Local sheikhs aren’t the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - opinion

The sheikhs are not fringe figures, representing a backward-looking but undeniably potent structure in Palestinian society. Together they claim allegiance from clans representing most of the wider area’s 700,000 residents. Their rhetoric is pragmatic: They reject terrorism, pledge coexistence, and are willing to recognize Israel as the Jewish state.

Israel has tried similar things before. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it backed a system of tribal leadership known as the Village Leagues. That effort, too, originated in the Hebron area. Led by Mustafa Dodin and supported by pro-Jordanian moderates, the leagues were meant to cultivate a peaceful alternative to the PLO. They failed.

Lacking democratic legitimacy, operating under occupation, and widely viewed as collaborators, the Village Leagues never gained traction among the broader Palestinian public. Their leaders were targeted by the PLO, discredited by Palestinian society, and ultimately abandoned by Israel. When the first Intifada broke out in 1987, the leagues were already defunct.

The idea that traditional leadership could serve as a workaround to nationalist politics was buried – until now.

During apartheid, South Africa created ten self-governed “homelands” for black citizens, stripping them of South African citizenship and placing them in fragmented, dependent enclaves under white control. The Bantustans were framed as steps toward self-rule. In reality, they were instruments of control and exclusion – economically nonviable, politically illegitimate, and engineered to prevent true sovereignty.

The sheikh-led “emirate” of Hebron fits this mold far more than it resembles a peace solution. It would be a local leadership accountable not to its people but to Israel, ruling over a pocket of land surrounded by Israeli territory, with no control over borders, airspace, or security. Add in work permits and a few economic zones, and you have a facade of autonomy masking continued occupation.

That route will not bring peace, but likely violence. It will pit clans against clans and Palestinians against one another. In the fog of violence, Jews will be killed; the settlers of the West Bank are easy targets, living on land Israel does not formally even claim, hated by most Arabs. Israel will be drawn back in, and voila: another intifada.

Its school curriculum badly needs reform. Abbas also failed to respond constructively to Ehud Olmert’s far-reaching 2008 statehood offer.

But for all that, the Palestinian Authority remains the least bad option in a region where that is often the best you can hope for. The PA has recognized Israel and publicly opposed terrorism. It has made it clear that it is not serious about the right of return – the major blockage to any deal.

It has cooperated with the IDF in the West Bank. It has called on Hamas to lay down arms and release hostages. Abbas has said Palestine will not have a traditional army. These positions are not minor. They reflect an orientation toward coexistence.

There is no viable alternative “brand.” Claims by Israeli spokespeople that the PA is no different than Hamas – a genocidal jihadist group – are absurd. Israel cannot afford to destroy the only Palestinian entity that collaborates on security while dreaming up a fragmented system of tribal protectorates.

Israelis should remember that separation remains vital – for the survival of Zionism. Without true separation from a contiguous Palestinian territory, the dominant reality is that between “the river and the sea,” Jews are not a majority. A future in which Palestinians live in isolated tribal enclaves under Israeli control – in noncontiguous sheikhdoms – won’t shield Israel from demographic or legal consequences of that, but rather formalize a reality in which a Jewish minority rules millions of Palestinians without political rights.

That path leads to pariah status. It invites boycott and isolation. It could even bring charges under international law, likely against a backdrop of inter-communal violence. Most of all, it makes the “one-state nightmare” permanent. Israel, inseparable from the West Bank (and possibly Gaza), will face global pressure to annex and enfranchise.

To be clear: I do not romanticize a full West Bank withdrawal. A sudden and total pullout could create a security vacuum that Hamas could fill. The pullout must be partial and phased, tightly monitored, with international guarantees. And any future Palestinian entity must be demilitarized. This aspect of sovereignty Palestinians will need to forego – if nothing else, October 7 proved that imperative.

But they must receive enough. Whether you call them emirates or Bantustans, tribal fiefdoms are simply not enough. This is not how you resolve or “manage” a century-long conflict between Jews and Arabs in the Holy Land. It’s how you prolong and deepen it.