As global shipping lanes face mounting threats—from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea to escalating instability in Gaza and Lebanon—the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has emerged as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced at the G20 Summit in September 2023, IMEC is more than a logistics project; it is a comprehensive geoeconomic blueprint aimed at reshaping the flow of goods, energy, and data between Asia and Europe. For Israel, the initiative represents both an unprecedented opportunity and a complex set of security challenges.
Positioned at the nexus of this emerging framework, Israel finds itself at the center of a new geostrategic vision designed to redefine trade routes linking Asia and Europe. Backed by the United States, India, the Gulf states, the European Union, and Israel itself, IMEC is conceived as a Western-led alternative to China’s expanding sphere of influence. It seeks to promote high-speed land-based freight transit, green energy corridors, and next-generation digital connectivity infrastructure.
For Israel, IMEC presents a dual potential. On one hand, the country stands to gain a central role as a Western anchor of the corridor, leveraging strategic assets such as the Port of Haifa, the Valley Railway, and planned integration into regional electricity and data infrastructure. On the other hand, this positioning also heightens Israel’s exposure to security threats from both state and non-state actors. Israel’s inclusion in IMEC is driven not only by its geographic location but also by its emerging role as a regional partner—bolstered by the Abraham Accords and its participation in the I2U2 Forum.
IMEC’s geo-economic promise includes a 40% reduction in transit time, lower transportation costs, and a direct link between Gulf ports and Haifa—facilitating seamless rail and maritime transit to European markets. However, the realization of this vision is far from guaranteed. The deteriorating regional security environment has increasingly turned civilian and commercial infrastructure into high-value targets, raising significant concerns about investment risk.
Since October 2023, the conflict in Gaza, Hezbollah’s missile threats in northern Israel, and Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have severely undermined regional stability and investor confidence in the corridor. Strikes on commercial vessels particularly in the Bab el-Mandab Strait—have compelled shipping companies to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, adding over a week to transit times and approximately $1 million in fuel costs per voyage. These disruptions have led to an estimated 20% reduction in global shipping capacity and a marked spike in insurance premiums.
The reliability of the Port of Haifa as a key transit hub has also been called into question. Hezbollah’s recent attacks on northern Israel have underscored the port’s vulnerability particularly given its role as the western terminus of IMEC and have contributed to a growing preference among shipping companies for alternative routes.
Beyond these direct security threats, the initiative faces broader regional opposition. Turkey perceives IMEC as a geopolitical rival that challenges its strategic position and has begun advancing a competing corridor via Iraq. Egypt fears a potential decline in revenue from the Suez Canal, while Iran—together with its Houthi and Lebanese proxies—may seek to exploit regional instability to sabotage infrastructure and obstruct emerging civilian and commercial linkages.
Collaboration with India and Saudi Arabia
This complex environment necessitates that Israel develop a comprehensive, multi-layered security framework that includes:
Close strategic coordination with India and Saudi Arabia, particularly regarding the protection of critical infrastructure such as ports, railways, and energy corridors.
The establishment of regional emergency response mechanisms to address potential crises including terrorist attacks, armed conflict, or natural disasters that could disrupt the uninterrupted operation of the corridor.
The integration of Israel’s advanced cyber and energy industries into the planning and implementation of IMEC components, thereby ensuring both technological superiority and mutual strategic investment across the partnership.
The strengthening of economic diplomacy with European IMEC partners, aimed at securing formal recognition of Israel’s role in the corridor and attracting long-term infrastructure investments.
Equally important, the Israeli government must avoid the pitfall of a reactive posture. Waiting for other states to shape the corridor’s security vision poses strategic risks. Instead, Israel must act now—through coordinated interagency efforts to formulate a proactive security doctrine that ensures its stable integration into IMEC, regardless of regional political volatility.
In conclusion, IMEC holds the potential to be a transformative initiative for Israel one that not only enhances connectivity but also redefines its strategic relevance between Asia and Europe. Realizing this potential, however, hinges on Israel’s ability to strike the right balance between economic ambition and security pragmatism. Israel must position itself not merely as a transit point, but as an active regional contributor in both defense and technological innovation. The success of IMEC will not be determined solely by relative calm, but by the construction of credible security mechanisms and forward-looking risk management strategies capable of fostering trust and sustained cooperation among all stakeholders.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a member of Forum Dvorah, which promotes women in Israel’s foreign and defense policy community.