There have been three acts so far in the relations between IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir on one side, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz on the other side.
Only on Saturday night did it become fully clear that Netanyahu has turned on Zamir as much as Katz and is fully backing the defense minister to alter the army’s future identity.
In Act One, Zamir was Netanyahu-Katz’s beloved savior of the military from his predecessor, Herzi Halevi, whom the two had soured on and wanted to force out.
Zamir was presented as the anti-Halevi IDF chief.
If Halevi was a philosophically sounding, somewhat long-winded general who could be held partially responsible for the October 7 disaster, Zamir spoke in crisp, more-macho sound bites and was not in the military during the invasion.
Also, Halevi had fought with Netanyahu over ending the war sooner to get the hostages back, even if it meant spending less time fighting Hamas, whereas Zamir was enthusiastic about another invasion into Gaza, which he initiated shortly after taking office in March.
Whereas Halevi had generally opposed any trends of reservists refusing to serve to protest policies of Netanyahu they disagreed with, but had also, in practice, been very patient with such reservists, Zamir, at least initially, had a zero-tolerance policy for such reservists.
Maybe most importantly, Zamir was the IDF chief in office in June when Israel finally bombed Iran’s nuclear program back two years, as well as hammered its ballistic missile program and its top military and intelligence commanders.
Halevi actually ordered and managed the crucial October 2024 attack on Iran, which eliminated all of its best Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft radar systems, which paved the way for June’s larger attack, but few remember such details.
Finally, Zamir ensured certain less-favored IDF General Staff officers were retired or pressured into retirement, and promoted certain officers more favored by Katz and Netanyahu into the general staff.
Netanyahu, Katz, Zamir's relationship begins to sour
Act Two saw a shift.
Essentially, Zamir believed he had already given whatever presents and flexibility he might owe to Katz and Netanyahu at the start of his term, and started to exercise more independence.
During this second act, Zamir also contradicted Netanyahu on some policy issues.
If he had been pro-broadening the Gaza invasion from March until July, including conquering 7% of Gaza to pressure Hamas for better terms in a hostage deal, by the end of July, he was already dead set against any further Gaza invasions, fearing that this would jeopardize the lives of the hostages.
Moreover, if Zamir had always been clear that he wanted more haredim (ultra-Orthodox) to serve in the IDF, he had made fewer public noises about it during his early months in office, and, as time drew on, he got louder, angering Katz and Netanyahu.
This new act presented itself with a first round of appointments that Zamir wanted to make, which Katz interfered with, and the sides negotiated through certain additional appointment concessions to Katz.
Katz’s intervention was also interpreted by many as a reminder from Netanyahu that the political echelon could make the IDF chief’s life difficult if he crossed them too much on public policy issues, even if he was more popular than Halevi.
But then it seemed for some months that the parties had found common ground.
Another invasion of Gaza started in September, but Zamir succeeded in limiting that invasion in ways that he thought would reduce the danger to the hostages.
When US President Donald Trump intervened and ended the war, the main difference between Netanyahu-Katz and Zamir was removed, as all parties wanted to be equally aggressive against Hezbollah, hostile Syrian elements, and Iran.
But Act Three has now shown that Katz, who it is also now clear is once again just a proxy for Netanyahu, has a broader agenda to remake the military.
Just as Netanyahu has installed outsiders to run the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), David Zini, and the Mossad, Roman Gofman (though he will only enter office in June), he and Katz have been campaigning to install a series of complete outsiders (such as former senior police commander Yoram Halevi) and partial outsiders (such as Katz’s military-secretary Brig.-Gen. Guy Markizano) in critical IDF positions.
They also seem intent on continuing to shoot down the careers of additional IDF officers for their performance on October 7, though most or all of the central IDF commanders relating to the failure quit or were forced out already in 2024 or the start of 2025.
On November 24, Katz initiated a new probe of his own of two previous rounds of IDF probes into October 7, to be led by Defense Ministry Comptroller Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yair Volansky.
On November 25, Netanyahu summoned Katz and Zamir for meetings, seemingly to try to get the two sides to work together more harmoniously and broker a compromise about the appointments disagreements, which overlapped with the October 7 issues, which Zamir believed he had closed when he issued penalties on November 23 against many former IDF General Staff officials.
However, after Katz this past Saturday night refused to allow Zamir’s appointments through and said he is continuing his Volansky-led probe into October 7, it has now become clear that Act Three is part of a sustained campaign by Netanyahu to change the future identity of the military, with Katz merely playing the role of his front man.
All military appointments, including the long-frozen posts of air force and navy chiefs, will remain frozen until at least December 24, 30 days after Katz announced his probe.
Top IDF sources have told The Jerusalem Post that this will lead to the retirement of many senior officers who have had it with months of multiple rounds of freezes and are concerned about the army's future professional independence.
Maybe, a compromise will be reached between Netanyahu-Katz-Zamir at the end of December, but the IDF chief has sent out signals that he believes he has already compromised too far, and that certain professional prerogatives regarding managing the military must be left to him once the political echelon passes the reins onto him.
In any event, the fight between the sides is very clearly no longer some sort of narrow technical disagreement about one role or another, but part of a more fundamental battle about how much or little the political echelon can dictate the identity of the IDF General Staff.