Today, about 10 million people live in Israel. In 1991, there were six million. Bless God, the country has grown quickly and is developing. But that is not the point. The point is that four million Israelis do not know that the efficient Home Front Command system has existed for only 30-something years; and, above all, they do not know that the credit for it should go to the late Moshe Arens, who served as defense minister three times.
First, full disclosure: I had the privilege of working alongside Arens during his postings in the Israeli embassy in Washington, at the Defense Ministry, and in my capacity as the IDF spokesperson during the Gulf War in 1991.
Pillar of defense
But this is not a personal matter; this is about Arens, who deserves credit for identifying that one of Israel’s key vulnerabilities is defending its home front. His decision to establish the Home Front Command fundamentally changed Israel’s security concept, which until the Gulf War had rested on three pillars: warning, deterrence, and decisive victory.
For the first time since founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion set out the country’s security doctrine in 1948, Arens dared to add the fourth pillar: defense.
Moreover, in the 35 years that have passed since the Gulf War, Israel has still not been open to examining its basic security doctrine, even though several serious studies have been conducted on the subject.
The story of Arens and Israel’s security is a typical Israeli one. Arens was not born in the country; he made aliyah from the United States after moving there from Lithuania as a teenager. In Israel, he advanced as an aeronautical engineer and spent several years at Israel Aerospace Industries as head of the Engineering Division.
He later entered politics as a longtime, committed Betar member. He was elected to the Knesset, and he was appointed chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Likud government under then-prime minister Menachem Begin.
From there, he was sent to the Israeli embassy in Washington. In 1981, he was urgently brought back from Washington to replace Ariel Sharon as defense minister. That was his first term, followed by two more.
All of this introduction is meant to show that he was not “one of our own” nor part of the “in group.” Israelis in the realm of defense were typically native-born Israelis (Sabras) – kibbutz members, Labor movement figures, and so on.
Enormous contributions
Arens was different, and perhaps for that reason he dared to make certain decisions. Establishing the Home Front Command was his second such decision. During his first term as defense minister, he concluded that the army lacked decent headquarters for its field forces. He took advantage of the appointments of two chiefs of staff – Moshe Levi and Ehud Barak – to promote significant structural changes within the IDF.
The doubts in the IDF about the man who spoke with a slight American accent and refused to “backslap” political activists have changed over the years. In hindsight, people now understand his enormous contribution to Israel’s security.
Arens was involved professionally – and personally – in the IDF’s growth and production. He made a decisive contribution to Israel’s defense industries by insisting that Israel could produce any weapons system. The Lavi aircraft, which he championed, was ultimately halted by the government, but its very development and all that flowed from it became one of the engines that shaped Israel’s defense industries and helped lead them to today’s remarkable achievements.
On the home front
But let’s return to the home front. In 1991, there were two players on the home front – Haga (Civil Defense) and Hagmar (Regional Defense). Both were at the bottom of the IDF’s priority list. In internal discussions, it was determined that it was preferable to invest in offensive systems, mainly in the air, based on the belief that we would succeed in moving any war onto the enemy’s territory and, of course, win.
The 1991 Gulf War was the first in which the Israeli home front was penetrated massively. Compared to today – 17 attacks and 37 missiles – it was hardly significant, but the threat of non-conventional weapons being fired into the country created psychological pressure on both the Israeli leadership and the public.
The road to the Gulf War was strewn with fundamental decisions, such as the distribution of gas masks, and with deliberations about how the civilian population should be managed.
Arens guided and led from afar, in his way, and never sought the main stage. When the war broke out, he and the chief of staff, Dan Shomron, tasked the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit – and me – with providing crucial information to the public.
This was a bold decision because the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit had never dealt with this before; but in retrospect, the public’s response and willingness to follow the spokesperson’s instructions were among the key tools that enabled Israel to withstand the missile attacks, refrain from responding – both for political and military reasons – and emerge from the war while receiving compensation from the United States, Germany, and other countries. The objective was achieved: The regime in Iraq fell, Iraq was defeated, and the Middle East continued on its course.
Security to millions
Based on this success, Arens instructed the IDF to establish the Home Front Command, assigning the task to one of the IDF’s best and smartest officers, Maj.-Gen. Ze’ev Livneh.
The command was gradually built into a professional, skilled, and sophisticated system, which today guides Israelis through the distress and pressure of missile attacks.
Over time, Israel came to understand that without a resilient home front that provides security to millions of Israelis, Israel will not be able to operate on the frontlines, to block and strike its enemies.
It became clear that civilian resilience is a key to victory in war – the exact opposite of what had been assumed for years.
Incidentally, senior officers who in the past shied away from serving in the Home Front Command – once a less attractive arena – are now competing for this role.
A second layer of the home front defense, one in which Arens also played a part, is active defense or the development of air-defense systems, including missiles and rockets.
It is hard to believe that in 1991, Israel had only outdated Hawk missiles it had received from the United States in the 1960s. Israel had decided to purchase Patriot missiles, but they were not yet in its possession, and it was forced to rely on American Patriot batteries that arrived from Germany in the midst of the war itself.
Everything that happened afterward – from the Iron Dome through to David’s Sling and the Arrow systems – stems from that same new understanding: that the home front and its defense are vital to Israel’s security.
And now the new laser system – previously discussed at length and even shelved – has been added, joining the other components of home front protection.
So what is the lesson? That we must think outside the box; that it is possible to challenge outdated and conservative concepts; and that leadership requires courage and determination. That is always important.
Thank you, Moshe Arens.■
Nachman Shai is the dean of the Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem, and member of the board of directors of the Israel Security Division. He also is a member of the board for Commanders for Israel’s Security. In the past, he was the Diaspora affairs minister and the IDF spokesperson.