Whether Israelis go to the polls in September or October, one thing already seems clear: barring dramatic and unforeseen developments, the autumn of 2026 will bring one of the most consequential elections in recent Israeli history. The vote will determine not only who governs, but also whether Israel continues along its current political trajectory or undergoes a deep transformation in both leadership and national priorities.
The existential questions that once defined Israeli elections have not disappeared, but their relative weight has shifted. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for decades the fault line separating Left and Right, no longer occupies the same central place in political discourse.
Instead, the country’s deepest divisions today are increasingly internal – centered on the nature of Israeli democracy, the legitimacy of governing coalitions, and competing visions of the state itself.
Taking responsibility
Four major issues are expected to dominate the coming campaign.
The first – though somewhat less explosive than in the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023 – is the question of responsibility for the Hamas terrorist attack and for the war that followed.
Supporters of the current government, especially voters likely to back the coalition parties again, argue that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership prevented a far greater national tragedy. In their telling, the roots of the failure lie primarily within the security establishment, whose commanders-in-chief failed to inform the prime minister in time, and in the policies of the previous short-lived Bennett-Lapid government, whose leaders now present themselves as Netanyahu’s alternative.
Opposition voters see the matter very differently. For them, Netanyahu’s refusal to accept responsibility – and his resistance to establishing a state commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7 – has become a defining symbol of political and even more so, moral evasion.
Added to this are growing disputes over the 2026 Operation Roaring Lion, against Iran. Critics argue that the operation was designed, at least in part, to generate strategic achievements that might eclipse the memory of October 7, though so far it appears not to have fully achieved that political effect.
Positions of influence
The second issue is closely tied to the first: the battle over who – and what – should be removed from positions of influence.
Among supporters of the governing coalition, there is a deeply rooted belief that despite repeated electoral victories by the Right, Israel’s “deep state” agents continue to dominate key institutions: the judiciary, academia, the media, the economy, and even parts of the security establishment. In this view, political change at the ballot box has yet to translate into a genuine transfer of power.
For supporters of the opposition, however, the goal is almost the reverse. They hope that an electoral victory would allow a new government to reverse what they see as years of democratic erosion under Netanyahu and his allies – dismantling illiberal political norms and replacing officials appointed by the current government, whom they accuse of undermining Israel’s liberal democratic foundations.
Arab Israeli participation
The third issue concerns the status of Arab citizens of Israel and the legitimacy of Arab participation in government coalitions.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared that “a government with Mansour Abbas is worse than the October 7 massacre.” Though perhaps hyperbolically, this general sentiment against Arab participation is shared by much of the Right.
Since October 7, large segments of the Jewish public have become even more skeptical of Arab participation in governing coalitions. Yet the political arithmetic remains stubborn: without at least one Arab party, the anti-Netanyahu “change bloc” may fail to assemble a parliamentary majority.
Indeed, leaders of the Left remain clear advocates of Arab political inclusion. However, centrists and moderate right-wing figures aligned with the present opposition tend to hedge their positions, aware of both the numerical necessity and the potential electoral backlash.
On the Right, by contrast, opposition to Arab participation in government has become close to a consensus.
Within Arab society itself, another strategic question remains unresolved: whether the Arab parties will reunite under a joint list. Such a move could increase turnout and reduce wasted votes (that could result from smaller Arab parties failing to pass the electoral threshold), but it might also complicate future coalition negotiations with Zionist parties.
Ultra-Orthodox debate
The fourth major issue likely to shape the election discourse is the role of the ultra-Orthodox sector in Israel’s future. The current coalition dramatically increased the political leverage of the haredi parties, largely because Netanyahu’s government depended on them for survival. Ultimately, it was the ultra-Orthodox parties that helped trigger the dissolution of the Knesset after failing to secure legislation exempting yeshiva students from military service.
Here, however, the political lines are more blurred. Opposition to broad draft exemptions for yeshiva students extends well beyond the anti-Netanyahu camp. Many right-wing voters also oppose permanent exemptions and resent growing ultra-Orthodox demands to reshape the public sphere – from the removal of women’s images from billboards to gender segregation at public events. Still, coalition mathematics may ultimately override ideology.
Even if a “change government” emerges after the election, it may find itself compelled – whether pragmatically or strategically – to include at least one ultra-Orthodox party.
Election over Israel’s soul
Ultimately, the upcoming election is shaping up to be a struggle over Israel’s soul. Beyond the immediate security concerns, the campaign will be a referendum on the future of democratic institutions, the balance between religion and state, and the possibility of restoring a liberal civic consensus in an era of unprecedented polarization.
The side that more effectively utilizes its narrative on these issues is more likely to see a higher turnout of its voters and ultimately a victory on Election Day.■
The writers are public opinion experts at the Israel Democracy Institute’s Viterbi Family Center of Public Opinion and Policy Research. Prof. Tamar Hermann is the academic director, and Dr. Lior Yohanani is the quantitative research manager.