A real Hamas disarmament plan is here.
How to disarm Hamas has been the central question that has dominated Israel's security scene and the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, possibly for decades to come, since October 7, 2023.
On Thursday, US President Donald Trump and his top aide on many of these issues, Jared Kushner, rolled out specific plans on a variety of issues relating to Gaza's "the Day After."
Here are the positives upfront.
Hamas gives away all of its heavy weapons, like rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and weaponized drones, which means it should no longer have the capacity to threaten Israel within the Green Line on a dime.
The Gaza terrorists will also need to give up all or large portions of their Gaza tunnel network, which could save the IDF huge amounts of time and resources, and maybe also reveal some spots which the military might have missed on its own.
Would NCAG weaken Hamas?
Some kind of new Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) police force would be formed, which would at least partially displace Hamas's ability to dominate the streets of the Strip at all times.
Maybe, this whole process might weaken Hamas enough that at some point it will get overpowered by the NCAG and other (hopefully) more moderate Palestinian and Arab forces.
But there are some gaping potential holes and questions that could tear the whole plan down in flames if not properly addressed.
A key aspect of the plan is that Hamas terrorists (suddenly valid fighters?) can keep their personal weapons, whether machine guns or handguns.
All they need to do to keep them is to register their weapons.
Who will ensure that all weapons are registered? For example, will the IDF and the Shin Bet be allowed to do surveillance in Gaza as they do in Lebanon to catch when Hezbollah and the Lebanese army lie and manipulate the disarmament process?
Another key aspect is that all Hamas members can be given amnesty, safe passage out of Gaza, or even integration into the new NCAG police.
Will all Hamas officers over a company commander rank and fighters who have actually been involved in attacks on Israelis get blacklisted from the new NCAG police, so that "integration" will be limited to newer Hamas recruits who have not committed acts of terror?
Or will Hamas members with blood on their hands get a second chance like Israel gave PLO terrorists during Oslo?
Does the US, Israel, or some third party decide if there is a dispute about whether a Hamas member can be trusted to become part of the NCAG?
When, inevitably, one or more members of the NCAG are revealed as being terrorists or spies, who will handle the issue?
If these details are handled well, the above recipe has a chance, even if it is a long shot, to, over time, lead to further reducing the threat of Hamas to Israel in a truly serious and lasting way?
If these details are handled poorly, even if the structure is built and lasts for months or some years, the whole thing could collapse in days, as the US's propped-up Afghanistan government and military fell to the Taliban practically overnight once the writing was on the wall.
And the truth is, even getting that far into analyzing the deal is optimistic.
Based on the Middle East's history and other similar regions, like Afghanistan, at some point, whoever has the most guns and fighters willing to die will outlast everyone else, and it is hard to see how this will not be Hamas unless the Palestinian people themselves undergo some new process of change to be able to resist them.
In an even worse scenario, 20% of what is being proposed will come to pass, but the rest will get stuck at an intermediate point when disputes break out in the field over unexpected or deliberately provoked incidents.
There will also be all kinds of questions about when the IDF will need to make partial withdrawals in relation to when Hamas makes partial disarmament moves.
But proposing the first real Hamas disarmament plan means the great game has begun for Israel, Hamas, the US, Qatar, Turkey, and others to try to reframe the future of the conflict and the region.