High drama in Lebanon: On August 5, in response to mounting US pressure to commit to a disarmament timetable for Hezbollah, the Lebanese government convened a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Baabda, just outside Beirut.
The meeting began at 3 p.m. and was still in progress when, at 5 p.m., Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem appeared on Al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s official television channel, to reject all calls for Hezbollah to disarm, and to issue stark threats to Israel.
If Israel launched a new, large-scale aggression against Lebanon, declared Qassem, Hezbollah, alongside the Lebanese army and the Lebanese people, would defend themselves.
“This defense will lead to missiles falling inside the Israeli entity,” he threatened, “and all the security they have built over eight months will collapse within an hour.”
Bold words, but largely bravado and bluster. Qassem was implying that Hezbollah still enjoys the closest of partnerships with the Lebanese government.
Hezbollah greatly eroded
In truth, Hezbollah’s former iron grip over the nation has been greatly eroded, and the newly elected government is beginning to assert its authority in areas where for decades Hezbollah’s word has been law. The “state within a state” is waning, and a truly sovereign state of Lebanon may be reemerging.
After hours of impassioned debate, the cabinet reached a majority decision. The Lebanese army would be instructed to develop a comprehensive plan by the end of August for establishing a state monopoly on arms, to be in place by the end of 2025.
The declared objective is to bring all weapons in the country under the control of six designated state security forces, thereby ending the autonomy of non-state actors, most notably Hezbollah. Some media reported that Shi’ite ministers representing Hezbollah walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest before the vote.
At around 7.30 p.m., Prime Minister Nawaf Salam held a press conference and announced the decision. Hezbollah rejected it completely. The next morning, in a written statement, Hezbollah declared: “We will treat this decision as if it does not exist.”
Political deadlock
For two years, Hezbollah and its political allies held Lebanon in a political deadlock, refusing to allow a presidential election. It was only after the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire that Hezbollah allowed Joseph Aoun to be elected president and the new government to be installed.
Since then, Lebanon’s leadership has been conducting negotiations with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack on a phased plan to disarm Hezbollah and reestablish the Lebanese state’s monopoly on weapons.
The Lebanese Armed Forces has reportedly dismantled over 90% of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, although north of the Litani River, Hezbollah retains substantive arms and capabilities.
Hezbollah is no longer what it was, politically or financially.
No longer able to dictate government policy, it does retain a significant bloc in parliament known as Loyalty to the Resistance. Regarding its finances, the Al-Qardh Al-Hasan Association (AQAH) operated as Hezbollah’s de facto bank.
In July, Lebanon’s central bank banned licensed banks from dealing with AQAH.
Funded by Iran
Hezbollah’s popularity with the Shi’ite population has historically been rooted in its extensive network of social services. It operated hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies, often providing medical care more cheaply than private institutions, and often at no cost for party members. Funded largely by Iran, it also ran schools, educational facilities, and youth programs.
Media reports indicate a significant reduction in Iranian financial support and, as of mid-2025, Hezbollah’s health, social service, and educational network has been significantly diminished.
Many of its hospitals and clinics have been damaged or destroyed.
Access to health care is limited. Mobile clinics and international aid groups are filling some gaps, but routine treatments for chronic diseases have been interrupted.
A large number of schools, particularly in the south, have been damaged or repurposed as emergency shelters, and many children are not receiving an education. Hezbollah’s ability to lead reconstruction and social support has clearly been weakened. Reports indicate a consequent loss of confidence among its traditional support base, particularly among Shi’ite civilians.
The new Lebanese administration is focused on strengthening state institutions. Recent diplomatic efforts have explicitly linked Lebanese demands for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon with a commitment to extend state authority and restrict Hezbollah’s independent operations and social authority.
Historically, Hezbollah’s social programs addressed the neglect by the central government of the Shi’ite community. By providing jobs, welfare, and direct aid, Hezbollah created a “shadow citizenry” closely tied to its institutions, reinforcing its political and social influence. According to a 2024 poll, about 85% of the Lebanese Shi’ites polled expressed trust in the group.
Dwindling national support
However, overall national support was much lower. Only about 30% of Lebanese said they trusted Hezbollah, while 55% reported no trust at all. Support among Sunnis, Druze, and Christians was minimal (below 16% in each group).
Municipal elections in 2025 showed that Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement still dominate in southern Lebanon, but reformist and opposition candidates made gains, even in some traditional Hezbollah strongholds. This suggests that Hezbollah’s legitimacy, even within its core constituency, has been damaged by its loss of charismatic leadership and its degraded military position.
It has been further weakened by its inability to protect or rebuild Shi’ite communities devastated by war, and by its perceived role in causing Lebanon’s economic crisis of the past few years.
In 2023, inflation rose to a staggering 221.3%. It was reduced to 45.2% in 2024, but by May 2025, government action had brought it down to 14.4% – still too high for stability, but at least under control.
Toward stability
Lebanon’s economy, too, has shown signs of fragile recovery since the ceasefire. After a severe contraction of 7.1% in 2024, the economy is projected to grow by 4.7% in 2025, marking its first growth since 2017. This rebound is driven by improved political stability, a recovery in tourism, stronger consumer spending, and modest capital inflows.
Renewed optimism and a more stable environment have been fostered by the election of a new president heading a reform-oriented government, a new Central Bank governor, key reforms, and international support.
Still, though growth has returned for the first time in years, and inflation is down significantly from its peak, Lebanon’s economy remains fragile.
Sustained recovery will depend on political stability and more by way of reform. And that depends above all on preventing Hezbollah from regaining anything like the power it has enjoyed in Lebanon for the past quarter-century.
Will the newly elected president and government be consistent in their determination to wrest the nation’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s grasp? If their reforms stall, or if Hezbollah stages the comeback Qassem seeks, the Lebanese government could once again find itself the junior partner of a dominant power with its own agenda.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.