Over the past decade, Russia and Iran have gone to great lengths to project the image of a “strategic alliance” united against Western influence. Their leaders trade high-profile visits, sign economic and military agreements, and coordinate policies on global platforms. Yet, beneath this carefully crafted façade lies a fragile partnership built not on trust or shared values, but on mutual need and overlapping – though far from identical – geopolitical interests.
Both Russia and Iran are reeling under heavy international sanctions: Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine and Tehran for its nuclear ambitions and support of terrorist proxies across the Middle East. These pressures have driven them into tighter economic and military cooperation. Iran’s Shahed-136 drones and missile technologies have become vital for Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, while Tehran has gained access to Russian satellite systems and advanced fighter jet technology.
Their shared hostility toward the US and Europe further cements this tactical alignment. Both nations portray themselves as champions of a “multi-polar world,” challenging the Western-led order and promoting a narrative of resistance. This cooperation is far more pragmatic than ideological.
Historical mistrust between Russia and Iran
The roots of mistrust between Moscow and Tehran run deep. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia’s imperial expansions led to significant territorial losses for Persia (modern-day Iran), leaving scars that still linger. During the Cold War, Iran’s Western-backed monarchy opposed Soviet influence in the Middle East. Even after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations remained complicated, with both sides cooperating only when necessity dictated.
This historical baggage still shapes their modern-day interactions. Tehran views Moscow as an opportunistic partner – one that could easily abandon Iran if the costs of the alliance rise. Russia, meanwhile, often sees Iran as a junior partner: useful, but expendable.
Syria was one of the clearest theaters of cooperation. Both powers had bolstered the Assad regime, with Russia providing air support and Iran deploying Hezbollah and other proxy militias. Yet here their strategic goals diverged. Russia’s priority was a stable Syria that secured its military bases and regional leverage. Iran, on the other hand, used Syria as a springboard for its anti-Israel operations and broader ambitions for regional dominance.
Tensions surfaced as Russia maintained deconfliction mechanisms with Israel, who routinely attacked Iranian positions in Syria. Tehran was frustrated over Moscow’s unwillingness to shield its forces from these attacks. When Assad fled Syria and Ahmed al-Sharaa took power in December 2024, Russia did nothing to save the Iranian proxies in Syria. The ayatollah regime has not forgiven Russia for this behavior.
Rivalry between the countries
Energy is another area where cooperation masks rivalry. As major oil and gas exporters, both nations are competing for shrinking markets. Sanctions have pushed Russia and Iran to target the same buyers –particularly China and India – creating price wars and undercutting Iran’s already fragile oil exports. Tehran has openly complained about Russia’s discounted crude flooding markets and weakening Iran’s bargaining power.
The South Caucasus has become a flashpoint that further exposes cracks in the Russia-Iran relationship. Iran is increasingly concerned about Russia’s growing ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey, two regional players Tehran sees as rivals. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the subsequent geopolitical realignments have left Iran sidelined, while Russia struggles to maintain its influence as a security guarantor in the region.
Tehran is particularly alarmed by Moscow’s perceived willingness to tolerate the strengthening of Azerbaijan-Turkey strategic cooperation, which could weaken Iran’s land and trade routes to the Caucasus and Europe. Russia’s limited intervention during Azerbaijan’s 2023 anti-terror operation in Karabakh deepened Tehran’s skepticism about Moscow’s reliability.
Iran fears that a stronger Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey and quietly tolerated by Russia, could reshape regional power dynamics at Tehran’s expense.
A major point of contention is the proposed Zangezur Corridor, a transport route that would connect Azerbaijan’s mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia, bypassing Iranian territory. Tehran has publicly opposed the project, arguing that it could threaten Iran’s role as a key transit hub between the Caspian region and Europe.
Russia, while officially neutral, has hinted at supporting the corridor as part of its regional strategy, viewing it as a means to expand its economic influence and secure new trade routes. This divergence places Moscow and Tehran at odds: Iran fears the corridor would diminish its geopolitical leverage, while Russia sees it as a potential bargaining chip with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.
The public portrayal of a solid Russia-Iran alliance is as much propaganda as it is policy. It serves to intimidate adversaries and strengthen domestic narratives. In reality, both states are pursuing separate agendas, often at one another’s expense. Russia’s occasional back-channel communications with Western powers, alongside Iran’s outreach to Asian states such as China and India, underscore the transactional nature of their relationship.
“This is not a true strategic partnership,” notes Alexei Malashenko, a Moscow-based political analyst. “It’s a temporary convergence of interests. If Russia’s war in Ukraine ends or Iran faces internal upheaval, the alliance will unravel.” Middle East expert Dina Esfandiary from the International Crisis Group adds: “Iran doesn’t fully trust Russia, and Russia doesn’t fully trust Iran. Their cooperation is born of isolation, not genuine alignment.”
The longevity of this partnership depends on shifting global dynamics. A peace deal in Ukraine, renewed US-Iran diplomacy, or domestic unrest in either country could easily erode their fragile cooperation. Neither Moscow nor Tehran wants to become entangled in the other’s long-term conflicts, and both have a history of recalibrating alliances when it suits their interests.
The Russia-Iran relationship is, at its core, a partnership of convenience, not conviction. While it may endure in the short term due to shared adversaries and economic pressures, it is far from the steadfast alliance their leaders claim. History suggests that when external pressures decrease, the cracks in such alliances often turn into fault lines.
The writer is a prominent Middle East scholar and commentator.