for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question," a demilitarized Palestinian state, and rejection of violence and terrorism. He also committed to holding democratic and transparent elections under international supervision within a year and to allow a new generation to assume political responsibility.
The framework envisages “a transitional administrative committee” under “the umbrella” of the PA temporarily providing civil governance in a post-Hamas Gaza Strip and, “the deployment of a temporary international stabilization mission upon invitation by the PA …mandated by the UN” to provide security within Gaza and provide security guarantees for Palestine and Israel, including monitoring a ceasefire and any future peace agreement.
The PA “umbrella” and “ invitation” are envisaged as an essential prerequisite to attach a form of Palestinian sanction and legitimacy to any such arrangements. Israel would, of course, continue to retain responsibility for securing its own borders.
The Framework commits parties to it “to supporting measures and programs combating radicalization, incitement, dehumanisation, violent extremism conducive to terrorism, discrimination and hate speech” and “promoting a culture of peace at school, in Israel and Palestine, and to support civil society engagement and dialogue.” An international monitoring mechanism to verify both sides' commitment to these objectives is proposed.
Whilst the framework is firmly anchored in the ultimate implementation of a two-state solution, the principles of non-violence, permanent peace and mutual recognition, it implicitly acknowledges Palestinian governance failures on the West Bank by recognising the need for the PA to implement a credible reform agenda “focusing on good governance, transparency, fiscal sustainability, fight against incitement and hate speeches, service provision, business, climate and development.”
Abbas and the PA have in the past made similar promises that have been reneged upon. But neither Abbas nor the PA can retain credibility with the Arab League members on whose support both are dependent to remain politically relevant, nor can Abbas hope for a positive legacy should that happen again. From Israel’s perspective, a united strategic framework embracing all Arab states that significantly aligns with its objectives and has the potential to effect a durable resolution to 77 years of conflict while sidelining Iran is an opportunity too good to ignore.
A fundamental failure of the Israeli government has been its incapacity to articulate and agree on a detailed plan for the day after the Israel-Hamas war. The five principles adopted by the Israeli cabinet to end the war following the conclusion of its lengthy cabinet meeting in the early hours of Friday, August 8, overlap with aspects of the framework but prescribe no long-term plan for a permanent peace.
The framework document has created a roadmap and the architecture to craft that plan and for reigniting negotiations between Israel and the PA to revisit and address difficult issues that were almost resolved in 2000 and 2008.
It will not be easy, nor despite the documents' aspiration of a “time-bound” process will it be swift. It will inevitably, like Ireland’s peace process, take some time for trust and confidence building, initiating and undertaking real substantive dialogue, addressing each other's genuine concerns and fears, unravelling complexity and creating the political space for compromised solutions that have the potential to receive majority popular support from both Israeli and Palestinian electorates. An essential prerequisite is the early holding of both Israeli and Palestinian elections, which confer a mandate on those elected to governance to constructively engage.
The controversial Israeli cabinet decision of last Friday morning has created a time-bound window for continuing negotiations to end the Gaza conflict and has delayed its further expansion. The IDF is reportedly affording Palestinians until October 7 to evacuate Gaza City; should all the hostages not be released by then, the IDF will reportedly then launch a ground offensive into Gaza City to kill any remaining Hamas operatives. Subsequent to its takeover of Gaza City, reportedly, the IDF will proceed to take over the rest of Gaza.
The two-month interregnum has created a window of opportunity that should be utilised by Israel to directly engage in the Framework process. In the intervening period, Israel should ensure Gaza is flooded with aid and medical assistance that bypasses Hamas and formally invite the Arab League and other states, with the PA’s consent, to establish within Gaza an international stabilisation force to maintain peace there and ensure an end to conflict.
Under the aegis of the Arab League, jointly with the PA, pending elections, an interim technocratic civil administration to govern Gaza should be created, and Israel should agree that the IDF hand over internal security to such a force and governance to such an administration within eight weeks of the release of all hostages.
Only subsequent to the release of all hostages and Hamas agreeing to and commencing independently supervised and verified disarmament, should reconstruction in Gaza be permitted to commence. France, the UK, Canada, Portugal, and Malta should defer their promised declarations of recognition of the state of Palestine until all the hostages are released, Hamas announces a permanent end to its war, an end to its rule of Gaza, and agrees to disarm.
Each of them doing so would directly contradict Hamas’s claim that their promised declarations are a reward for its October 7 atrocities. It would also confer credibility, relevance, and additional status on the framework process in which France, the UK, and Canada directly participated and Portugal and Malta through the EU’s engagement in it.
Alan Shatter is a member of the board of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations & a former Irish minister for Justice and Defence. The views expressed here are his own.