Massive security faults and serious lapses in the design, construction, and operational readiness of the barrier along the Gaza border that Hamas breached during the October 7 massacre were revealed by N12 on Saturday.
The report highlighted a series of systemic issues, including unfulfilled technological promises, misallocated resources, ignored warnings, and gaps in strategic planning that ultimately left southern communities unprotected.
Launched in 2021, the barrier was introduced as a groundbreaking defense project. It was intended to utilize autonomous systems, robotics, and advanced surveillance to stop infiltration from Gaza.
“The upper fence is very significant,” said Brig.-Gen. Eran Ophir, head of the Border and Seam Administration at the Defense Ministry, and project lead. “It is prepared for the threats from Gaza. It’s massive, it’s strong, and it will respond to all the threats in this area. This is an above-ground obstacle that prevents overground infiltration.”
However, according to multiple project officials interviewed by N12, the advanced capabilities described in public statements were not fully realized. One senior official involved in the project stated, “Where are all the technologies that were promised? They sold dreams to the residents. The border wasn’t smart or lethal.”
Another officer added, “There were two robots patrolling the barrier whenever journalists came. Other than that, they did nothing. The defense establishment knew the ‘smart barrier’ was a fiction.”
The barrier project started after the 2014 Gaza conflict revealed extensive tunnel networks into Israeli territory. Of the estimated NIS 5 billion budget, the vast majority was used for underground defenses, while only NIS 122 million was invested in the above-ground fence, which was eventually breached.
According to former intelligence officer Dr. Ofer Guterman, “We invested billions in a project intended to cut off tunnels and prevent infiltration through them. What we missed was the capability to carry out a wide ground incursion.”
Dr. Yuval Steinitz, then a cabinet member, also warned of broader threats. “I always said the main danger was not a squad or even 20 squads coming through tunnels, but a mass attack of thousands of fighters crossing the fence and entering Sderot, kibbutzim, and bases.”
Despite this, the above-ground barrier was not upgraded to counter such scenarios. “They prepared for the previous war,” one senior Southern Command officer said, referring to the focus on tunnel threats from 2014.
Early Warnings Overlooked
Military intelligence reportedly received Hamas’s detailed invasion plan in 2018. The plan, known four years later as “Jericho Wall,” outlined how thousands of elite Nukhba fighters would cross the border overground, not via tunnels.
Dr. Danny Tirza, a defense barrier planning expert, told N12, “We received these threats, the invasion threats, and didn’t respond to them with the fence we built.”
Another senior officer said, “They told residents the above-ground fence would prevent infiltration, but it wasn’t even built for that. It was only meant to delay attackers by 15 minutes. It didn’t respond to explosives, not even to a tractor.”
Langotsky, a former tunnel warfare advisor, added, “I said, ‘Friends, this is an illusion.’ Not that it doesn’t help at all, but the illusion is that this is a hermetic seal. There’s no such thing. Heaven forbid, look what can happen.”
Hamas Conducted Field Tests Weeks Before Attack
According to the report, Hamas carried out several test operations on the fence weeks before October 7, using motorcycles, small bridges, and explosives. One key test, conducted one week prior, involved blowing up a structural beam critical to the fence’s integrity. It succeeded. The report states this activity did not trigger an IDF response.
Langotsky also said he proposed conducting IDF simulations on how the wall could be breached, but was unaware if any were actually carried out. “I suggested doing an exercise on how to breach the wall. Let’s bring someone to dedicate thought to play the role of Hamas. That way, we’d understand the deficiencies. I don’t think that was done.”
Efforts by Gaza Division commanders to improve the defensive response were reportedly unsuccessful. Proposals to upgrade weapon systems, such as replacing outdated machine guns with more effective naval-style cannons or implementing a new project called “Green Axe,” were rejected due to budget concerns.
Commanders also reported a lack of readiness in armored forces. Only 14 tanks were staffed on the morning of the attack, and some were not functional due to restrictions aimed at conserving operating costs.
Yehuda Cohen, father of hostage survivor Nimrod Cohen, described the situation, “They’re there, near the border. And the tank arrives on a carrier to save engine hours. The crew can’t function in an operational situation because the equipment given to them by the army wasn’t working. They tried to save a few pennies.”
An additional directive reportedly issued five months prior to the attack called for a significant reduction in kilometers traveled by tanks and APCs, including in the Gaza Division. Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld allegedly exceeded the quota and was reprimanded.
Command disputes and promotions
N12 reported internal disagreements between then-IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi and Southern Command head Herzi Halevi regarding where to deploy new detection systems. While Halevi requested they be installed along the Gaza border, Kochavi ordered deployment in the north.
N12 also highlighted the recent promotion of Brig.-Gen. Eran Ophir to the rank of major general. Former officers questioned the decision, given his role in overseeing the barrier’s construction. One senior official said Ophir had asked Halevi for the promotion based on tenure, but was refused. Current Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir later approved it, with support from Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
Sabag, the IDF’s former Chief Engineering Officer who investigated the barrier's failure, concluded, “Like the Maginot Line and the Bar-Lev Line, when a long and expensive project is undertaken, it creates excessive confidence.”
The Ministry of Defense stated, “The barrier disrupted over 30 tunnels and stopped new ones from being built. The above-ground fence was constructed per operational requirements to stop infiltration, not a mass explosive breach. The barrier’s sensor systems provided early warning and real-time information. We fully support Maj.-Gen. Eran Ophir and the Border Administration, which built over 1,200 kilometers of barriers nationwide.”
From former Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi’s office, it said, “During Kochavi’s term, new methods were initiated to detect and destroy enemies. These took time and were not fully realized before his term ended. Traditional defenses were also reinforced. New techniques and operations improved intelligence in the area.”
The IDF Spokesperson said, “In-depth investigations were conducted regarding the Gaza border defense concept. Operational limitations and budget constraints affected armored unit deployments. The attempt to link current failures directly to Lt.-Gen. Zamir and the intelligence from seven years ago are manipulative and unprofessional. Maj.-Gen. Ophir’s promotion was backed by multiple past chiefs of staff and defense ministers.”