Since the IAF struck Iran’s nuclear facility at Taleghan 2 last October, there have been at least four developments in construction at the site.
An Institute for Science and International Security report published on Monday by its president, David Albright, and other institute members gives a detailed analysis of satellite imagery during these four stages.
While this site is only one of many of interest to Israel and the West regarding Iranian attempts to rebuild its nuclear program, it serves as a useful test case and view into Tehran’s broader efforts.
The larger picture
Stepping back for the larger picture, it is important to recall that the IAF hit about 20 targets in Iran last October, more than seven months before its more dramatic strike of at least 1,000 targets in June.
The main goal of last October’s strike was to eliminate all of Iran’s advanced and Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.
Once that was accomplished, it cleared the way for Israel’s much more ambitious attack in June, which is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear program by about two years.
While the primary focus of the October 2024 airstrikes was the S-300 anti-aircraft systems, Israel also struck several Iranian nuclear and ballistic-missile facilities.
Already by mid-May of this year, Albright’s report documents that Iran had built a black temporary cover over the previously struck site and had started to rebuild some aspects of it.
By June 12, just before the most recent Israeli attack, imagery showed that Iran was laying the foundations in front of the black cover.
Those were the two construction moves Iran had already made before the June airstrikes.
By August 30, a new large arch-roofed structure was under construction, and two smaller arch-roofed structures were also being built above the foundation previously laid on either side and in front of the larger structure.
Furthermore, by September 27, satellite photos showed that a third arched structure had been added, and that other arched structures were making modest progress.
Possibly more importantly, the layout of the two previously observed smaller side buildings appeared to be designed in a manner that if they were bunkered over with earth, they could each include a blast mitigation feature referred to as a “blast trap.”
Albright’s report also said there was a new support facility about 200 meters away from the main rebuilding project.
These were the two moves that Iran made regarding rebuilding the facility since the June airstrikes.
The institute's report said it could not conclusively determine what Tehran is building in the area, and that it was still even possible that the new structures are not connected to the nuclear program.
Nevertheless, Albright also wrote: “It is deeply concerning that construction is occurring at a former AMAD plan nuclear weapons site, raising considerable questions as to the true purpose of the facilities there.”
He warned that the West, Israel, or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should make efforts to discern if these are attempts by Iran to “reconstitute either the nuclear weapons related high explosive test chamber facilities that were originally part of the AMAD program, or the more recently reported PETN plastic explosive manufacturing capability that would have been a key part of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts.”
Furthermore, the institute said if the new facilities are covered up with earth to bunker them, they might be much more difficult to destroy by Israeli airstrikes.
While nothing in Albright’s report is conclusive, in the worst-case scenario, what has happened is that Tehran learned from the October 2024 Israeli attacks what the IAF’s capabilities are for destroying its facilities and also likely some of the limits for strikes from the air.
In that sense, the construction developments in May and June were likely Iranian advances to insulate the newly rebuilt nuclear site from Israeli airstrikes.
If the June strikes had led Tehran to doubt the viability of its rebuilding project at this prior nuclear site, it probably would have halted construction and pivoted to construction at a different site.
That it continued and even expanded construction at the site – not only after the October 2024 strikes, but also after the June strikes – suggests that the ayatollahs believe they have found a new formula to insulate from future Israeli attacks some facilities that are being built anew.
Many of the descriptions in the report suggest that Iran is using a strategy of moving more of its nuclear facilities underground, together with various other measures, to limit the effectiveness of future potential IAF airstrikes.
Although both the October 2024 and June airstrikes against Iran were extremely successful, the open-source record is clear that the IAF had to strike certain nuclear sites several times.
Sometimes this may have been to destroy different facilities spread out within the same nuclear site that had not been previously targeted.
But some of the cases were definitely because an earlier strike had failed to sufficiently harm the nuclear facility in question.
Likewise, we know that Israel in June requested and received help from the US to strike the completely deep underground Fordow nuclear facility and also the portions of the Isfahan nuclear facility that were underground.
Israel’s requests to the US for help to strike multiple nuclear facilities make it even clearer that some of Iran’s tactics to insulate its nuclear facilities – by building them underground or with mitigating measures to reduce the blast and shock waves from airstrikes – are working.
They also leave Israel with some limited options when: Iran has banned virtually all IAEA inspections, the 2015 nuclear deal has been vitiated by all parties, and no nuclear negotiations are taking place between Iran and the West.
Global sanctions
The most powerful diplomatic and economic weapon against Iran, the “snapback” of global sanctions, was activated by the UK, France, and Germany (the E3) almost a month ago, and yet there is no sense that Tehran is any closer to returning to talks.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sounded as deep in denial as ever this week about the impact of the June airstrikes by Israel when he said the Trump administration was “dreaming” that it had destroyed Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei was right that US President Donald Trump’s comment about obliterating the whole program was an exaggeration, but to act as if the program did not receive a body blow, which has delayed any chance at building a nuclear program for at least two years, signals that Iran’s leader is himself dreaming.
To be clear, the concerns about a reconstituted Iranian nuclear program are not short- or medium-term worries.
In four months since the June strikes, Iran has failed to show a single sign of its nuclear program continuing to have a substantial heartbeat, including not showing a single functioning centrifuge to enrich uranium from a prewar uranium centrifuge fleet of around 20,000.
The concerns are about Iran reconstituting its nuclear threat over the long term, i.e., beyond two years.
If it uses disciplined patience to move all or virtually all of its nuclear facilities deeper underground and weaves in new defenses to mitigate the impact of airstrikes, will Israel be in a position that it would need US help to strike any Iranian nuclear facility, and not just the two hardest targets at Fordow and Isfahan?
And what if Iran hits a critical point in its nuclear program at some later date in the Trump administration, i.e., when Trump is no longer willing to use American military power as much? Or if Khamenei waits for the next US president, who may be much more hesitant to order high-stakes American airstrikes with mega-bunker buster bombs?
Iran’s secret AMAD nuclear-weapons program was discovered by the Mossad, and the full map of Iran’s nuclear sites used for airstrikes last October and this June was found by the Israeli spy agency during a raid of Tehran’s nuclear archives in 2018.
If Iran keeps the IAEA out of the country and rejects diplomacy even as it faces global sanctions, then the Mossad’s future efforts to keep surveillance of Tehran’s nuclear facilities and, if necessary, act against them will become more crucial than ever.