The phenomenon of “hilltop youth” – or, rather, that small element of them who are proving ill-disciplined, too willing to engage in illicit acts, and disrespectful of state representatives – needs to be addressed in a fundamental manner that deals with its essence as much as its performance.
As I am not a sociologist, I will limit my observations to the ideological and political aspects of what they are doing, what they claim to want to achieve, and, hopefully, to pinpoint the holes and cracks that are problematic, not only for themselves and for the Jews residing in Judea and Samaria but, indeed, for the State of Israel.
Ariel Sharon called to settle the lands
With the threat of the Oslo Accords as backdrop, and specifically a demand by Yasser Arafat that all current communities in the area be restricted to a boundary line of 50 meters from the last house built, it was Ariel Sharon, then Israel’s foreign minister, who issued a call.
On November 16, 1998, at a meeting of the Likud central committee, he declared, “Run and grab the hills. Grab a hill and another one. Grab the top of the hills.” The Washington Post framed it as “everyone should take action, should run, should grab more hills. We’ll expand the area. Whatever is seized will be ours. Whatever isn’t seized will end up in their hands.”
In other words, the goal was the continuation of the resettling of the Land of Israel with security. Youth and then young marrieds moved out to the outmost demarcation zoning mark on the maps of the various bodies dealing with the establishment and development of the communities.
In fact, my family with another dozen families did basically that in 1981 when we moved, at Sharon’s instruction as agriculture minister, to the top of a hill in Shiloh. The land in question was well within the assigned land as drawn up by the maps of the Civil Administration and Defense Ministry and with full approval.
A next stage emerged after the Second Intifada and was the thwarting of the Palestinian Authority’s goal of controlling Area C, which was to be continued to be resettled by Jews. The 2009 Fayyad Plan, under then-PA prime minister Salam Fayyad, promoted a campaign for Area C so that most of that area come under Palestinian sovereignty. It was funded by a foreign budget and assisted by international activists who led on the local Arabs.
A resolution of the European Union stated the PA can also promote a political settlement and not just humanitarian projects. With that backing and with generous European funding, land has been registered and, more importantly, housing, road, and industrial construction has been done, along with other projects. As the Regavim NGO has shown, much of all that was done in an illegal manner, with encroachment the method.
The “hilltop youth” began to face a new reality after the 2005 Disengagement operation. The Bedouin encampment of Khan al-Ahmar, east of Ma’aleh Adumim, which already in 2018 the High Court of Justice decided could be dismantled, is a prime example. Various governments have done nothing to remove the illegal squatting. As a result, this past decade or so has seen the “hilltop youth” shift into confronting the Arab takeover attempts.
If, at the initial stage, their activity was to assure the retention of land already designated for Jewish resettlement, the next stage was to protect a possibility not only for future resettlement but to deny the PA its encroachment intent.
Crisis of distrust
The Disengagement set in motion a latent ideological underpinning of a small core element of the youth who began to see the failure of the Yesha Council to halt the loss of Gaza as a reason to promote an almost total lack of confidence in that body as well as the government.
The harsh methods of administrative detention – and we should recall the recent revelations from leaked phone conversations with senior police officers of just how the Jewish Section of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) can operate – brought about a disregard for the law and the judiciary.
A crisis of civic distrust as well as an ideological dispute developed. The lack of sufficient parental supervision also contributed.
Due to the inability of the IDF and the Shin Bet to fully eliminate Arab terrorism, an element within the “hilltop youth” has assumed a role of state “replacement” and, combined with arrogance, exhibits extreme contempt for establishment Zionism.
That thinking and that attitude are what represent a danger not only to those who choose to be irresponsible but to the future of the over half a million Jews residing in Judea and Samaria. The unlawful and immoral behavior of the very few – for example, those who perpetrate acts of violence against civilians – cannot be permitted to negatively affect the positive project the many are engaged in.
In the first decades of the struggle to establish Jewish communities throughout Judea and Samaria, the idea was that in doing so, not only was a Jewish and Zionist commandment being fulfilled, but redemption was being achieved. Now, however, an alternative goal is being set. Persuasive elements within the “hilltop youth” have replaced resettlement as an instrument. The new instrument to obtain redemption is to target the local Arab population.
The failure of the so-called Jewish underground of the 1980s is a lesson that has, it seems, been either forgotten or reconstructed. We are not in the pre-state era of Irgun or Palmah reprisals. The assumption that they (elements within the “hilltop youth”) are engaged in a most important project does not give them the right to act in spheres that must be left to the state and its agencies. An approach that is one of anarchy and smug presumptuousness is not only dangerous but self-destructive.
The claim “but they are doing good” is insufficient when they are doing too much that is bad. There can be no ifs, ands, or buts.
The writer is a researcher, analyst, and commentator on political, cultural, and media issues.