The Sinai Peninsula has long been Egypt’s Achilles’ heel – a vulnerable frontier caught between regional chaos and domestic instability. For both the Egyptian public and government, Sinai is not merely a geographic zone but a perpetual strategic concern. It is where the friction of local Bedouin tribes and the tremors of the Israel-Palestinian conflict threaten Egypt’s delicate balance between security, sovereignty, and economic stability.
Today, this concern is amplified by the longest war in Gaza’s history and the ripple effects of Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Egypt’s anxiety is rooted less in the war itself than in its consequences: a potential refugee influx from Gaza, radicalization among Hamas sympathizers, disruption of Sinai’s fragile security architecture, and threats to the Suez Canal – one of Egypt’s top sources of foreign currency income.
Gaza crisis in the eyes of Egyptians
For Egyptians, the Gaza crisis evokes a complex blend of emotions born from conflicting ideologies. Decades of pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric and religious affinity have ingrained in Egyptians a subconscious cultural and political connection to Palestinians. Gaza feels familiar, almost like an extension of Egypt. Yet this empathy contrasts sharply with a visceral resistance to opening Sinai’s borders to refugees, even to save them from war.
This contradiction is not hypocrisy but schizophrenia. Many Egyptians who praise the “Palestinian cause” also believe that former president Anwar Sadat abandoned Gaza in the 1979 peace treaty for a good reason. They fear importing the Middle East’s most chronic geopolitical crisis into Egyptian territory more than they fear conflict with Israel.
Palestinians, indoctrinated with ideas that glorify violent resistance and suicidal victimhood, are often perceived as agents of instability. Their arrival could ignite brutal conflicts with Sinai’s Bedouin tribes, who would not tolerate their presence. History confirms these fears: large-scale Palestinian refugee influxes have triggered protracted security dilemmas for host states, as seen in Jordan and Lebanon.
For Egypt’s leadership and military, Gaza is not a humanitarian concern but a national security menace. Since Hamas’s takeover in 2006 and its links to the banned Muslim Brotherhood, Gaza has been viewed as a breeding ground for extremist ideology, smuggling, and terrorism.
Between 2013 and 2015, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi cooperated with Israel to combat terrorist cells that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad had embedded in Sinai after the Arab Spring. These terrorists targeted both Egyptian civilians and military personnel.
Egyptian military buildup in Sinai
Egypt’s military buildup in Sinai is not new. It began in 2014 as part of a long-term plan to stabilize the peninsula and integrate it into Egypt’s national fabric. In 2018, Egypt’s chief of staff bragged about deploying 88 battalions, totaling over 42,000 troops.
In 2024, Egypt further bolstered its forces by relocating units from the Second and Third Field Armies along the Suez Canal to Sinai. Recent troop movements near Rafah were not preparations for war with Israel but performative displays to appease domestic and regional audiences angered by Israel’s war in Gaza.
Three strategic calculations underpin Egypt’s Sinai doctrine. First, counterterrorism: Wilayat (province) Sinai’s insurgency exposed Egypt’s inability to fully control the peninsula. Military operations shifted from sporadic raids to systematic counterinsurgency, combining kinetic strikes with intelligence coordination and tribal co-optation.
Second, assertion of sovereignty: Heavy force deployment signals Egypt’s sovereign capability to control Sinai without external intervention.
Third, development as a security measure: Military buildup has been accompanied by infrastructure projects to integrate Sinai economically, thereby reducing extremist recruitment incentives.
Despite tensions, Egypt and Israel share converging interests in countering jihadist movements in Sinai and containing Hamas’s militarization of Gaza. Their security cooperation, anchored in intelligence sharing and border management, remains strong despite rhetorical friction.
However, Egypt’s injudicious policies since October 7 – including perceived sympathy for Hamas and rapid troop deployments – have strained trust in Tel Aviv and Washington. The US administration is also concerned about Egypt’s deepening defense ties with China, which challenge American strategic dominance and complicate regional security calculus.
Still, basic game theory suggests that neither Egypt nor Israel benefits from confrontation. Egypt’s military doctrine is strictly defensive; it has never initiated a war with Israel and will not do so now, especially not over Gaza. The idea that Egyptians would sacrifice their sons for Gaza is naive. On the other hand, Israel has no incentive to open another war front and jeopardize its normalization process with Gulf states.
Looking ahead, Egypt-Israel security cooperation will continue to evolve beyond border policing toward joint regional security initiatives. Ultimately, what binds Egypt and Israel today is not merely a peace treaty but a shared strategic understanding of threats that cross borders. As long as Gaza remains unstable and Sinai vulnerable, Cairo and Tel Aviv will remain on the same side of security, even if they debate the details in public.
The writer is an Egyptian scholar and senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.