Israel beats enemies on multiple fronts but risks diplomatic setbacks - analysis

Everything has changed for Israel – particularly with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria.

Nowadays, Israel has a plethora of security zones and is unafraid to bludgeon its enemies if necessary, including Iran. On the flip side, Israel is not using diplomacy or compromises to achieve its strategic goals, leading to record lows in its diplomatic strength. Because diplomatic strength eventually impacts military strength – particularly when it comes to the US – this is not a secondary issue.

Let's start with Iran.

Most people forget that Israel and Iran have not fought twice in the last few years. By now, the two countries have clashed five times.

The fighting started in April 2024 and worsened in October 2024. Then, its scope expanded in June 2025 and February 2026, with a smaller, but not insignificant round (around 25 Iranian ballistic missiles and dozens of IDF airstrikes) occurring this week.

In this new Middle East, the constant rounds of clashes are not between Israel and Hamas, but Israel and Iran.

For Israel, there are pros and cons to this new “arrangement.”

One of the worst parts of this arrangement is dealing with Iran’s ballistic missiles, which are far more dangerous than Hamas’s low-class rockets.

But there is a silver lining here: now, when Israel fights, it can directly damage – and address – the head of the snake.

While Israel battled Hamas in Gaza, round after round, year after year, Iran did not care that Hamas was losing more fighters than Israel. After all, the Islamic Republic was happily drinking Kool-Aid from the sidelines, 1,500 kilometers away from any and all danger.

Now, Israel has shown it is ready, willing, and able to hold Iran accountable. And that, when it does so, the Jewish state will come out ahead.

Until this point, Iran was under the misconception that Israel was afraid to strike its nuclear or ballistic missile programs. But Iran now knows that, regardless of any deals with the Trump administration, it is a question of when, not if, Israel will respond if it crosses the line.

This may be terrifying for Israel’s citizens for short bursts of time, but Israel is militarily safer against Iran now that it has rewritten the rules.

Every month that goes by without rebuilding in Gaza doesn’t just hurt Hamas – it also hurts Israel.

Israel needs Hamas to disarm – at least in part – to move rebuilding past a certain point. This will also allow for partial reductions of Israel’s security zone in Gaza (say, for example, from 50-70% to 30%).

However, Israel wants Hamas’s complete disarmament before reconstruction efforts start, even in areas under Israeli control. This serves to harm long-term Israeli interests in the US, in Europe, and with Israel’s Arab allies. And that is only counting Israel’s allies; Israel’s enemies are another story. The current situation is providing Israel’s enemies with the ammunition they seek for aggressive disinformation campaigns.

If, after October 7, 2023, Israel needed to topple Hamas’s military threat and ensure that the terror group couldn’t rearm in the near future, it has accomplished that by now. But that came at the steep price of Israel’s legitimacy, which has lessened far more than was necessary.

While some Israeli officials want to keep the focus solely on Iran, ignoring Gaza costs Israel more than most are willing to admit.

The terror group went from threatening the whole country by way of 150,000 rockets and missiles to being confined to Israel’s North. It can threaten the nearby northern areas, but not much farther than that.

And, whenever Hezbollah provokes Israel, the Israeli air force can exact revenge without worrying about setting off Judgment Day. Hezbollah, as it exists now, no longer presents the apocalyptic threat it once did.

Whether Israel can get Hezbollah to partially disarm in exchange for withdrawal – or partial withdrawal – from southern Lebanon remains an open question. But, like with Gaza, the IDF is likely to hold a security zone in Lebanon for the foreseeable future, as it cannot fully disarm Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, Israel has had a tentative calm with Syria for over 18 months.

Syrian ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa has an Al-Qaeda background and may be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Currently, however, it is unclear what Israel stands to lose if it partly reduced its Syrian buffer zone in exchange for Syria demilitarizing in areas near Israel.

As long as Israel keeps a partial zone, jihadists shouldn’t be able to overrun Israeli villages as had occurred on October 7. If al-Sharaa has opted against fighting Israel because of too many internal problems in Syria, then there may be grounds for some sort of deal.

In relative terms, Israel has beaten its enemies on every front. Unfortunately, the Jewish state has failed to secure long-term diplomatic results that would allow it to switch from constant fighting to only partial fighting.

No one in Israel is talking about going back to the country’s timid pre-October 7 position. But if Israel does not remember its diplomacy before it is too late, then it will eventually pay the price for ignoring this critical arena.