Looking at militia, terror groups from other places can show how Hamas can be disarmed - analysis

Looking at some recent disarmaments and considering what worked and what failed to bring peace can help better prepare for the successful demilitarization of Gaza. Learning about history can be instructive for what may happen in Gaza.

After the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Hezbollah essentially replaced the ineffective Lebanese government in parts of the country, controlling education, healthcare, media, and more. Its terrorists were seen as stronger than the government’s Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), meaning that there was no real way to counter its influence from within the country, despite the 2004 and 2006 UNSC Resolutions requiring the disarmament of non-state militias in Lebanon.

By the end of November 2024, a US-and France-brokered ceasefire was agreed upon, with the terms including Hezbollah’s disarmament. The Lebanese government, looking to regain power, accepted the deal and responsibility for disarming the Shi’ite terror group that had controlled the country for decades.

Since then, the LAF has begun tentative steps aimed at laying the groundwork for the process of disarmament, with little apparent resistance from Hezbollah. Still, the group has explicitly rejected disarmament, vowing to keep its weapons and presence in Lebanon. Its strong support from Lebanon’s Shi’ite population will make it difficult for the Lebanese government to fully remove Hezbollah.

An example that is often on the international community’s minds when thinking about the Israel-Gaza war is Northern Ireland. Whilst not the same situation, the successful disarmament of the IRA and other nationalist forces can perhaps provide helpful insight into the future disarmament of Hamas and what has worked before.

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was an agreement between the British and Irish, endorsed by most of Northern Ireland, which recognised the legitimacy of both views as to what should happen to Northern Ireland. It accepted nationalism (the belief that Northern Ireland should be part of the Republic of Ireland) and unionism (the belief that Northern Ireland should be part of the UK).

Facilitated by an independent commission set up solely for this purpose, the IRA decommissioned its arms and by September 2005 had completed the destruction of its arsenal. In 2009, the other nationalist forces finished disarmament too.

In 2023, the UK government passed the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act, which exempts conduct related to the Troubles from prosecution and set up the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery.

Although there is still cultural conflict over Northern Ireland, the violence and bloodshed of the troubles have not returned, all terror organisations have disarmed, and there has been official reconciliation with Britain.

In 2015, the disarmament of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) began in the Philippines. MILF is an Islamic armed group that split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which sought an autonomous region of the Moro people in Mindanao separate from the central government.

Operating from 1977-2014, the MILF committed attacks and assassinations, declaring a jihad against the government, its citizens, and any supporters. Although they were not officially affiliated with al-Qaeda, Libyan military officer Muammar Gaddafi was a big supporter of the MILF and their cause.

Whilst the MNLF accepted deals for semi-autonomy in 1987, the MILF refused, continuing their insurgency operations. A ceasefire was put into action between the Government in Manila and the MILF from 1997, which was abolished by the Philippine Army in 2000. In 2005, amid renewed peace negotiations, the MILF attacked government troops, quashing ceasefire talks.

In 2011, the MILF withdrew demands for complete independence in favour of pursuing a substate within the Philippines. In 2014, the MILF and the government signed a peace agreement aiming to set up a Muslim autonomous entity (Bangsamoro) by 2016 in return for the deactivation of the MILF forces.

The MILF was to turn over its firearms to a third party chosen together with the Government. In 2015, they began the process of disarmament. In 2021, 12,000 combatants were decommissioned; however, as of 2023, they were still not fully disarmed.

The MILF is still in control of most of Mindanao and is still operative within Bangsamoro. However, they are at peace with the government of the Philippines. There has only been a somewhat successful disarmament and peace effort.

Another example of a successful disarmament in recent history is the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia. GAM wanted independence for the Aceh region, fighting against the Indonesian government from 1976-2005.

In the 2000’s GAM was hit hard by a government crackdown and a natural disaster. After a tsunami hit Aceh, they were weakened and forced to negotiate with the government. GAM agreed to disband in return for Aceh representation and economic benefits for the region, including getting to keep 70 percent of the income from local produce.

The peace agreement was officially signed in 2005 and stated that GAM would disarm, the government would withdraw non-local military and police, and an independent commission would oversee disarmament and reintegration of GAM members into society.

The disarmament was successfully facilitated by the independent commission, and there has been peace and reconciliation between GAM members, the people of Aceh, and the Indonesian government.

In both Northern Ireland and Indonesia, the disarmament was only possible through an independent body set up entirely to facilitate the decommissioning.

In contrast, in Lebanon and the Philippines, the attempted disarmament failed in part because there wasn’t an independent body overseeing it. Despite blanket statements requiring them to disarm, no party was set up to successfully enforce this, allowing Hezbollah and the MILF to maintain and even grow their militias.

It’s important that the demilitarization is enforced, not just demanded. In historically successful disarmaments, independent bodies facilitated the decommissioning - in the ones that failed, independent bodies weren’t set up. Point 13 of Trump’s plan for Gaza’s disarmament mentions an independent monitor supervising the demilitarization, but does not expand upon who that will be or what it might look like.

The other key step Northern Ireland and Indonesia have in common is reconciliation and reintegration. The GFA, much like Trump’s 20-point plan, included a prisoner release program for members of the IRA. Since the Legacy Act of 2023, anyone involved in the Troubles has been given amnesty, and in Indonesia, members of GAM were pardoned, allowed back from exile, and reintegrated into society.

Point 13 of Trump’s plan discusses the reintegration of cooperative members of Hamas and other factions into the new Gazan society, but importantly keeps them out of governance, unlike in Indonesia or Northern Ireland. Points 13 and 16 also emphasise an effort for peaceful coexistence between the new Gaza and Israel, an important step towards the possibility of reconciliation.

Lebanon and the Philippines show attempts to disarm a group entrenched in the infrastructure and running of a region. The limited successes thus far at fully disarming militant groups are arguably more helpful to understanding how to disarm Hamas than Northern Ireland or Indonesia, as it includes the struggle to move past the militias they control when they play such a huge role in the society.